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Abstract
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF SEMANTIC EXTERNALISM
by
Consuelo Preti 
Adviser: Professor Jerry A. Fodor
Semantic externalism is the view that meaning and 
mental content are determined by relations to the world of 
objects and properties outside the physical boundaries of 
the subject of mental states. What you mean by your words - 
what you're thinking when you're thinking about something - 
is essentially constituted by the world at large. It has 
become customary to formulate externalism in terms of so- 
called twin earth cases - cases where (some kinds of) 
content do not supervene on inner states, but this 
formulation can be shown to be too limited to be of any 
great use in characterizing a theory of mind. A more general 
formulation of externalism is defended in chapter 1, one 
that characterizes all content.
That externalism has untoward consequences for belief- 
desire psychology is a familiar point, but, given the 
predominance of twin earth formulations, the problem of 
content's explanatory role is often construed as the problem 
of content's failing to supervene. In chapter 2 we argue 
that this is a mistake. Externalism in its most general
iv
formulation has consequences for all content in explanation, 
not just content that fails to supervene on inner states. If 
content is externalistically individuated, then content is 
redundant in causal explanation. In chapter 2 we examine the 
redundancy problem and consider the options for its 
solution.
Part one of chapter 3 concerns the further - unnoticed 
- consequence of externalism that requires a reconsideration 
of Davidson's charge that Fregean semantic theories fail the 
test of 'semantic innocence.' If meaning is partly 
determined by reference, then what an expression refers to 
in an opaque context, is, ultimately, its reference. Part 
two of chapter 3 concerns the consequences of externalism 
for analytic truth. If meaning is partly determined by 
reference, a question arises as to what becomes of the 
classical philosophical distinction between analytic and 
synthetic truth; between 'truth in virtue of meaning alone' 
and 'truth in virtue of meaning and the world.' Chapter 3 
concludes with an account of analytic truth from the 
perspective of semantic externalism.
v
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CHAPTER 1
EXTERNALISM: FORMULATING A THEORY OF MIND
If my darling were once to decide 
Not to stop at my eyes,
But to jump, like Alice, with floating skirt 
into my head,
She would find no tables and chairs,
No mahogany claw-footed sideboards,
No undisturbed embers . . .
Philip Larkin, "If My Darling"
1. Introduction 
In what follows, I will be formulating and defending a 
certain thesis about the individuation of mental states, one 
that claims that mental states are determined by relations 
between the subject of those states and the world beyond the 
subject.
The underlying substantive issue concerns the nature 
of mind. The traditional view, whose paradigm is the 
Cartesian model, claims that the existence and identity 
conditions of mental states are independent of the existence 
and identity conditions of the items that are the objects of 
those states; there is no necessary correspondence - let 
alone individuation relation - between states of affairs and 
mental states. In direct opposition to this is the view that 
claims that mental content is related to states of affairs
1
so thoroughly that, to put it vividly, a psychological 
subject should not be thought to instantiate certain states 
in the absence of the objects of those states.1 The mind is 
thus no longer to be thought of an autonomous, world- 
independent entity.
We can call these two general views about the nature 
of mind internalism and externalism, and understand them to 
conflict in the following way (McGinn, 1989, 9):
. . . mind and world are not, according 
to externalism, metaphysically 
independent categories, sliding smoothly 
past each other. To regard them so is to 
commit oneself to an 'untenable 
dualism,' to marking a metaphysical 
boundary that does not exist.
Internalism, for its part, insists upon 
such a duality, drawing a sharp line 
between mind and world. . . .
What we are concerned with in this chapter is a 
formulation of externalism that best captures the idea that 
there is a genuinely constitutive relation between the mind 
and the extra-mental world (suitably delineated), and just 
what kind of relation this might turn out to be.
Judging by the literature, at least two things might 
be meant by externalism2; and one formulation, we will 
argue, is too limited to adequately capture a robust notion 
of externalism. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to 
first, distinguishing two formulations of externalism; and 
second, to make good on the claim that only one of these 
formulations supports any general or widespread condition 
for content.
2
A brief introduction to the alternative formulations 
is in order. One employs the familiar device of twin earth 
(TE), and entails a failure of supervenience of mental 
states on inner states. This view takes content to be 
determined by a causal or contextual relation between the 
subject and the world outside his head, from which it 
follows that the mental states of two internally 
indistinguishable subjects fail to supervene on those 
internal states when the subjects inhabit different 
environments. The other formulation of externalism involves 
no entailment of non-supervenience; it is the view that only 
the co-presence in a world of a subject and the relevant 
worldly entity to which he is related is required in order 
to effect the individuation of his mental states.
This more general formulation of externalism is to be 
understood as a thesis concerning under what conditions 
someone may or may not possess a thought: it is generally 
understood to be the claim that it is a necessary condition 
on the possession of a thought that the subject be related 
to extra-cranial objects and properties - the worldly 
entities that are the reference of the expressions he 
employs.3 It follows from this, of course, that should the 
requisite objects and properties fail to exist, the thought 
in question is, in Noonan's terms (1991, 1) "not available 
to be thought." Note that the condition applies 
counterfactually as well: were the requisite objects or
3
properties to fail to coexist with an individual in a world, 
that individual would not possess the concepts held to be 
individuated by those entities.4
Now, as we will show, twin earth cases do not apply to 
all concepts, though of course they do apply to some; so 
formulations of externalism in terms of twin earth cases are 
too limited to be of any great use in formulating a general 
theory of mind. What will emerge is that there is more to 
the notion of externalism than is implied by cases where 
content fails to supervene.
Among the many details we will consider in subsequent 
sections is one so crucial it is best to mention it, even 
preliminarily, here. It will emerge that the distinction in 
formulations of externalism can be understood as turning on 
important distinctions concerning the notion of 
supervenience: in particular, concerning what is to be 
included or excluded in the supervenience base.5 First, 
however, some general remarks.
2. Meaning, Reference and Externalism
Formulations of externalism in terms of twin earth 
cases have occupied a prominent position in some of the 
literature; but there is, of course, no in principle reason 
to take these as definitive of externalism. We can begin 
with an examination of the intuitions behind the emergence 
of the notion of externalism in the literature, in order to
4
build up to the idea that formulations of externalism 
involving cases of failure of supervenience are too 
restrictive to adequately capture that notion.
Putnam (1975a, 215-271) was among the first6 to 
consider the challenge to traditional theories of mind now 
known as semantic externalism. Traditional theories are, 
according to Putnam, methodologically solipsist, a view he 
characterizes as follows:
. . . no mental state, properly so- 
called, presupposes the existence of any 
individual other than the subject to 
whom that state is ascribed.7
An externalist theory, by contrast, can be understood
as the denial of methodological solipsism. Burge (1982,
117;120) clarifies this, noting that:
In some instances, an individual's 
having certain de dicto attitudes 
entails the existence of entities other 
than himself and his attitude contents 
. . . [Putnam] also gives examples of 
psychological states in the 'wide 
sense', and characterizes these as 
entailing the existence of other 
entities besides the subject of the 
state.
So, as the remarks by Putnam and Burge above indicate, 
"widely" individuated mental states, to be "properly so- 
called," presuppose or entail the existence of some entity 
other than - independent of - the subject of the state.
A few preliminary remarks are in order. Ultimately, 
the issue in question centers on that of intentionality: 
what our thoughts are about, captured in what our words
5
refer to. An externalist, as opposed to an internalist, will 
hold that the content/meaning of a person's thoughts/words 
is (necessarily) individuated by items extrinsic to her 
spatial contours. But stated like this, the claim is very 
general; too general, it might be thought. It is consistent, 
after all, with the claim that states of affairs in a 
distant galaxy are necessarily implicated in the content of 
one's thoughts - and consistent with that claim's being a 
unique necessary condition on the individuation of content. 
And what we are after, in the end, is a way of necessarily 
linking a subject's mental states with the material world of 
objects and the properties they instantiate and with which 
she consorts and co-exists.
And the most obvious way to proceed is by way of the 
reference of the expressions of the language employed by a 
psychological subject. Clearly what is "outside the head" 
will not bear on content in the relevant manner - that is, 
give us a way of determining how it is that content plays a 
role in fixing the aboutness relation - unless it is through 
the reference of mental states; these issues are naturally 
joined. The relation between meaning and reference is the 
relation between mental states and the world, given the 
principle that the concept expressed by a term is given by 
what that term means. Given this obvious point, externalism 
is quite reasonably conceived of as a claim about the 
relation between meaning and reference - and thereby about
6
the relation between the mind and the world.8
A glance at the early literature on this question 
bears this out: it was precisely the meaning-reference 
relation - and not anything to do with failure of 
supervenience - that preoccupied those who initially 
formulated the notion of externalism familiar to most.
Recall Putnam's claims in "Is Semantics Possible"
(1975e, 139-152), "Meaning and Reference" (1973, 699-711)9 
and "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" (1975a, 215-271), three 
articles where the notion of externalism is introduced into 
the literature. "Is Semantics Possible?" is an attempt to 
come to grips with the question "why is the theory of 
meaning so hard?" (1975e, 139):
. . . enormous progress seems to have 
been made in the syntactic theory of 
natural languages . . . Comparable 
progress seems not to have been made in 
trfe semantic theory of natural 
languages, and perhaps it is time to ask 
why this should be the case.
Putnam diagnoses the problem (1975a, 216-218):
Since the Middle Ages at least, writers 
on the theory of meaning have purported 
to discover an ambiguity in the ordinary 
concept of meaning and have introduced a 
pair of terms - extension and intension 
or Sinn and Bedeutung, or whatever - to 
disambiguate them . . . Suppose that 
there is a sense of 'meaning' in which 
meaning = extension, there must be 
another sense of 'meaning' in which the 
meaning of a term is not its extension 
but something else, say the 'concept' 
associated with the term. Let us call 
this 'something else' the intension of 
the term . . . .  Something like the 
preceding paragraph appears in every
7
standard exposition of the notions 
'intension' and 'extension.' But it is 
not at all satisfactory . . . Unclear as 
it is, the traditional doctrine that the 
notion 'meaning' possesses the 
extension/intension ambiguity has 
certain typical consequences. Most 
traditional philosophers thought of 
concepts as something mental . . .
Secondly, the timeworn example of the 
two terms 'creature with a kidney' and 
'creature with a heart' does show that 
two terms can the same extension and yet 
differ in intension. But it was taken to 
be obvious that the reverse is 
impossible: two terms cannot differ in 
extension and have the same 
intension. . . .
And makes a now familiar remark (1973, 710-11):
. . . the theory that (1) words have 
'intensions' which are something like 
concepts associated with the words by 
speakers; and (2) intension determines 
extension - cannot be true of natural- 
kind words like 'water' . . . [this] 
leaves it open, however, whether to say 
that 'water' in the Twin Earth dialect 
of English has the same meaning as 
'water' in the Earth dialect and a 
different extension - thereby giving up 
the doctrine that 'meaning (intension) 
determines extension,' or to say, as we 
have chosen to do, that difference in 
extension is ipso facto a difference in 
meaning . . . thereby giving up the 
doctrine that meanings are concepts, or 
indeed, mental entities of any kind.
Those familiar with the literature will recall that 
Putnam was concerned to mount an attack on a Fregean 
semantic theory; he was not alone (cf. Kripke (1972, 253- 
355), Donnellan (1962, 356-379;1966, 281-304), and Kaplan 
(March 1972, draft), among others). The arguments concerning 
the role of reference in the individuation of meaning were
8
crucial to that project. The implications for a theory of 
mind were obvious; and externalism emerged on the scene.
Now, the formulation of externalism as a claim 
concerning the existence-dependence of mental states on 
their objects - a formulation that takes its cue from the 
denial of methodological solipsism and which is often 
understood as the view that reference partly determines 
meaning - certainly does not entail the failure of content 
to supervene on an individual's internal states; this view 
does not entail TE thought experiments. The TE formulation 
has occupied a prominent position in the literature; so 
prominent that some take it to be essential to formulations 
of externalism. Our preliminary remarks suggest that this is 
a mistake: and, in fact, there is no reason to accept the TE 
formulation as definitive of externalism, as we shall next 
argue.
It is worth noting that, since much of the notice in 
the literature regarding externalism as a theory of content 
devolves on its repercussions for content in belief-desire 
explanation, it is all the more pressing to clearly 
establish that the orthodox understanding of externalism, 
formulated in terms of content's failure to supervene, is, 
at best, limited. This, of course, suggests that the problem 
of content in explanation is not - exclusively - the problem 
of the failure of content to supervene on inner states. I 
will show (see chapter 2) that the more general formulation
9
of externalism likewise results in explanatory role problems 
for content, one of three consequences for this view that I 
examine (see chapter 3). In sum, I contend that the true 
significance of externalism as a theory of mind might be 
better appreciated if it can be shown to be true of, and to 
have repercussions for, content in general - something that 
the influence of twin earth may have obscured.
3. Supervenience and externalism: a reductio 
We can begin with a reductio of the idea that there is 
an essential connection between failure of supervenience and 
the notion of externalism, as a preliminary salvo. The 
Cartesian theory of mind has it that mental substance and 
physical substance are utterly distinct - in fact, mental 
states can be what they are independent of there being 
bodies (heads with brains in them, say) at all. On this 
view, it is perfectly conceivable - Descartes even thought 
it was desirable - that one's mental states be what they are 
whether or not the objects of those states exist. Now, this 
is a view that entails, quite dramatically, a failure of the 
supervenience of the mental on inner states; but it is 
really a gross and unwarranted perversion of the Cartesian 
position to claim that from this failure of supervenience 
follows externalism about content. Descartes is, 
notoriously, an internalist: what states one is in are not 
essentially determined by any relation to the world.
10
Of course, it might be thought that Descartes is an 
externalist with respect to God-thoughts, for these have the 
their content in virtue of God, the only being of sufficient 
magnitude to cause those ideas in us - and God is an extra- 
cranial entity, (someone who clings to the TE formulation of 
externalism will not see this, since what you're thinking 
when you think about God won't vary depending on what world 
you're in; more on this below). This would be confused, 
however: the relevant thing to remember is Descartes's 
mentalism. Ideas in the mind - whose origin is innate - are 
the objects of thought and knowledge. That these Ideas 
happen to correspond to the world (thanks to the non- 
deceptive nature of God) is not to say that these Ideas are 
vulnerable to fluctuations of any sort in the world. God's 
job is to ensure veridicality, and hence certainty; the 
individuation of content is not His concern.
4. Externalism and Twin Earth
An unclouded consideration of the essence of TE cases 
and what, if anything, they can be taken to establish with 
respect to externalism as a general theory of mind, is next 
in order.
Putnam (1975a, 214-271) uses TE cases as an 
illustrative device in an argument to support the claim that 
what a person's utterances mean cannot be a function of his 
internal properties alone: a claim, as we have said above,
11
quite plausibly understood as the denial of methodological 
solipsism. (Nowhere, of course, is the TE formulation of the 
issue offered by Putnam as a definition of externalism). 
Surrounding a psychological subject are objects (and, n.b., 
the properties they instantiate); these are what he refers 
to by his words, what his thoughts are about. The question 
is: is it consistent to suppose that two subjects who share 
all the same internal properties share the same conceptual 
ones?
Putnam makes the point - aided by TE cases - that it 
is not consistent: it is stretching plausibility to maintain 
that one's words refer to anything - that one's thoughts are 
about anything - but the items in the extra-cranial 
environment with which one is in (causal) contact. The
essence of a canonical TE case is thus to hold the internal
states of an individual fixed (or one individual at 
different times, or entire communities of individuals) and 
to vary the environment. The upshot is that a variation in 
the environment results in a variation of a mental 
state.10
Burge (1979, 73-121) makes an amendment to the basic 
sketch.11 Among the items in one's extra-cranial 
environment are other people, who perform a range of 
linguistic acts. Isn't it plausible to suppose that the
meaning of one's words and the content of one's thoughts
might also be subject to variation in the linguistic
12
practices and conventions in the social environment? Thus, 
consider two individuals who inhabit two communities where 
the linguistic practices relevant to the use of the term 
•cramps' differ. In community 1, 'cramps' correctly applies 
to a uterine complaint alone. In community 2, 'cramps' 
correctly applies to a uterine as well as a general muscular 
complaint . Now consider two male individuals - identical in 
every internal property - who utter the sentence "I've got 
the worst cramps again, doctor." In community 1, the doctor 
would presumably correct the speaker, saying that whatever 
is wrong with him it can't be cramps. In community 2, 
however, his doctor would simply prescribe the necessary 
sedative.
We can critically examine number of things about the 
basic idea, which may be useful in getting a clearer grasp 
on the deeper intuition for which these cases are meant to 
be an argument. First we will consider the nature of the 
relation between Putnam-type TE cases and Burge-type cases 
(which often are themselves formulated using the TE device), 
and then move on to show that there is content for which it 
is difficult to maintain that TE cases can be erected.
First: Putnam-type TE cases can be understood in terms 
of the appearance/reality distinction (more on this below). 
Both twins are in the presence of two substances that 
present the very same appearance, but that have - as it is 
sometimes called - different essences.12 These essences
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are in principle discoverable by the experts, to which we
may need to defer for the sake of complete accuracy. Burge-
type cases, however, at least according to Burge, are to be
understood in terms of an individual's incomplete grasp of
the meanings of his own words (1979, 79):
The argument can get under way in any 
case where it is intuitively possible to 
attribute a mental state or event whose 
content involves a notion that the 
subject incompletely understands. As 
will become clear, this possibility is 
the key to the thought experiment.
Questions to do with distinguishing some cubic 
zirconium from some diamond, or a glass of Clorox from a 
glass of water, can be settled - so, likewise, can questions 
to do with what the words that refer to those entities mean. 
For settling questions to do with what the meanings of words 
like 'arthritis' or 'cramps' are, different standards - 
community standards - are thought to apply. Vary the 
community standard and you vary the meaning of the word.
Now, one thing to notice is that Burge's claims about 
the role of the social environment in the individuation of a 
mental state are not such as to impose a necessary condition 
on fixing content, although this is, more often than not, 
misunderstood.13 This strikes me as an important 
disanalogy with respect to Putnam's conclusions about the 
role of the extra-cranial environment in fixing the nature 
of mental states.
Putnam's TE examples are, strictly speaking, best
14
interpreted as making a necessary claim concerning 
distinctions in content-possession: twins whose environment 
is not the same will (necessarily) not share the same 
concepts. But it is also plausible to suppose that Putnam's 
claims about the relation between the environment and the 
mind are to be understood as imposing a necessary condition 
on concept-possession itself.14 Certainly the formulation 
of the view as the denial of methodological solipsism quite 
explicitly exploits an entailment relation between the 
existence of a head-independent, environmental entity and 
the mental state that takes that entity as an object. TE 
cases are not so explicit, but, as many would agree, it is 
perverse to take them otherwise.
The key point is this: Putnam's formulations of the 
notion of externalism are quite plausibly understood as 
invoking a necessary connection between one's mental states 
and the environment one is in. No such necessary connection 
is present in the Burge-type cases, however. For one thing, 
social externalism (as we might call Burge's view) is at the 
very least logically independent of environmental 
externalism (Putnam's view), so considerations may in 
principle be made with respect to one that do not impinge on 
the other.
Consider that there is no claim in Burge to the effect 
that one could not have the concept 'arthritis' in the 
absence of a social environment. As he himself makes clear,
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his thought-examples turn on defective possession of a 
concept - it is members of a community with incomplete 
understanding of a given concept whose mental states are, as 
it were, vulnerable to variations from the social 
environment. Nothing in Burge's claims prevents someone in 
possession of the full definition of 'arthritis' to 
genuinely so possess it quite independent of any of his 
peers.
There is another, more important point to notice. From 
the fact that meaning is subject to variations in an 
individual's social environment it does not follow that 
meaning isn't "in the head." The fact is that what 
individuates the meaning of a particular individual's 
expressions may just as well be in the heads of one or more 
of those who comprise his social environment - a clear case 
of anti-individualism15 but internalism about meaning.
Burge never clarifies this point, appearing to think that 
the roles individuals other than oneself may play in the 
fixing of the content of one's mental states is sufficient 
to promote externalism in the relevant sense. It is hardly 
the case, however, that other minds are sufficiently 
externalistic - merely by being other - to add the other 
dimension to externalist criteria of content individuation 
that Burge seeks. It is hard to see that merely being not in 
my head but in the head of another is going to capture the 
intuition at work behind the notion of externalism.
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Further, and conversely, from the thesis that meaning 
is subject and sensitive to variations in an individual's 
environment need follow nothing about the role of the 
individual's social environment in the determination of 
meaning. So care must be taken here when applying these 
cases to establish externalist claims.
Now: is it the case that the Putnam/Burge TE cases
apply to all concepts? They are taken to, at least by Fodor
(1988, 27):
. . . I'll assume that the Burge story 
shows that if the Putnam story raises 
any problems for the notion of content, 
then the problems that it raises are 
completely general and affect all 
content-bearing mental states.
Putnam seems to concur (1975a, 242):
So far we have only used natural-kind 
words as examples; but the points we 
have made apply to many other kinds of 
words as well.
Burge himself, on the other hand, appears to have
realized that Putnam-type cases are of limited
applicability, noting (1979, 118):
The argument regarding the notion of 
water that I extracted from Putnam's 
paper is narrower in scope than our 
argument. The Putnam-derived argument 
seems to work only for natural kind 
terms and close relatives.
However, he seems to think that his own cases apply
quite generally (1982, 117):
The Twin Earth thought experiment may 
work only for certain propositional 
attitudes. Certainly its clearest
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applications are to those whose contents 
involve non-theoretical natural kind 
notions. But the arguments of 
'Individualism and the Mental' suggest 
that virtually no propositional 
attitudes can be explicated in 
individualistic terms.
There is reason to think, however, that this general 
applicability thesis isn't true. First: since the Putnam 
cases don't entail the Burge cases, nor the other way 
around, one would have to find some way to defend the view 
that the individuation thesis supported by these cases is 
completely general. Second: even if Burge-cases can be 
applied to a wider range of cases than those of Putnam, it 
far from follows that Burge-type cases apply to most, let 
alone all concepts. Recall that our concern here is to 
formulate a notion of externalism that applies to as many 
concepts as possible. It is my contention that the kind of 
formulation of externalism exemplified by the Putnam and 
Burge cases is too limited to be of any great interest for 
issues concerning mind and mental content. An examination of 
a few concepts for which TE cases can't be erected is next.
5. The Limited Applicability of Twin Earth Cases
Putnam's well-known summary of his view is this 
(1975a, 227): "Cut the pie any way you like, 'meanings' just 
ain't in the head!" McGinn makes a laconic comment (1989,
31) :
In fact this conclusion exaggerates what 
has been established, since only some
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meanings have been argued to be 
environmentally determined, not all. The 
appropriate conclusion should have been 
that a proper subset of meanings are not 
in the head - a somewhat less resounding 
announcement.
Let us see whether this is so: is there content for 
which for which Putnam-type TE cases cannot be erected? If 
Putnam-type TE cases can't be erected for some concepts, do 
Burge-type cases take up the slack? If not, are there 
concepts for which externalist individuation does not - or 
even cannot - apply? We will answer these questions 
respectively: yes, no, and no.
TE cases, remember, are cases where internal facts are 
held constant and the extra-cranial "surround"16 is 
varied. So what can we make of cases where the relevant 
extra-cranial entity can’t be varied? McGinn gives a fairly 
comprehensive list (1989, 47-100): that which is referred to 
by complex concepts, formal concepts, psychological concepts 
(concepts of mental states), and perceptual concepts. To 
this we could add also the ethical and aesthetic 
environment.
The most obvious instance of non-conformity to a 
standard TE case concerns formal entities like number. How 
is it possible to erect a situation where the mathematical 
environment is varied but the internal factors - say the way 
that environment appears to those on Earth and on Twin Earth 
- stay the same? It seems practically incoherent to say that 
•prime number' or the logical expression 'if and only if'
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refer to different things on Earth and Twin Earth but that 
both communities have the same qualitative experiences with 
respect to those entities.
What about, analogously, aesthetic concepts such as 
1 beauty'? Does it make any sense to claim that on Earth and 
Twin Earth the aesthetic environment is (really) different 
but appears the same to both sets of people, so that the
word 'beautiful* refers to really quite different things
(maybe ugly things) that don't seem at all different? Could 
the moral environment really be varied while appearing the 
same both to me and my twin, so that when she applauds 
someone's integrity, she's doing something I might in fact 
recoil from?17
Davies (1992, draft, p.3) makes a few remarks 
concerning the applicability of what he calls modal 
externalism (what characterizes concepts that are subject to 
TE cases) that are directly relevant here:
. . . perhaps we should consider . . . 
ways in which it might turn out to be
impossible to generate the 'Twin Earth'
examples that would establish modal
externalism. One kind of case would be 
where there is a necessary connection 
between the relevant features of the 
environment E and X's inner 
constitution, so that a situation with 
environment E' instead of E is 
inevitably a situation in which there is 
no duplicate of X.
If all this is correct, then not only do TE 
formulations tend to come apart under scrutiny - even for 
those concepts for which they are generally thought to apply
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- but, more importantly, there are any number of concepts 
for which the preconditions for setting up such cases are 
not met. There is, as a result, no reason to suppose that TE 
cases - at least Putnam-type TE cases - do apply generally.
Given the logical independence of Putnam- and Burge- 
type TE cases there is no reason to think that what the 
Putnam cases don't cover the Burge cases will, but it is 
worth pointing out that social externalism doesn't apply to 
all concepts either.
Burge points out (1979, 79) that his cases depend on 
the individual's only partially understanding the term that 
she employs - but of course, Burge-type cases are slightly 
more complicated than that. Burge never says that it is 
sufficient to get one of his cases off the ground that one 
be deficient in a particular concept that one possesses or 
employs. What is actually operative in these cases is that 
the deficiency be such as to allow for cases where I and my 
counterpart both have a concept - but not the same one. My 
counterpart and I both have a concept we express with the 
word 'arthritis' - but given that, in the counterpart 
community, 'arthritis' is used to refer to an ailment of the 
joints and muscles, rather than the joints alone, we do not 
have the same concept, in spite of our internal identity.
Now, imagine running a Burge case for a color 
concept - say 'purple.' Could it plausibly be the case that 
a person employs a color concept only partially correctly:
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say picking out purple things correctly six out of ten 
times, and picking out yellow ones the other four times; and 
that the relevant community standards allow 'purple' in fact 
to applies to both purple and yellow objects? This just 
can't be right: a person who so grasps the concept 'purple' 
must be said not to grasp it at all.18
Burge cases are also unlikely to go through for 
psychological concepts: for concepts of mental states. For 
consider: we can stipulate the counterfactual community as 
having different experiences from mine that they describe 
with the same words. The words 'experience of red' apply to, 
on Earth, an experience of red, but on Twin Earth, they 
apply to an experience of green. The same words express 
different (experiential) concepts. But now notice that if 
the counterfactual community can fix my counterpart's 
experiential concepts - the way it's supposed to work for 
others - then her self-ascriptions with respect to those 
concepts will be false. Her concept 'experience of red' is 
fixed by the counterfactual community, where it means 
'experience of green' - because that is the kind of 
experience the community is having on Twin Earth. But the 
experience that she's having is a red experience - since 
that's the experience I ’m having and we are internal 
duplicates. The same points apply vice versa for me, 
obviously. My concept 'experience of red' is - supposedly - 
fixed by my community, according to the experiences that
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they are having - and suppose these are experiences of blue. 
My twin's community, however, has experiences of red that 
they describe with the words 'experience of red.' I have the 
same experiences as my twin - since we are internal 
duplicates - so when I ascribe to myself the experiential 
mental states under consideration here J am wrong - since 
the words 'experience of red' on Earth apply to experiences 
of blue. Surely it is vastly implausible to think that 
anyone is so hyperfallible about the content of one's own 
experiences - and therefore about the concepts used in 
referring to those experiences. Likewise, it is implausible 
that Burge cases go through for such concepts.19
There is another aspect of externalism that needs to 
be clarified, as it has important repercussions for the 
distinction in formulations of externalism that we shall be 
exploiting in later remarks. The issue here concerns the 
understanding of supervenience on internal properties or 
states: how is the idea that content - in some cases - fails 
to supervene on such states most accurately to be 
understood? In the next section (section (6)), we will make 
some remarks concerning the best understanding of internal 
properties. In section (7) we will reconsider the notion of 
supervenience.
6. Internal properties
We can begin by taking note of a few interesting
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details. Burge (1979, 79), for instance, gives an inventory
of 'internal' factors that he takes as relevant to
establishing externalist content individuation:
internal qualitative experiences, 
physiological states and events, 
behaviorally described stimuli and 
responses, dispositions to behave, and 
whatever sequences of states [mediate]
. . . input and output.
In order to assess the true contribution of TE cases
in support of externalism as a general theory of mind,
however, it is important to characterize 'internal' factors
in such a way as to avoid begging the question. It won't,
for instance, follow from the fact that a state is inside
the head that it is thereby 'internal' in the relevant
sense. McGinn (1989, 2) notes:
it is important to notice that 
'internal' is being used as a term of 
art . . .; internalists, in the intended 
sense, do not literally locate the mind 
inside the head (though they may do); 
they assert, rather, that mental states 
are determined by facts relating to the 
subject considered in isolation from his 
environment - by facts about him . . . 
internalism is best seen negatively as 
the denial of externalism; it is the 
role of the environment in fixing the 
nature of mind that is centrally at 
issue.20
Now, it is natural to take the base domain in issues 
regarding the fixing of content as physiological - even 
neurophysiological - but we ought to be pedantic. There are 
at least three kinds of things that could plausibly count as 
'inner' or 'internal' in the sense needed to drive the
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intuitions about content illustrated in the TE cases. These 
are: 1) internal states of the body and brain 2) behavioral 
dispositions 3) local stimulations at the sensory receptors. 
And, what's more, it is certainly open to someone to claim 
that all three are individuated relationally. What's 
relevantly 'internal' in these discussions should not be 
thought to be fixed when the geography is fixed.
It seems that inaccurate formulations of the upshot of 
the TE story can lead to pitfalls concerning grasp of the 
more general nature of externalism that I shall shortly be 
urging. Consider Stich (1978, 575, emphasis his):
. . . the principle of autonomy states 
that the properties and relations to be 
invoked in an explanatory psychological 
theory must be supervenient upon the 
current, internal, physical properties 
and relations of organisms.
The kind of failure of supervenience thought to be 
illustrated by TE cases won't necessarily follow even if the 
states on which content is supposed not to supervene are 
thought to be neurophysiological. Again, that such states 
are internal to the organism - in a geographical sense - 
isn't enough to guarantee that they are non-relational’, and 
it is this sense of 'inner' or 'internal' that is required 
to get failure of supervenience.21
Further: surely it is at least logically possible that 
content should supervene on qualitative states, which a) 
needn't themselves be thought to supervene on the 
physiological (disembodied minds, etc.); or b) might well,
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for all we know, be themselves non-relationally 
individuated.
It is interesting to note that in the usual 
formulations of the TE thought experiment consideration as 
to whether qualitative states really are internal in the 
relevant sense is rarely raised; these kinds of states are 
generally assumed to be paradigms of the internal (Cf. 
Burge's inventory above). In fact, a short summary of 
Putnam's conclusions with respect to twins is that although 
both share the same phenomenological states ("water is a 
tasteless, colorless, liquid," they say) they do not share 
the same contentful states as expressed by that sentence.
But this does beg the question: what if phenomenological 
states are externally individuated? It takes argument to 
show that they are not, if they are not; this cannot simply 
be presupposed.22
6. Supervenience
The canonical formulation of externalism, as we know, 
has it that content fails to supervene on inner states. What 
we will be formulating and defending shortly is that there 
is another - much more general - formulation of externalism 
that denies failure of supervenience. On this more general 
formulation of externalism, content is - consistently - both 
externalistically individuated and supervenient.
It turns out, in fact, that the notion of
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supervenience is ambiguous enough to lead to some genuine 
misunderstandings about the general notion of externalism. 
What we shall do in this section is distinguish between 
three notions of supervenience, as to avoid even prima facie 
inconsistencies. It goes without saying that in the 
subsequent discussion of weak externalism, the distinction 
between the three notions of supervenience must be kept 
firmly in mind.23
First things first: obviously, no claim about 
supervenience or non-supervenience will in itself involve 
any claims about externalism. Supervenience is a 
metaphysical relation between two domains: it is the claim 
that one domain supervenes on another if there can be no 
difference in the supervening domain without difference in 
the base domain, and can be brought to bear in the analysis 
of almost anything.24 When, however, this notion is 
brought to bear on issues concerning the aboutness relation, 
then the question is as follows: what facts are such that 
when you fix them, the aboutness relation holds? or, what 
does the aboutness relation supervene on?
This question ultimately concerns the interaction of 
three things: the internal states of heads, the aboutness 
relation, and the objects out there in the world. It is 
sometimes put by asking whether fixing the internal states 
of the head is sufficient to guarantee the aboutness 
relation under certain conditions. What tends to be
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presupposed - completely plausibly, of course - is that the 
object that the mental state in question is about exists. An 
analogy helps with this.
Consider the 1loves-relation.1 Suppose our question is 
whether the 'loves-relation' between x and y supervenes on 
the intrinsic states of, say, x. What we are obviously 
asking here is what makes it the case that x loves y and not 
2, and it ought to go without saying that we are 
presupposing that x and y (and even z) exist. Now we might 
of course have been interested in a more abstract question, 
one having to do with the loves-relation and its necessary 
and sufficient conditions, and that kind of inquiry would 
not necessarily presuppose the existence of any beings that 
instantiate the relation. But our previous question was not 
that one: it was the question what is it about x (if 
anything) that is sufficient to guarantee his loving y and 
not 2.
Now, externalism as a general claim can be understood, 
as we noted in section (1), as the view that a mental state 
essentially involves being in a relation to the object of 
that state - that mental states are relational.25 In other 
words, given that an object exists, what we want to know is 
what it is about a subject (if anything) that makes her 
thought about a and not about b. Is it sufficient that she 
be in a particular physiological state s - that is, does her 
thought being about a rather than b supervene on her
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intrinsic states? Or is there more to the story? Could the 
causal/environmental relations that she bears to a play a 
relevant role? What about these kinds of relations 
themselves? Are they conditions that must met in order to 
claim that a mental state is relational? Or can a mental 
state be relational without them?
These remarks set up the context against which it is 
imperative that the distinction to come in formulations of 
externalism be understood. Canonical TE cases make the point 
that whether you're thinking about water as opposed to 
something else does not supervene on your intrinsic states 
alone. Intrinsic states are not sufficient given that your 
twin has just those states and yet is not thinking about 
water; how could she be? She bears causal/environmental 
relations to a certain substance that is not water but 
something else. And it is these causal relations that have 
to be added, in TE-type cases, to reach an adequate 
supervenience base (i.e. sufficient condition).
Now, the analogy with the question concerning the 
'loves-relation' specified above makes it absolutely clear 
what the issue concerning TE cases is all about. The 
question there concerns the issue whether, given the 
existence of XYZ and H20, whether you're thinking about one 
or the other is what fails to supervene on inner states. The 
intrinsic states, familiarly, are not sufficient: what is 
further necessary is certain causal/environmental relations
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that will select (as it were) one thing rather than the 
other.
What we want to defend is a notion of externalism that 
goes (well) beyond TE cases, since, as we saw above, these 
kinds of cases cannot be erected for many kinds of content - 
that is, no causal dependence or environmental theory will 
be correct or apply to them- And a very natural way to put 
this will be to say that many mental states are relational 
without being causally/environmentally relational. In fact, 
we can go further: we will show that there is a sense of 
supervenience that is perfectly consistent with the claim 
that content supervenes but is nevertheless relational.
Now, on the face of it, there seems to be a glaring 
problem. Externalism is the claim that mental states are 
relational: it is a necessary condition on being in a mental 
state m that the object of the state exist. But to say that 
mental states supervene on intrinsic states means - in one 
sense of supervenience - that intrinsic states are 
sufficient to fix what mental state you're in. So how can a 
mental state be both supervenient and externalist?
The answer is that the notion of supervenience at work 
throughout this issue is ambiguous enough to support three 
different readings. In the formulation that follows of weak 
externalism, the notion of supervenience at work there could 
be understood, roughly speaking, as a kind of shorthand.
What we need to do is specify what the supervenience base
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includes or does not include in order to make certain 
crucial distinctions between states that supervene, states 
that don't, and to formulate a notion of externalism that 
straddles that distinction. Once the supervenience base is 
specified for a particular case, all we need to do is to 
remember what the term 'supervenience' for that case is 
meant to include or exclude. The same term will be used, but 
it will mean slightly different - but importantly 
different - things.
We distinguish between three cases:
1. Pain states: when we say that pain states 
supervene on physiological states, we stipulate that the 
supervenience base consists solely of the physiological 
states. It is sufficient, to fix the pain state, to fix the 
physiology: there are no other necessary conditions.
2. Canonical TE cases: Here, we must understand the 
supervenience base to consist of three things: the intrinsic 
facts about the subject; the facts about the world - the 
existence of the objects of the relevant mental states - 
and, further, the causal/environmental relations that the 
subject bears to the objects of her mental states. These 
three are necessary for determining whether someone is 
thinking about one thing rather than another; and they are 
jointly sufficient. Content (in some cases) fails to 
supervene on intrinsic states in the sense that intrinsic 
facts alone are not sufficient to fix the aboutness
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relation; a causal/environmental relation is also required.
3. The Intermediate case: weak externalism. There is 
a position in logical space that denies that
causal/environmental relations are part of the supervenience 
base. The claim is, roughly speaking, that mental states can 
be relational (externalist) without being 
causally/environmentally relational. What we need to 
stipulate for this kind of intermediate case is that the 
supervenience base will include intrinsic facts, and it will 
include facts about the world - the existence of the objects 
of the mental states in question - but it will exclude any 
causal/environmental relational facts. The upshot is that 
there is room for the idea that being in the very same 
intrinsic physiological states is sufficient to fix mental 
states, without ruling out the possibility that the states 
are relations to - but not causal relations to - head- 
independent entities. That is, no further property of the 
object needs to be instantiated, in contrast to what holds 
for content subject to TE cases.
Keeping the threefold distinction above firmly in mind 
puts us in a position to amplify - and refute - the 
objection alluded to above. Briefly, one way of 
understanding the issues here might proceed as follows: 
since, according to externalism, aboutness is relational (it 
necessitates there being an object of the intentional mental 
state), then it is quite false to suppose that aboutness
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supervenes. The latter claim means that intrinsic states are 
sufficient to fix the mental state in question, but this is 
inconsistent with the claim that the mental state is 
relational. To say that a mental state supervenes on inner 
states is to say that the state is not world-involving; the 
only necessary condition for fixing that state relates to 
the head. How can it make any sense to say that a mental 
state is both supervenient and world-involving? It might be 
possible to make those two claims consistent by claiming 
that intrinsic states somehow guarantee the existence of the 
object of the state, but this is, of course, absurd.
The reply to this (admittedly rather perverse) reading 
of the question concerning the more general formulation of 
externalism is now obvious, given our distinctions above.
The objection presupposes an understanding of supervenience 
such that the only things that are included in the 
supervenience base are intrinsic states. But there are two 
other possible formulations of the supervenience base: one, 
the familiar TE case, where there are three necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions included in the supervenience 
base; and the other, middle of the road position, which 
includes not only intrinsic facts in the supervenience base, 
but also the existence of the objects of the mental state. 
What is not included in this latter position is, of course, 
the causal/environmental relations to the objects in 
question; and it is just here that the two views can be
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essentially distinguished. And it is this distinction - no 
other - that is the focus of our discussion.
Of course, it should be fairly obvious that the entire
issue concerning the aboutness relation and what it 
supervenes on presupposes that the objects of the 
intentional state exist: after all, intuitively, if they 
didn't, there wouldn't be such an instantiated relation. The 
position here is exactly on analogy with the remarks made 
earlier concerning the 'loves-relation.' Obviously, if what 
we are interested in is what facts about that relation (as 
it is borne by x and y) supervene on what facts about x or 
y, then it quite obvious that we are presupposing that both 
individuals exist: what sense would it make to ask the 
question "what makes her love him rather than the other 
guy?" if there wasn't anyone you were talking about?
As we said above concerning a familiar TE case, the
issue is not to do with the existence of H20 or XY2 somehow
failing to supervene on intrinsic states, rather, the 
question concerns which of those substances you can be said 
to be thinking about under certain conditions. What we have 
shown here is that there is logical room to hold - given a 
specification of supervenience that builds in the perfectly 
obvious presupposition that the object of the mental state 
exists - that internal facts are sufficient (in conjunction 
with the object) to fix the mental state in question; but 
the mental state is no less relational for all that. Again,
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the only facts about the subject that are part of the 
supervenience base are intrinsic - no extrinsic 
causal/environmental relations are required, in contrast 
with the lesson of the TE case.
8. Strong and Weak Externalism
The question to consider now in greater detail is 
whether the fact that TE cases - both the social and 
environmental varieties - don't apply to all concepts means 
that externalism need be abandoned as a general theory of 
mind. The answer, as we have suggested, is no.
We can best think of externalism as a genus of which 
there are two species. Following McGinn (1989), we can 
distinguish externalist claims into two sorts. Strong 
externalism is to be understood as the species of 
externalism that entails non-supervenience. Weak externalism 
is to be understood as the species of externalism that 
claims that the (necessary) existence and identity 
conditions of content are those of the objects of the mental 
state with that content. The key difference is that strong 
externalism claims that the local environment inhabited by a 
subject is what determines her mental states; it is this 
part of the environment, after all, with which she has 
contextual and causal contact; what (some of) her thoughts 
are directed onto, what (some of) her words refer to. Weak 
externalism, however, claims that the (necessary) relation
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between mental states and the environment is one between the 
subject and those parts of the head-independent environment 
to which her words refer, not just those with which she 
locally consorts.
The difference between strong and weak externalism
ought not to be thought of in terms of the degree of
externality that applies to concepts, but should rather be
thought of as a distinction that concerns the conditions
under which content - externally determined content - gets
fixed. McGinn notes (1989, 8):
The distinction between the two sorts of 
externalism arises out of the simple 
point that something can exist or be 
instantiated without existing or being 
instantiated in a given subject's 
environment, where the notion of 
environment is taken causally or 
contextually, thus making people on twin 
earth occupy a different environment 
from us. Co-existence in a possible 
world is not the same as co-presence in 
an environmental niche. These two 
conditions coalesce only for the case of 
God: because of his omniscience and 
omnipresence the whole of reality is his 
environment - which is why you cannot 
run a twin earth case for God.
The best way to understand the difference between 
strong and weak externalism is as follows. TE cases (and the 
concepts subject to them) are meant to counter the Fregean 
picture that what one means by one's words is to do with, 
exclusively, facts about oneself. The anti-Fregean picture - 
externalism - claims that mental states are determined by 
relations to entities that are independent of the subject of
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those states. Twins make the case that being identical in 
every local (non-relational) respect does not always 
guarantee sameness of mental content. Content doesn't 
(always) supervene on inner states, since we can stipulate 
plausible cases where all the inner states are held stable 
but a subject is quite obviously not in a position to be 
ascribed the contentful state.
Now, I can alter the natural kind environment (at 
least in principle) - so taking natural kind concepts with 
me - but no such alteration is even in principle possible 
with respect to, for instance, the ethical, formal, or 
aesthetic environment. So the respective concepts will 
supervene on inner states. They can't be pried apart: it 
isn't coherent to argue that what my twin means by 'not' 
isn't what I mean by 'not' because on TE 'not' is really F 
. . . although it looks like/feels like what it does to me 
here on Earth (G, say).
The upshot is that my twin and I are in the same mental 
states when it comes to 'not,' 'beautiful,' 'two' and the 
like. Fix the inner non-relational states and you fix the 
mental states when it comes to these kinds of concepts. 
Anyone who takes externalism to be equivalent to failures of 
supervenience will of course deny that externalism applies 
to these concepts: these don't fail to supervene. But this 
is, of course, nonsense.
Externalism is a quite general individuation thesis,
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like many others. The general claim is that content is 
essentially determined by relations to non-mental entities 
that are independent of the subject of the mental states in 
question. And what could be more obvious than that being in 
a mental state whose object is the number two or the 
property ’beautiful' is to be in a relation to head- 
independent entities? The objects of aesthetic, mathematical 
and ethical beliefs are properties. The most sensible view 
to take about properties is realism and non-mentalism with 
respect to them.26 So what you're thinking about when 
you're thinking about 'not' is determined by something that 
is not in your head: a perfectly straightforward - and 
recognizable - formulation of externalism.
Given our remarks about the general applicability of 
TE cases, we now are in a position to appreciate that for 
content for which TE cases can be erected - strongly 
external content - weak externalism will also be true. But 
not all content for which weak externalism is true is 
content for which strong externalism will likewise be true. 
We now turn to arguments in support of the general 
applicability of weak externalism.
9. Weak Externalism: Presuppositions
There are at least two ways that weak externalism 
might be understood. In this section, we will consider a 
semantic argument for weak externalism; in the next, a
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metaphysical one. Both are, as it might be surmised, 
essentially two sides of the same coin.27
Weak externalism can be derived from some 
straightforward - although not uncontroversial and not 
uncontested - semantic principles.28 By way of scotching 
at least preliminary misunderstanding, let me say that it is 
imperative to understand at the outset that weak externalism 
should be understood to result from these principles taken 
together; each one in itself is not sufficient to establish 
the claim. The semantic argument can be most simply 
understood by way of the following three presuppositions:
(i) Externalism is the claim that there is an 
existence-dependence between mental states and the objects 
of those states - a characterization of mental states that, 
as we have seen, is consistent with failure of supervenience 
formulations, but that also applies to mental states that do 
not fail to supervene.
(ii) A Russellian semantic background, extended, 
however, to general thoughts. According to Russell, singular 
terms are meaningful on condition that they refer; this 
condition applies to predicates as well. It goes without 
saying that also presupposed here is an ordinary materialist 
metaphysics, wherein singular terms refer to ordinary 
worldly particulars, and predicates to the properties those 
particulars instantiate. Quantifiers are to be interpreted 
here as objectual rather than substitutional.
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(iii) Exportation - inferring the relational form of 
a belief sentence from the notional form - is to be 
considered a legitimate inference.
The first of these presuppositions is definitional, 
and we have said a great deal about it already.29 We turn 
to the second.
It is best to start with a rough sketch of the line of
argument. First, a brief reminder of Russell's claims
regarding denoting expressions, as summarized by Strawson
(1956, 222):
Of logically proper names Russell says 
or implies the following things:
(1) That they and they alone 
can occur as subjects of 
sentences which are genuinely 
of the subject-predicate form.
(2) That an expression 
intended to be a logically 
proper name is meaningless 
unless there is some single 
object for which it stands: 
for the meaning of such an 
expression just is the 
individual object which the 
expression designates. To be a 
name at all, therefore, it 
must designate something.
Now, presupposing the Russellian characterization of 
genuinely denoting expressions summarized by Strawson 
above,30 consider first the truth-conditions of
(1) That dog is a dachshund
These are such that (1) is true when the referent of 'that
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dog' satisfies the predicate 'is a dachshund' and false when 
it doesn't. Should a referent for the expression 'that dog' 
fail to obtain, (1) fails to express a proposition.31
Now, we can, quite uncontroversially, symbolize (1) in 
standard predicate calculus notation as
(2) Fa
to which we can further apply existential generalization, a 
valid rule of inference in first-order predicate logic, 
which yields
(3) (3x) Fx
(2) , that is, has what are known as existential entaiIntents.
But now consider the behavior of a demonstrative 
expression inside a that-clause. The question arises: does 
it retain its existential implications when embedded? For 
existential generalization to apply just as readily to the 
embedded demonstrative in
(4) Keith believes that dog is a dachshund
would be for it to follow that there is something in 
particular such that Keith believes that thing to be an F. 
And given that there is an existential entailment between
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(1) (symbolized as (2)) and (3), then, intuitively, there is 
- on grounds of uniformity, if nothing else - an analogous 
case to be made for the retention of such ordinary 
existential entailments of expressions in opaque contexts.
So untutored intuition might suppose. And notice that, if 
such an inference were legitimate, this would amount to - 
not forgetting our other presuppositions, of course - a 
capsule statement of weak externalism.
For consider that if a sentence p is true, then its 
implications have to be true. So - presupposing the 
legitimacy of inferring the relational from the notional 
form of a belief sentence - it is clear that if the belief- 
sentence p is true, then its existential entailments are 
also true. Add to this the Russellian theory of denoting 
expressions, and belief-sentences can be characterized as 
existence-dependent on their objects. Were no such objects 
to exist, then no such belief sentence could be ascribed, 
since no proposition would be expressed.32
The lie of the land ought now to be more or less 
clear. We move on to details.
10. Weak Externalism and Exportation
The third presupposition in our formulation of weak 
externalism makes use of the notion known as exportation. 
Exportation is, of course, a thorny issue, details of which 
we consider below. In spite of the complications33
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which go beyond the scope of my project to consider, let 
alone adjudicate - the key idea is quite intuitive. We ought 
to keep firmly in mind that it is certainly an option, 
logically speaking, to insist that exportation is a valid 
inference. This intuition is consistent with a Russellian 
approach to the issues, as opposed, of course, to Fregean 
accounts - hence my earlier emphasis on the combination of 
the presuppositions in the formulation of weak externalism.
Some remarks about exportation are in order. Quine 
noticed (1975b) that in ordinary thinking about 
propositional attitude idioms like belief, it was 
appropriate to distinguish between what he called relational 
and notional readings of ambiguous sentences like
(5) Keith believes someone is an artist.
The relational (sometimes called de re) reading of (5) 
emphasizes the subject's relation to an object and is 
rendered with the existential quantifier outside the scope 
of the propositional attitude verb34:
(6) There is someone believed by Keith to be an artist.
The notional (de dicto) reading of (5) captures 
instead the subject's relation to a proposition, and is 
rendered with the quantifier inside the scope of the
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propositional attitude verb:
(7) Keith believes that there exist artists.
Now, Quine comments, inter alia, on a certain 
inferential move which is intuitively correct and appears 
reasonable, at least in some cases, but which unfortunately 
creates a theoretical headache. It appears difficult to get 
an adequate semantics for the inference from the notional 
form of a sentence like (5) to the relational form; the 
inference known as exportation.
This can be understood with the aid of a few intuitive 
points concerning truth-conditions. As we said above, the 
truth-conditions of (1) are such that the reference of the 
singular term 'a' must satisfy the predicate 'F.' This makes 
it legitimate to existentially generalize on the singular 
term position: what is being expressed by (1) is that what 
is referred to by 'a' satisfies 'F'; so, we can infer that 
there is an x such that Fx.
Things become less straightforward, however, when (1) 
is embedded in a propositional attitude context. For, as is 
well-known, the truth-conditions of the embedded sentence 
would appear now not to be the same: if they were, we could 
unhesitatingly substitute a co-denoting term 'b' for 'a' and 
expect that the truth-value of the whole sentence would 
remain unchanged. But of course, the stability of truth-
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value is not guaranteed.
The truth-conditions of the unembedded sentence are 
made in terms of the object and whether it satisfies the 
predicate: no mention whatever is made of the way in which 
it is presented or referred to. But in an opaque context, 
the way in which an object is referred to makes a difference 
to the truth-value of the belief sentence: it is the very 
proposition believed that is relevant to the truth-value of 
the whole sentence.
These are familiar points concerning the opacity of 
contexts such as belief. But now the difficulty concerning 
quantifying into these contexts emerges. When from (7) we 
infer (6) it seems we are in effect proceeding as if the 
truth-conditions of an opaque occurrence of singular term 
are just what they are when the occurrence is transparent.
For what is being claimed when existential 
generalization is applied to (1) is that there exists an 
object and it satisfies the predicate. All that matters is 
that the object exist and that it satisfy the predicate - 
the way in which it is referred to does not make a 
difference. This suggests, in the interest of uniformity, 
that existentially generalizing on an opaque occurrence of a 
singular term is to treat that occurrence as if all that 
matters is whether the object exists and whether it 
satisfies the predicate. But failure of substitutivity of 
co-denoting expressions shows that the way in which the
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object is referred to is relevant. Hence the puzzle about 
quantifying in.
This, roughly speaking, acknowledges the controversy: 
as I have said, I will not attempt to adjudicate it, let 
alone weigh in on any side, although a few remarks are in 
order.35 What is at work here is the intuitive idea that 
expressions do have straightforward existential entailments 
(pace Frege), and that these entailments need not 
necessarily be thought to be abandoned when those terms 
occur opaquely. After all, as Davidson vividly pointed 
out,36 the natural reaction is to resist Frege's solution 
to the (putative) problem of the behavior of expressions in 
intensional contexts, imposing as it does what might well be 
thought of as a quite preposterous referential ambiguity as 
regards expressions in those contexts.
Keeping this Davidsonian attitude in mind, we can try 
to undermine some of the orthodox resistance concerning 
quantifying into intensional contexts by drawing an analogy 
between the so-called opaque contexts wrought by, for 
example, modal operators, and factive expressions, and 
propositional attitude contexts such as belief. The natural 
and intuitive expectation (and the one that Davidson makes 
much of) is that expressions that find themselves in the 
scope of such operators will not suddenly find themselves 
denuded of their usual or standard semantic value. On the 
face of it, at least, there is no reason why they should. A
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demonstrative expression, for instance, has a certain 
function: it refers to a certain entity. And whether it 
succeeds or not is quite naturally supposed to depend on the 
way the world is, rather than on its location in a sentence.
Consider, to drive this home, a vacuous demonstrative. 
If embedding a demonstrative expression in an opaque context 
is sufficient to derail its usual reference to the extent 
that the Fregean picture maintains, what's to stop us 
supposing such an embedding is sufficient to make up for 
failures of reference? Why not suppose that a reference is 
generated for such expressions? Clearly this is 
unacceptable. The semantic role that is played by 
expressions outside of intensional contexts is most 
plausibly thought to persist when they are embedded. 
Inserting a vacuous demonstrative inside a belief context 
can't magically generate a reference for it.
Negation offers a straightforward commonsense case. 
Negating a sentence that contains a demonstrative expression 
doesn't inexplicably deprive the expression of its usual 
role of referring to a certain entity; the truth-value of 
the whole, familiarly, is a function of the truth-value of 
the parts. Existential entailments don't just vanish in 
these cases. Can't such commonsense apply equally to modal 
contexts as well? Is there any reason to suppose that the 
expression 'that F is S' won't do its usual semantic 
business - among other things, hang on to its customary
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existential entailments - when it is embedded in the scope 
of the modal operator It is necessary that . . .? And 
similarly for sentences reporting factive attitudes. In the 
sentence 'C knows that that cat is an Angora,' the embedded 
demonstrative expresses no fact without a corresponding cat: 
in the case of hallucination, no genuine state of knowledge 
can be ascribed. The key point to remember is that it is 
understandable to suppose that the principle of semantic 
constancy or uniformity ought to prevail - in fact, 
initially, it does prevail - with respect to expression 
outside and inside these contexts, and there is no in 
principle reason not to try to defend its holding for 
propositional attitude contexts - obstacles notwithstanding.
11. Weak Externalism: Formulation 
Having commented on the presuppositions, we can now 
consider how it is that weak externalism can be formulated 
in terms of their combination. The next thing to examine is 
whether every sort of expression capable of occupying 
singular term position - descriptions as well as proper 
names and demonstratives - will admit of existential 
entailments. The essence of weak externalism, we might say, 
is located in this issue. For the orthodox understanding of 
existential import denies that general sentences (sentences 
of the form 'For all x. . . .1 and 'There is an x. . . .') 
imply the existence of the referents of the expressions in
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those sentences. And descriptions - according to Russell - 
are to be analyzed as general sentences. What will emerge is 
that although descriptive sentences themselves cannot be 
thought to have existential entailments, it is perfectly 
plausible that their constituents - the predicates that make 
them up - do.
Let us recapitulate. (4), above - a sentence 
containing a demonstrative singular term - can be true only 
if its logical implications are true; and one of these is an 
existential sentence. This is essentially equivalent to the 
claim that the belief in question is existence-dependent on 
the object of that belief: should the reference fail to 
obtain, no proposition is expressed: and if no proposition 
is expressed, so no proposition can be believed.37
There is nothing particularly controversial about 
this. Obviously one wouldn't use a demonstrative in a 
belief-report unless one took it to refer: the report could 
only be true if the expression did refer. The idea is this: 
suppose Katie hallucinates a dog directly in her path baring 
its teeth and poised to spring. She no doubt takes herself 
to possess the belief that dog is baring its teeth and is 
poised to spring, which she would express by saying "That 
dog is baring its teeth and is poised to spring." Janet, 
observing her behavior, which includes looking frightened 
and clutching at her in a panic, turns to me, wondering what 
can explain Katie's behavior: Katie's odd behavior, given
49
that neither Janet nor I perceive any object in Katie's
path. I cannot sincerely report Katie's mental state by
uttering the sentence "Katie believes that dog is poised to
spring," since I don't believe there is a dog there. Were I
to attempt such an ascription, Janet would be fully entitled
to ask - even testily - "WHAT dog?" In sum: I cannot report
a belief with existential commitments when I possess
disconfirming knowledge concerning the existence of the
object of the belief. Segal, for one, makes this explicit
with his own example (1989, 54-55):
Suppose that Orville, perhaps in the 
clutches of a mad scientist, is 
undergoing a visual experience that 
seems to present a particular olive.
Orville, fond of olives and hungry, 
extends his hand in the appropriate 
direction. What is Orville doing?
Orville, what are you doing? 'I am 
reaching for that olive.' When we try to 
describe Orville's action what we find 
ourselves saying is: Orville is reaching 
for the olive that he thinks is there 
. . .  We say 'he is reaching for the 
olive that he thinks is there' because 
we are trying to say that he is reaching 
for an olive, which is what he thinks he 
is doing, without committing ourselves 
to there being an olive that he is 
reaching for.
This is the intuitive case for non-descriptive 
singular terms. The difficulties are thought to arise with 
respect to descriptive sentences.
Certainly the meaningfulness of 'There are F's' 
doesn't depend on there being anything that is an F (whether 
or not such a sentence is true, however, does so depend). So
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we have a clear distinction, on the Russellian picture, 
between expressions like proper names and demonstratives - 
which do depend on their reference for meaningfulness38 - 
and quantified expressions, which do not. And this isn't so 
surprising, given that expressions like proper names and 
demonstratives are singular terms, whose very point is to 
refer to an object. Quantified expressions, as Russell 
notoriously pointed out, are not singular terms. The thing 
to realize at this juncture is that were there nothing to 
left to say about the existence-dependence of expressions, 
externalism in its most general formulation would not be 
established: for, at this stage, the only thing that emerges 
is the existence-dependence of non-descriptive singular 
terms on their objects. And there are many concepts that are 
not expressed by singular terms.
But there is something further to note. Consider 
descriptive expressions. Definite descriptions are not, 
according to Russell, proper singular terms, for they have 
the logical form of existential sentences. The sentence
(8) The author of Waverly was a man
is analyzed according to the Theory of Descriptions as
(9) There is one and only one x such that x wrote Waverly 
and x was a man
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Now those familiar with the terrain here will recall 
that the canonical position concerning a descriptive thought 
is that one can possess, for instance, a descriptive belief 
without being en rapport (Kaplan 1968) with the object that 
satisfies the description: for instance, from
(10) Jerry believes that the most amusing cat in New York 
should go on the stage
there is supposed to be no clear inference to
(11) There is some cat in particular believed by Jerry to be 
the most amusing in New York and to thereby belong on the 
stage
since clearly Jerry can frame beliefs about the most amusing 
cat in New York and its theatrical potential by reasoning 
that cats come in different degrees of comic talent, and 
that there are cats in New York, so that there must be some 
cat or other who, by virtue of being the most amusing of the 
felines in that city, belongs on the stage. The canonical 
position regarding descriptive belief, that is, is that 
exportation is not a justified inference. But that would be 
to ignore the possibility that existential generalization 
might well apply to terms in predicate position as well to
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those in singular term position. If this could be made 
plausible, then the case for the existence-dependence of 
even general thought on its objects would be at least prima 
facie secured.
Briefly, the idea is this. As we have said, for
(12) (3x) Fx
to be true, an individual (corresponding to the variable) 
must exist. But now consider the meaningfulness of (12). 
Certainly (12) can be meaningful in the absence of any 
individual. But if we consider (12) more closely, it's clear 
that there might be thought to be something further that 
needs to be true in order for (12) to be meaningful. And 
this is that the property referred by the predicate exist - 
after all, what makes (12) true or false is whether the 
world obliges with an object that instantiates that 
property.
What is of course presupposed in this line of thought 
is second-order quantification, argument for which is well 
outside the scope of my project here. Assuming, therefore, 
that second-order quantification (quantification over 
properties) is legitimate, then we may say that the 
meaningfulness, the content, of (12) presupposes that
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(13) (3P) (P = Ax Fx )
is true: what (13) says is that there is a property P such 
that P is identical to the property F. The content of (12) 
is thus existence-dependent on properties via the predicates 
it contains; and properties are extra-cranial entities.
This line of thought can be understood to extend a 
certain way of thinking about singular terms to predicates 
Those familiar with that way of thinking will remember that 
Strawson (1956;1959;1974), and, later, Evans (1982), argued 
that if 'a' is a logically singular term, then for
(14) Fa
to express a proposition (to have content, to be
meaningful), it must be the case that there is an x such
that x is identical to a. Strawson writes (1974, 58):
. . . what about the very rare but not
impossible case where there is an
intended primary use of a name but . . .
there just does not exist any real
particular such that to indicate or 
specify that particular would be 
correctly to answer the question,
•Who/what is being named (or even mis­
named) by the name?' . . . The answer I 
suggest is simple. If there is nothing 
which counts as command-of-the-name-as- 
then-used, then there is no proposition 
asserted, though the speaker by 
hypothesis thinks there is. . . .
Given, then, a putative utterance of a 
proposition of our basic class with,
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say, a personal name in the 'a' place, 
we have it that a necessary condition of 
such a proposition being expressed by 
the utterance is that there should 
actually exist someone to whom the 
speaker is referring in uttering the
HcUQO • • • •
The analogous move for predicates, as we have seen, 
requires that a second-order existential sentence be true; 
what (14) can be understood to express, that is, is that 
there is a property F such that a has F. And for this to be
the case, it must follow, roughly speaking, that there exist
a property F - although, of course, what won't follow is 
that anything does have F.
Let us summarize the basic points. Russell, as it
happens, himself remarks (1988, 51):
. . . speaking generally, suppose we 
wish to say that the author of Waverly 
had the property <J> / what we wish to say 
is equivalent to 'One and only one
entity wrote Waverly, and that one had
the property <|>'.
And this serves to focus attention on a key idea. 
Descriptive sentences are made up predicates, as the 
analysis afforded by the Theory of Descriptions makes even 
more manifest. And while we can agree that general sentences 
do not bear a relation of existence-dependence to the 
entities over which the (first-order) quantifiers range, it 
does not follow from this that the predicate expressions 
that constitute those general sentences won't bear 
existence-dependence relations to extra-cranial entities.
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Predicates are (assumed to be) open to second-order 
quantification, and second-order quantifiers range over 
properties.
After all, what is it that makes predicates 
meaningful? One perfectly straightforward answer (captured 
in presupposition (2), above) is properties; the properties 
that those predicates refer to. Predicate expressions can 
thus be thought to have existential entailments in the same 
way that singular terms do: such expressions depend for 
their meaningfulness on the existence of the properties to 
which they refer.39 We have the basic picture in place for 
a prima facie case for the existential entailments of even 
general thought.
The picture that emerges from putting all of our 
presuppositions together is that, from (10), there is a 
perfectly plausible inference to
(15) There is an x (in particular) and there are properties 
F and G such that J believes that x instantiates F and G.
And, if so, it supports a notion of the existence- 
dependence of (both singular and general) beliefs on their 
objects. Given that, quite plausibly, (10) couldn't be true 
unless its logical implications were true - and some of its 
logical implications are the existential entailments of the 
expressions in predicate position, as well the existential
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entailments of the expressions in singular term position - 
we are in a position to formulate weak externalism.
Mental states such as belief are relational - 
externalistically determined - in that they depend for their 
existence on their (mind-and-language independent) objects: 
the particulars and properties referred to by the 
expressions that make up the belief-sentence; the singular 
terms and the predicates. This existence-dependence is made 
manifest in the considerations concerning inferences from 
the notional to the relational forms of belief sentences. 
Given the admittedly controversial but perfectly acceptable 
intuition that what logical and semantic characteristics 
apply to expressions outside of intensional contexts ought 
uniformly to be supposed to apply to them when they are 
embedded, we have seen that there is no reason to suppose 
that both singular terms and definite descriptions - via 
the predicates that make up those descriptions - can't be 
thought to have existential entailments.
And if this is so, then descriptive content is no less
existence-dependent on extra-cranial reality than is non-
descriptive singular content - existence-dependent on extra-
cranial abstract reality, to be sure, but extra-cranial
nevertheless. McGinn sums up the point (1989, 41):
weak externalism . . . does seem to me 
pretty uncontroversial considered by 
itself . . . properties are precisely 
the kinds of item that things in the 
world instantiate. The item that has to 
exist for me to think (say) 'something
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is square1 is the very same item that 
has to exist in order for the material 
object in front of me to be square, 
viz., the property of being square. This 
property . . . has causal powers (when 
instantiated) that operate out there in 
the extramental world. It should strike 
us as more surprising (more significant) 
than it does that this very objective 
property also enters into the 
individuation of mental states: that 
what is objective and nonmental should 
enter into the very identity conditions 
of something subjective, a state of 
mind.
A few concluding - historical - remarks should 
suffice. One way to absorb the line of thought behind weak 
externalism is to recall the context in which it is located: 
that of a wider issue onto which the work on singular 
thought and descriptive content - prominent in the late 
1970's and early 1980's - was directed.
A question can arise concerning the connection between 
externalism and the theory of descriptions: is it or is it 
not possible to avoid externalism with respect to 
particulars? According the theory of descriptions, all 
apparent singular terms can be analyzed away, so there is no 
reason to suppose that some thoughts necessarily involve 
reference to a (head-extraneous) particular: all thought is 
general thought.
Now, apart from the objection that the theory of 
descriptions may not apply to all denoting singular 
expressions, there is the following. What motivates the view 
that externalism should be denied for particulars? It seems
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that a determined internalist about the mind might well try 
to deny the existence of singular thought - since the 
necessary condition on the existence of a singular thought 
is that the worldly object of that thought exist - and think 
to succeed in this suppression by characterizing all thought 
as general. But this would be to fail to notice that 
descriptions themselves might arguably be indirectly linked 
to extra-cranial reality. Descriptions are composed of 
predicates: expressions that, plausibly, refer to 
properties. The internalist (masquerading as a description 
theorist) determined to deny an extra-cranial link between 
thought and its objects would then have to presuppose a 
particular ontological view about the status of properties - 
that these are mentalistic or in some way internal - in a 
rather desperate move to avoid externalism about even 
general thought.
Ultimately, the issue of whether or not there exists 
singular thought is independent of the debate between 
externalism and internalism, since singularity need not in 
itself imply extra-cranial content links (suppose you 
thought the reference of all singular expressions were 
sense-data). However, there is a convergence, since it will 
be sufficient for externalism that there be singular 
thoughts about non-mental entities. The point is, however, 
that even if it could be argued that there were no singular 
thought about non-mental entities, externalism would not
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necessarily thereby be avoided: externalism could still be 
claimed with respect to descriptive content, by raising 
issues concerning the ontological status of properties. And 
this brings the sketch up to date (for more, see Blackburn 
(1984), Evans (1982), McCulloch (1989), and McGinn (1989), 
among others).
12. Weak Externalism 
and Propositional Constituency 
Weak externalism's claim that mental states are 
necessarily individuated by mind-and-language independent 
reality - that their existence-and-identity-conditions are 
those of objects and properties that are the reference of 
those states - can be formulated in a slightly different 
way, according to a line of argument associated with Russell 
(1918), and developed by Evans (1982) and Kaplan (1972,
1978) , among others. This is the view, roughly speaking, 
that states of affairs have constituents, and, given that 
propositions represent states of affairs, it is quite 
plausible that propositions have the very same constituents 
that do the states of affairs they represent. It follows 
from this that the existence conditions of a belief content 
are those of the state of affairs the content represents: 
for the having of a belief is to bear a certain complex 
psychological relation to a state of affairs.40 Let us 
review the basic architecture of this view.
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Kaplan notes (1979, 212):
There is also an important - though less 
often noted - difference between Frege 
and Russell regarding the structure of 
intensional entities. According to 
Russell, an individual may be an 
immediate element of a proposition. In 
fact, certain atomic propositions 
consist of just individuals and 
attributes (or relations); whereas, for 
Frege, the immediate elements of a 
proposition must themselves be 
intensional entities of one sort or 
another.
This is borne out in the correspondence between Frege
and Russell on the subject of propositional constituency
(Frege, 1980, 163;169):
Truth is not a component part of a 
thought, just as Mont Blanc with its 
snowfields is not itself a component 
part of the thought that Mont Blanc is 
more than 4000 metres high. (Frege to 
Russell, 13.11.04)
Concerning sense and meaning, I see 
nothing but difficulties which I cannot 
overcome. . . I believe that in spite of 
all its snowfields Mont Blanc itself is 
a component part of what is actually 
asserted in the proposition 'Mont Blanc 
is more than 4000 metres high.' We do 
not assert the thought, for this is a 
private psychological matter: we assert 
the object of the thought, and this is, 
to my mind, a certain complex (an 
objective proposition, one might say) in 
which Mont Blanc itself is a component 
part . . . This is why for me the 
meaning of a proposition is not the 
true, but a certain complex which (in 
the given case) is true. (Russell to 
Frege, 12.12.04)
Kaplan (1979, 218) adapts the Russellian conception of 
a proposition and makes a distinction between singular
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propositions (those propositions which contain individuals 
as immediate constituents; 'This is blue') and general 
propositions, which do not contain individuals as 
constituents ('All men are mortal'). Kaplan's view - 
sometimes known as the Theory of Direct Reference - is that 
a propositional attitude like a belief is a relation to a 
proposition, whose constituents are the reference of the 
expressions of the sentence that expresses the belief: for 
singular propositions, objects, for general propositions, 
properties. It is true that Kaplan himself does not extend 
his points about propositional constituency to general 
propositions,41 nor does he draw the implication for 
possession of thought or the lack of it, should the relevant 
objects (properties) fail to obtain, but the implication is 
obvious. If to be in belief-state b one is held to be in a 
relation to a proposition whose constituents are object o 
and property P, and o and P fail to exist, then one is not 
related to a proposition: so one fails to be in belief-state 
b.
Evans's work on the subject of what he calls 
Russellian thought (1982) parallels Kaplan's but makes the 
existence-dependence of singular propositions on their 
objects completely explicit. For those unfamiliar with Evans 
on the subject of Russellian thought, the following is a 
precis of the position: content involving non-descriptive 
singular terms cannot be possessed in the absence of the
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object.42 The possession of descriptive thought is subject 
to conditions that are a little less uncompromising, as 
descriptions are analyzed according to Russell's Theory of 
Descriptions.43
According to Evans (1982, 44-6; 30-1):
Russell . . . held a theory of thought 
which incorporated the principle that it 
is not possible for a person to have a 
thought about something unless he knows 
which particular individual in the world 
he is thinking about . . . Given 
Russell's restriction, a situation can 
never arise in which a subject thinks 
that he is having or expressing a 
thought about an object while failing to 
do so; and this was a possibility which 
Russell very much wished to rule out, 
because it seemed to him incoherent. . .
However, there does not seem to me to be 
anything incoherent in the idea that it 
may be, for a subject, exactly as though 
he were thinking about a physical object 
(say) which he can see, and yet that, 
precisely because there is no physical 
object he is seeing, he may fail to have 
a thought of the kind he supposes 
himself to have. It is not part of this 
proposal that his mind is wholly vacant 
. . . The claim is simply that there is 
a kind of thought we sometimes have, 
typically expressed in the form 'This G 
is F', and we may aim to have a thought 
of this kind when, in virtue of the 
absence of any appropriate object, there 
is no such thought to be had.
Anyone who is attracted by a Russellian 
view of a class of singular terms must 
always attempt this further task: the 
task of explaining why, when a member of 
the class is empty, there is such a 
strong impression of understanding, 
communicating, and thinking.
Now, weak externalism extends, to general concepts, 
the idea of the identity-and-existence-dependence of content
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on the world outside the subject's skin.44 There is no
prima facie reason to rule out properties being themselves 
constituents of propositions, (assuming there are any such 
things as properties). Russell (1912, 58, emphasis his) 
notes:
Many universals, like many particulars, 
are only known to us by description. But 
here, as in the case of particulars, 
knowledge concerning what is known by 
description is ultimately reducible to 
knowledge concerning what is known by 
acquaintance . . . every proposition 
which we can understand must be composed 
wholly of constituents with which we are 
acquainted.
Of course, if one suffers from a deep-seated
scepticism about the existence of properties, one will fail
to be persuaded by the unzipped realism presupposed in weak
externalism's Russellian conception of a general
proposition. Now, it is no part of my project to argue for
realism about properties; a remark by Field (1981, 110),
however, sets the tone45:
Some people may feel that there is no 
ontological gain in quantifying over 
properties rather than over 
propositions. Such a person should read 
Putnam (1975f). Putnam makes a good case 
(a) that quantification over properties 
is needed in science, and (b) that 
properties are quite distinct from 
meanings, in that two predicates like 'x 
has temperature 210°C' and 'x has mean 
molecular energy 10-20 joules' can turn 
out to stand for the same property even 
though they clearly differ in meaning.
Here, however, we can make a few points about abstract
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objects and weak externalism, in anticipation of the charge 
that externalism is not relevantly supported by the claim 
that extra-cranial abstract reality has a content- 
individuating role.
13. Externalism and Abstracta
There is, of course, no reason to lump all abstract 
objects together from the point of view of their potential 
role as content-individuating items. We must distinguish, 
say, between Fregean senses and properties. Fregean senses 
are, of course, not in the head; Frege was himself adamant 
that they be considered objects in the public domain, so as 
to serve as media through which cognitive information could 
be transmitted. Now, it is an interesting question in what 
respect, if any, content individuated by way of Fregean 
sense can be considered externalistic in the sense we are 
interested in here (we might perhaps call that notion Very 
Weak Externalism, if we could bring it off),46 but it is 
one that would take me too far afield here. I will confine 
myself to a few suggestive remarks.
It seems to me to be a gross distortion of Frege's 
canonical position to claim that Fregean senses belong to 
the world in a sense of world illuminative of the notion of 
externalism we are interested in formulating here. It may be 
useful to remember the characterization of Fregean sense 
given by Barwise and Perry (1982, 4), who attribute to Frege
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the notion of a "third realm," a realm "neither of ideas nor 
of worldly events;" the realm to which sense can be thought 
to belong. Barwise and Perry may get this from Popper 
(1972), who puts the point in terms of "worlds": he 
distinguishes the world of physical objects or physical 
states; the world of states of consciousness; and, finally, 
the world of objective contents of thought. We can adapt his 
usage and speak of the 'world of sense' as distinguished 
from the 'world of reference.' Both of these 'worlds' can be 
thought of as mind-and-language independent,47 but only 
one of them, according to this line of argument, will have a 
genuinely externalistic role to play in the individuation of 
mental content.
To see this, one must keep in mind the notion of 
externalism that is at stake here. Externalism, as we have 
been formulating it, is a claim that the nature of mind is 
essentially determined by something usually thought of as 
utterly different in character - states of affairs; the 
movements and permutations in objects and their properties. 
What makes this an interesting and innovative claim is 
precisely that the mind, on this view, is conceived of as a 
set of relations to the world of objects and their 
properties: the ordinary world, the one that engages the 
interest of scientists and ordinary people.48 This flies 
in the face of the usual conception of mind: as a substance, 
as autonomous with respect to the world of things it is
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presumably directed onto in its states of perception of 
knowledge, as directly, introspectibly, infallibly 
accessible.
Now, to say that the essential character of mind is 
determined by a relation to Fregean senses simply doesn't 
have the same kind of bite, and there is a plausible way to 
explain that: following our usage above, Fregean sense does 
not belong to the world of reference (by definition).
Fregean sense is a semantic device, introduced to explain 
certain pyschological phenomena: for instance, why it is 
that in spite of the fact that the reference of two 
expressions a and b is identical, different cognitive 
information is expressed by the sentence 'a is a 1 than is 
expressed by the sentence 'a is b.1 Fregean sense is 
supposed to explain why knowing the truth of 'a is a' is 
trivial, while knowing the truth of 'a is b' is informative. 
Now, none of this has anything to do with the world of 
interest to scientists and ordinary people: the world, as it 
is sometimes characterized, as it is in itself. States of 
affairs are not determined by the, say, causal interaction 
of their Fregean senses (it is difficult to know what this 
would even mean) - they are determined, if by anything, by 
the permutations undergone by objects and their properties. 
Objects, likewise, do not instantiate Fregean sense: they 
instantiate properties. There is a plausible distinction to 
be drawn between the role that properties could conceivably
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play in the externalistic individuation of mental content 
and the role that senses might play: to deny this is to be 
perverse.
It cannot be emphasized enough that clinging to a TE 
formulation of externalism will obscure one's grasp of these 
points. For example, an objection might be raised that 
properties, being abstract objects, are necessary existents, 
so there is no such case as one where two individuals 
inhabit a different environment: their abstract environment 
will always be the same; thus, no externalism. Clearly, this 
is to confuse the formulations. Of course, the notions of 
'environment' or 'world-involving' or 'world-dependent' are 
not always understood in the same way in the literature.
Some take them to mean the causal context - the familiar 
twin earth story - but others take them merely to mean what 
Pettit (1986) calls the "surround" outside the subject's 
skin. This demarcates the 'environment' or 'world' in a 
broader way than does the twin earth story, and supports the 
view that 'environmental' or 'worldly' entities need not 
necessarily exclude, for example, abstract entities such as 
properties. This is a rather complicated issue, which I 
believe is illuminated by distinguishing properties from 
other abstract objects in terms of their causal powers and 
their role in explanations about the physical world (See, 
among others, Armstrong, 1983, 1989; Dretske, 1977; 
Haugeland, 1980; Shoemaker, 1984; Tooley, 1987). I consider
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this in more detail in chapter 3.
We might further remark that there are conceptions of 
universals which link them to their instantiation (cf. 
Aristotle: "For the species is synonymous with its 
individuals"; Topics, 154al8); surely not every world will 
instantiate all properties. The thing to keep in mind is 
that that externalism is a theory of mind from which a 
determined Cartesian about the mind would recoil; what makes 
it so repulsive to the Cartesian is its adherence to a 
genuinely constitutive necessary relation between mind- 
independent reality and the the mind; a relation analogous 
to that, say, between a set and it members. It is a 
necessary condition - but not sufficient - on candidates for 
individuation that they be mind-independent; and properties, 
instantiated or not, satisfy that condition.
14. Conclusion
We have been concerned, in this chapter, with 
formulating a notion of externalism that captures the idea 
that there is inextricable relation between independently 
obtaining states of affairs and the mind. We have argued 
that there is natural correlation between issues to do with 
meaning and reference and those to do with the fixing of 
mental content by head-independent reality. We have shown 
that the Twin Earth formulation of externalism - that 
content fails to supervene on inner states - though
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prominent, fails to reckon with the idea that there may be 
content for which failure of supervenience is not an option; 
as the price of popularism is, familiarly, precision, this 
may perhaps come as little surprise. The exposure of the 
Twin Earth formulation as very likely limited to a few kinds 
of content raises the possibility that there is a more 
general formulation of externalism that more accurately 
captures the general intuition that Twin Earth cases were 
meant to support.
We have distinguished externalism into two strands: 
strong and weak; and have argued that weak externalism can 
be established by the use of familiar semantic principles 
concerning, among other things, expressions and their 
existential entailments. None of this is without 
controversy, of course. But a case has been put forward for 
a general and necessary connection between content and the 
extra-cranial environment, a view whose interest stems from 
its direct challenge to the traditional Cartesian model of 
the mind as an entity of an incomparable and immaterial 
sort, permutating in splendid isolation from the world of 
objects and properties.
The consequences of externalism for psychological 
explanation is a familiar issue. In Chapter 2, I argue that 
the repercussions for explanation are more widespread than 
has been hitherto supposed, given our more general 
formulation of the notion of externalism.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
1. The notion of mental states as existence-dependent 
on the extra-mental environment can be found originally in 
Russell (1988, 175-281;285-322).
2. One that, as I intend to show, is more or less 
spurious. In fact, however, there seems to be a split on the 
understanding of 'externalism' depending on which side of 
the Atlantic one is on. In England, the issues center around 
singular or object-dependent thought; in the US, Twin Earth 
cases - failures of supervenience - are the dominant 
criteria for establishing externalism (those on the west 
coast (Kaplan, say), are closer to the British, however, in 
their formulations). A glance at the references to this work 
will give some idea of the division.
3. The condition is a necessary one, since it is 
otherwise difficult to see how one could establish a 
decisive distinction between a theory of mind that claims 
that the world, as it happens, corresponds to the mental 
states directed onto it; and one that claims that the fact 
that mental states have intentionality is partly because the 
world is a constituent of mental states.
4. More will be said about this controversial claim 
below: see the discussion of Evans (section 8).
5. I subject this to detailed scrutiny below in 
section (6).
6. Putnam is sometimes credited with being the first 
to raise the issue of externalism, which has for one reason 
or another come to mean, in the minds of some, the view that 
content fails to supervene, but the fact is that his 
concerns about whether meaning was or was not in the head is 
a clear historical progression - with a slightly different 
emphasis - from the concerns of Russell about the nature of 
the proposition. It was Russell, actually, who first argued 
against Frege that the constituents of propositions were the
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very objects of the proposition, as against Frege's view 
that the constituents of propositions were, rather, a 
mediate, semantic entity. Naturally the Russellian view has 
interesting consequences for the individuation of content 
and for belief-ascription: what if the objects don't exist? 
What if two people have exactly the same internal makeup but 
are causally related to two completely different objects? 
What if the objects are unfailingly mind-and-language 
independent, whether they are contingent or abstract? It is 
this extremely general issue that I take as the context 
against which the critical remarks in this chapter need to 
be understood.
7. Psychological states that are methodologically 
solipsist can be understood to be psychological states in 
the narrow sense; Putnam makes the point and Fodor generates 
an industry: see Fodor (1980, 63-109).
8. See McGinn (1989, 31).
9. The title of this paper - a compressed version of 
"The Meaning of 'Meaning'" - says it all. But, just for the 
record, note Burge's remarks (1979, 117, n. 2) in 
summarizing his position and its connection to that of 
Putnam's:
Putnam himself does not give quite this 
argument . . . This is partly just a 
result of his concentration on meaning 
instead of propositional attitudes.
10. The fact is that even for content for which TE 
cases are usually thought to apply, a careful examination of 
the facts reveals that the canonical case - varying the 
environment while keeping internal states the same - doesn't 
always make a perfect fit. Take for instance beliefs about 
oneself. Using 'I,' two speakers utter the sentence "I'm 
hot." Their internal states are the same, but it is 
stretching a point to say their environment has varied - 
what has varied is the identity of the speakers. This, I 
suppose, is sufficient for the purpose at hand; but it isn't 
a canonical TE case.
A separate but related point is this. Once you earmark 
for the reference of an expression (or a mental state) a 
necessary role in the determination of content, then the way 
is clear to claim that content is existence-dependent on its 
objects. So, in the case where two people believe a horse is 
snorting behind them, and one of them is hallucinating, then
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only one of them is in possession of the belief that that 
horse is getting nearer - the relevant (individuating) 
object of the belief being a figment. This kind of case can 
be understood in terms of non-supervenience: having the 
belief in question doesn't supervene on inner states - but 
there is no necessary connection; putting it this way gets 
the point across but involves none of the canonical TE 
apparatus.
The right thing to say about this (given that the 
examples involve indexicals, which Putnam argues are the 
other kind of content for which TE cases can be erected) is 
that even for the kind of content for which TE cases can be 
erected one should realize that TE itself is unnecessary, as 
is varying the environment in some dramatic sense. These 
points ought really to eradicate any lingering idea that TE 
is somehow necessary for making claims consistent with 
externalism. The really interesting question concerns 
content for which TE cases CAN'T be erected: can content 
both supervene and be thought to be externalistically 
determined? We shall see below that the answer is yes.
11. Putnam (1975a) himself appears to make the 
essential points in the section entitled "A socio-linguistic 
hypothesis" (227-229).
On a different note, it is worth pointing out, for the 
sake of accuracy, that Putnam does not, in (1975a), actually 
draw the conclusion that the mental states of Twins differ 
when their environments do: his view in 1975a, summarized by 
McGinn (1977, 531), is
that two speakers, or two linguistic 
communities, could use (phonetically 
identical) terms whose extensions in 
their respective languages were disjoint 
and yet be in the same mental states 
with respect to the terms and their 
extensions.
Burge (1979, p.117, note 2) concurs:
[Putnam] remarks in effect that the 
subject's thoughts remain constant 
between the actual and counterfactual 
cases (p.224). In his own argument he 
explicates the difference between actual 
and counterfactual cases in terms of a 
difference in the extension of terms, 
not a difference in those aspects of 
their meaning that play a role in the 
cognitive life of the subject. In my 
view, the examples do illustrate the
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fact that all attitudes involving 
natural kind notions, including de dicto 
attitudes, presuppose de re attitudes.
12. This notion was made much of later by Kripke, 
(1980), Lecture III.
13. It seems that Burge himself seems to think such a 
condition is imposed; see Antony (1993, 247-48) who accepts 
Burge's own valuation of the matter, but goes on to 
challenge it:
Of all Burge's thought experiments those 
alone [in 'Individualism and the 
Mental'] support his thesis that social 
relations are essential to the nature's 
of one's thoughts . . . Burge does 
provide an account from which it follows 
that Yolanda's actual and counterfactual 
thoughts differ - his story that 
'language-community membership' is 
essential to the natures of one's 
thoughts.
14. Certainly a number of commentators proceed as if 
this is Putnam's claim: see almost anyone British who writes 
in this area. Anyway, as we have said above, the interest of 
externalism as a general characterization of mental content 
would be significantly diminished if the claims in question 
weren't thought to be imposing necessary conditions on 
concept-possession.
15. Here the use of the term should be understood in 
Burge's sense. Note that 'individualism' is used in at least 
two ways in the literature. Burge (1979, 103) originally 
uses it to
apply . . .  to philosophical treatments 
that seek to see a person's intentional 
mental phenomena ultimately and purely 
in terms of what happens to the person, 
what occurs within him, and how he 
responds to his physical environment, 
without any essential reference to the 
social context in which he or the 
interpreter of his mental phenomena are 
situated.
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Fodor (1988, 30), on the other hand, uses 
'individualism' to apply to: ''standards of individuation 
according to which my Twin and I are in the same mental 
state. . . . "
This might be a good place to make a few 
terminological points. It has become standard to use 'anti­
individualism' to mean 'externalism' at least in some sense. 
This seems to me to add a certain amount of confusion to an 
already complicated set of issues. We will take 
'individualism' and 'anti-individualism' to refer to issues 
having to do with what McGinn (1989, 2, n.5) calls the 
subject-other relation; and 'internalism' and 'externalism' 
to refer to issues having to do with what he calls the 
subject-object relation. As McGinn puts it:
The guestion whether minds can fix the 
content of other minds is really a very 
different question from the question 
whether the extramental world can fix 
what holds of minds: different 
'interfaces' are being considered in the 
two cases.
16. Pettit and McDowell (1986, 1-15) use this notion 
in their formulation of Putnam's thesis.
17. Realism about moral and aesthetic concepts is here 
presupposed.
18. Burge (1979), despite a number of remarks about 
color concepts, doesn't appear to face up to this point. He 
considers the case of color ranges (p. 82):
People sometimes make mistakes about 
color ranges. They may correctly apply a 
color term to a certain color, but also 
mistakenly apply it to shades of a 
neighboring color. When asked to explain 
the color term, they cite the standard 
cases . . . but they apply the term 
somewhat beyond its conventionally 
established range. . . .
That's fine as far as it goes. But then he goes on:
The error is linguistic or conceptual 
. . .  It is not an ordinary empirical 
error. But one may reasonably doubt that 
the subjects misunderstand the
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dictionary meaning of the color term 
. . .  we can imagine that 'red' were 
applied as they mistakenly apply it. In 
such cases, we would no longer ascribe 
content-clauses involving the term 'red' 
in oblique position.
This seems to suggest that when a subject's mistake 
about color-ranges goes so far as to lead him to think a 
color term applies to two colors (a sort of extreme color- 
range mistake, perhaps), then the conditions for the 
thought-experiment break down.
19. He who remains sceptical is invited to try to 
erect a Burge-type case for concepts of belief and desire, 
or concepts of pain and pleasure. Surely we want to deny 
that it is possible to be wrong about whether one has a 
belief - as opposed to a desire. Yet, if on TE the words 
'belief-state' are used by the community to apply to 
desires, then my twin and I are in the same state - that of 
desire - which I inaccurately ascribe to myself as 'belief- 
state, ' since on Earth, the community uses 'belief-state' to 
apply to belief states. This is really quite implausible.
20. McGinn further points out that even this 
characterization of the conditions on formulation assumes 
that 'personhood' is not environmentally determined - 
something that might be open to question.
21. I have no particular views here: I am merely 
spelling out the logically possibilities for the sake of 
accuracy. The fact is, you could take the view that brain 
states are individuated by their function or purpose: if 
you're a teleologist about brain states then you're an 
externalist about such states, and the preconditions for TE 
cases might not be met. See Millikan (1984) for the basic 
picture; see also Fodor's (critical) discussion (1988, 31). 
I discuss teleological views of content below: section x,
(e) .
22. I don't want to anticipate my later remarks too 
much at this ground-clearing stage: suffice it to say that 
McGinn's distinction between strong and weak externalism - 
the distinction in formulations of externalism introduced at 
the beginning of the chapter - applies to perceptual 
content. Qualitative states are weakly, but not strongly, 
external, as he argues (1989, 58-100). Externalism about 
perceptual content is a thorny issue, and not one that is
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relevant to my concerns in this thesis.
23. It must be said that the original formulations of 
externalism qua externalism (and many subsequent) do not 
avail themselves of the notion of supervenience - Putnam 
(1975a) most certainly never mentions it, and neither do 
Evans, McDowell, or anyone else working in that tradition of 
thought about externalism. This concept has crept into the 
externalist literature and become entrenched - at least in 
some parts of the world - mainly, I would say, as a result 
of Fodor's arguments (1980, 1988) concerning content and 
explanation. But now there is every reason to suppose that 
the notion of supervenience might be actually somewhat 
ambiguous.
24. Say, for example, the relation of the moral on the 
descriptive, the aesthetic on the physical, and the modal on 
the actual.
25. But let's be careful here. Those who are 
unfamiliar with the literature concerning weak and strong 
externalism might easily simply take 'relational' to be 
equivalent to 'bears causal/environmental relations to . . 
.' This is of course because such persons confuse TE with 
externalism. We stipulate rather that "relational" be 
understood as generally as possible: to include 
causal/environmental relations, but not to be exclusively 
restricted to those.
26. Much more about this below.
27. These arguments are by no means original to me: 
McGinn, adding to certain key ideas from Russell, Strawson, 
and Evans, makes them in his 1989, chapter 1. More on this 
below.
28. It must be said that there are issues that could 
arise here that are extremely complex and raise all sorts of 
difficulties; for example, the remarks below will touch on 
exportation, the reference of predicates, Russell's theory 
of descriptions, opacity, vacuous singular terms, fictional 
discourse, negative existentials and de re modality. I 
resist getting drawn into the controversies that surround 
these fearsome issues. All I am concerned to do here is to 
examine the ways in which some of these notions and that of 
externalism in its most general formulation might be seen to
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converge.
29. We have already pointed out that nearly all of 
those who write on the subject of externalism put it in 
terms of object-dependent thought - anyone working on the 
subject, that is, in England or the on West Coast. It really 
is only a handful of people who put this issue in terms - 
exclusively - of failures of supervenience. It remains to be 
noted that most of the work done with respect to object- 
dependent thought concentrated on (non-descriptive) singular 
terms; for a long time, for instance, demonstratives were 
all the vogue (see Evans, 1982; McDowell, 1977;1984 for 
starters). McGinn 1989 was the first to extend the notion of 
object-dependent thought to the predicates involved in 
attitude ascription.
30. The issue of vacuous singular terms is one with 
familiar complications, comment on which is mercifully not 
part of my project here. A comment on the semantic behavior 
of indexicals like "I" and "now" might be useful, however: 
from the fact that it is difficult to erect a case with a 
vacuous referential use of "I" it won't follow that the 
semantics of this kind of demonstrative expression differs 
from the others: it simply represents a sort of limit case.
31. McGinn (1989, 37):
The term 'that dog' . . . has need of a 
demonstrated dog if the sentence is to 
succeed in stating a fact.
32. The sceptic about denotation and existence- 
dependence is invited to examine the history of these 
notions. The place to start is Russell (1988, 39-56; 175- 
282). If that isn't sufficient, Evans (1982) is worthwhile. 
Finally, Kaplan (1972) is useful.
33. In particular, I will not consider issues to do 
with vacuous names, fictional discourse, negative 
existentials, or de re modality. These are obviously 
interesting but too complicated to be treated in this paper, 
and, in particular, not relevant to my project, which is to 
formulate externalism as generally as possible. I will, 
however, have something to say about descriptive singular 
terms. For a survey and treatment of the problems associated 
with these issues, see Evans (1982).
I would make one point however, concerning these
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difficult cases. As those familiar with the literature will 
know, it is sometimes argued that these cases show that 
there cannot be any such thing as object-dependent or 
singular thought. One line of argument against this one 
might proceed as follows: there has got to be a fallacy 
involved in the argument that claims that because
(0) It is not the case that Hermes is mortal
can be true without there being a real god that is mortal it 
must follow that
(O') Alan is disgusted
does not presuppose the existence of a concrete individual. 
If this argument were correct, that would mean that no 
sentence ever presupposed the existence of a concrete, real 
individual. And it's doubtful that the reference relation is 
in that much trouble.
34. An analogy can be drawn, as is well-known, with 
modal contexts.
35. See at the very least, Kaplan (1968).
36. For more on this, see Davidson (1984, 93-108); 
also chapter 3 below.
37. Once more, the sceptic is invited to review his or 
her Russell, Evans and Kaplan. I emphasize this since 
resistance on this point will completely interfere with 
grasp of the essence of this chapter.
38. Of course, this is a slight misrepresentation of 
the conservative Russellian view of what counts as a proper 
singular term. As those familiar with Russell will recall, 
the only expressions that count as logically proper names 
are the expressions 'this1 and 'that1 - and these only when 
they are used to refer to one's own sense-data.
39. A very good source for views on the subject (as 
well as critical commentary and a defense of property 
realism) is Armstrong (1978, Vol. I); see also Bealer 
(1992). It so happens that Burge makes a relevant remark 
(1982, 120):
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As I mentioned earlier, one might hold 
that ‘water1 names an abstract property 
or kind and that attitude attributions 
typically attribute de re attitudes of 
the kind. . . .
40. Classic sceptical arguments, say about the 
existence of the external world, proceed by noting that one 
can indeed instantiate the belief that the table is in the 
room even if there isn't a table (or a room). This is 
because there would appear to be a distinction between 
having the belief that p and having the veridical belief 
that p. The literature opposed to this view does indeed 
claim that for some content (non-descriptive singular 
content), an ascription cannot be made unless it is 
veridical (see Evans, 1982, among others, for an extended 
discussion). Naturally this is controversial.
41. But Salmon does. See his (1982), particularly 
chapter two.
42. The issue concerning the possession of negative 
existential thought is a familiar complication; Evans has 
much to say on the subject, and the reader is referred to 
his (1982). My desire is simply to make use of some basic 
concepts from Evans, not to treat his views to extensive 
critical scrutiny.
43. And so (1982, 47; 43):
. . . Russell held, and I think he was 
entirely right to hold, that where a 
clear descriptive condition exists for 
something's being the referent or 
denotation of a term, a quite 
determinate truth condition is 
associated with sentences containing the 
term, whether or not it is empty; the 
sentence is true just in case there 
exist something which uniquely satisfies 
the condition, and which satisfies the 
sentence's predicate. . . .
Where '<J>' is a coherent description, 
perfectly clear conditions for the truth 
of the sentence 'the <t> is F' (and
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thereby equally clear conditions for its 
non-truth) have been laid down: the 
absence of a satisfier of the 
description is no obstacle to someone's 
correctly understanding an utterance of 
the sentence as having these truth- 
conditions. A thought may be conveyed; 
and a belief (that the conditions are 
satisfied) may be induced. I do not 
believe that it is open to us to hold, 
with Strawson, that someone who utters a 
sentence containing an empty description 
has said nothing (expressed no 
proposition). . . .
44. It cannot be emphasized enough that basic ideas 
must be kept clear in order to avoid getting sidetracked on 
to orthogonal issues. The claim that reference is a 
necessary condition on meaning/content is not equivalent to 
the claim that it is a necessary and sufficient condition. 
(Worth remembering here, as an example, is that the 
Evans/McDowell view of Russellian thought does not preclude 
sense (See Evans, 1982, 39;51)). As a purely logical point, 
it is surely obvious that from the fact that reference is 
taken to be a necessary propositional constituent, it will 
not follow that reference is taken to be the only 
propositional constituent. The claim that propositions are 
held to contain worldly items is not in itself a claim that 
worldly items is all they contain. In a word, it won't do to 
mix up the claims of a Direct Reference Theory with, for 
instance, the more conciliatory claims of dual componency 
theories of content.
Of course, the question: "In virtue of what are the 
propositions expressed by
(1) Batman is Batman 
and
(2) Bruce Wayne is Batman
distinguished, given that a) Catwoman believes (1) and 
doesn't believe (2); and b) on the account under 
consideration, these propositions have the very same 
referential constituents?" is a perfectly good question. It 
is not one whose answer is essential to my project, and I do 
not anticipate delving into the vast literature on the 
subject, as it is to one side of my interests.
It is worth pointing out, however, by way of suggestive 
remark, that:
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(1) propositions can be claimed to have the same 
referential constituents without it following that they must 
contain the very same intensional constituents.
(2) We can draw a plausible analogy with perceptual 
states such as seeing an object, to support the claim that 
propositional states can share the same necessary conditions 
without sharing the same sufficient ones.
(3) It won't do to understand 'containment' or 
'constituency' too crudely: it is best to understand these 
as a way of talking about the necessary conditions on 
content.
45. The account of analyticity given semantic 
externalism formulated in chapter 3 will rely on a firm 
distinction between concepts and properties. Some remarks to 
challenge mentalism about properties will be made there.
46. On further thought, however, it seems likely that 
we shall have to deny that any such notion of externalism is 
defensible. One might be tempted to think that there is 
variety of externalism formulable in terms of the content- 
individuating role of any and all abstract entities, these 
not being in the head. What appears to be at stake here is 
the claim that it is sufficient to generate externalism that 
the phenomenon in question involves a relation to an 
abstract entity: the having of belief b, for instance, in 
that it involves a relation to some abstract entity, thus 
implies externalism about belief-individuation.
But this claim appears open to a glaring reductio. 
Take, for instance, an object's being square. An object's 
being square is plausibly a function of a relation between 
the object and an abstract object - the universal 'square.' 
But surely no one in their right minds would want to argue 
that since an abstract object is involved in something's 
being square then we have to be externalists about object- 
individuation. So, analogously, for claims about mental 
state individuation, for this sort of view implies that you 
are an externalist in virtue of instantiating any property: 
like the property of being in pain, or the property of 
instantiating neurophysiological property p, both commonly 
considered quite internal properties. What's worse, this 
sort of view implies that you are an externalist in virtue 
of believing in beliefs at all: being the belief that snow 
is white, is, after all, an abstract entity.
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47. Although, as Fregean exegesis will attest, there 
is some controversy over whether Fregean senses are indeed 
language-independent.
48. McGinn (1989, 18, n.24) makes the point that there 
is an interesting analogy between the externalistic 
determination of mind and the relational determination of 
space.
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CHAPTER 2
EXTERNALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
. . . Koznyshev was not alone. With him was a famous 
professor of philosophy who had coe from Kharkov for the 
express purpose of clearing up some difference that had 
arisen between them on a very important philosophical 
question . . . They were discussing the fashionable 
question whether there was a dividing line between the 
psychological and physiological phenomena in 
human activity; and, if so, where?
Tolstoy, Anna Karenin
1. Introduction: Causation and Explanation 
A number of related questions arise concerning the 
occurrence of an event. Two of the most predictable, and 
familiar, are "what caused this event?" and "what explains 
the occurrence of this event?" That these questions can be 
distinguished is something that has been very thoroughly 
examined by Davidson (1980), among others, whose remarks on 
the subject serve as a useful background. We will briefly 
rehearse a few points about causal relations and their 
descriptions, then move on to consider the consequences of 
semantic externalism for mental events and their 
explanation.
Davidson, familiarly, does not directly consider the 
nature of causal relations1, but focuses instead on the 
logical form of causal sentences. The sentence:
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(1) The explosion caused the evacuation of the World Trade 
Center
expresses a two-place relation, with the singular terms 'the 
explosion' and 'the evacuation' referring to particular 
events. Now, in that this sentence states a causal relation 
between two events, it is referentially transparent. That 
is, replacing the two singular terms with other co- 
ref erential singular terms, as in
(2) The act of terrorism linked to the blind Islamic cleric 
caused the biggest catastrophe in New York in 1993
results in no variation in truth-value. So, briefly, it 
appears correct to say that causal relations hold between 
events and do so no matter how the events are described.
The same thing, however, cannot be said for 
explanations. When the question concerns the explanation for 
the evacuation of the building, rather than the relation 
between the evacuation and its causal antecedents, then it 
appears to be the case that only some purported explanation 
sentences will be adequate to the job, not all.
A natural reply, when asked why the building was 
evacuated is, "an explosion went off." The property of being 
an explosion here almost certainly can be said to have an 
explanatory role. Explosions involve disintegration of
85
materials and the like, which appear to reveal the mechanism 
at work behind a sudden mass exodus out of a building. 
Consider, on the other hand, whether the following reply 
would be satisfactory: "the building was evacuated on 
account of the occurrence of an event linked to the blind 
Islamic cleric in New Jersey." This reply is unsatisfactory 
in that it seems quite beside the point, given that we want 
to explain the connection between the explosion event and 
the evacuation event. That these events had something to do 
with the cleric does not seem to get to the root of the 
question: after all, lots of things are linked to the cleric 
every day, not many of which result in evacuations of 
buildings. His merely being linked to an event, that is, 
isn't sufficient to bring about the evacuation of a 
building.
The upshot is that not every description of an event - 
even if it is a true description - will refer to the 
properties of the event that have a role in an explanation 
involving that event. Metaphysically speaking, this comes 
down to the fairly uncontroversial claim that for any event, 
many things (even infinitely many things) are true of it, 
but not all of those things will explain it or its effects. 
In sum, not every property of an event has an explanatory 
role.
Clearly, however, if one is interested in explaining 
an event, then one needs some criterion to narrow down those
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properties of an event that do have an explanatory role. A 
criterion that is widely thought to be useful involves laws 
and counterfactuals.2
2. The role of laws in scientific explanation 
Hempel is noted for, among other things, a classic 
treatment of the role of laws in explanation. His deductive- 
nomological model (D-N model) of scientific explanation 
(1965, 336-337):
. . . effects a deductive subsumption 
of the explanandum under principles that 
have the character of general laws. Thus 
a D-N explanation answers the question 
'Why did the explanandum-phenomenon 
occur?1 by showing that the phenomenon 
resulted from certain particular 
circumstances, specified in C1( . . .
Ck [sentences describing the particular 
facts invoked], in accordance with the 
laws La, L2, . . . Lr [the general laws
on which the explanation rests]. By 
pointing this out, the argument shows 
that, given the particular circumstances 
and the laws in question, the occurrence 
of the phenomenon was to be expected; 
and it is in this sense that the 
explanation enables us to understand why 
the phenomenon occurred. In a D-N 
explanation, then, the explanadum is a 
logical consequence of the explanans.
Furthermore, reliance on general laws is 
essential to a D-N explanation; it is in 
virtue of such laws that the particular 
facts cited in the explanans possess 
explanatory relevance to the explanandum 
phenomenon.
Hempel's criterion illustrates one paradigm of the 
nature of explanation: that explanation in science is 
concerned to uncover the mechanisms that operate with
87
respect to the objects and events that we observe. These
mechanisms are understood as the links between causes and
effects of phenomena, and science is understood to offer
causal explanation (Hempel 1965, 347-349):
An explanation of a particular 
occurrence is often conceived as 
pointing out what 'caused' it . . . But 
causal attributions . . . presuppose 
appropriate laws . . . And by virtue of 
thus presupposing general laws which 
connect 'cause' and 'effect,' causal 
explanation conforms to the D-N model 
. . . And the law tacitly implied by the 
assertion that b, as an event of kind B 
was caused by a as an event of kind A is 
a general statement of causal connection
In sum: explanations are deductive arguments, the 
conclusion of an explanation is a sentence that describes 
the phenomenon to be explained, and the premises of the 
argument contain a natural law.
Hempel's criterion, although it relies heavily on the 
notion of a law, does not in itself offer any 
characterization or explication of the notion of law, as he 
himself notes (1965, 340-345). This is an issue best left to 
one side here; one or two remarks, however, can help to shed 
light on the issue of the explanatory role of properties of 
objects and events.
Properties customarily thought to characterize a law 
are, first, its generality, and second, its being 
counterfactual supporting. Take the statement "All the cats 
in my apartment are black and white." Does this entail the
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conditional "If x were a cat, and x were in my apartment, 
then x would be black and white?" No: given the fact that 
what cats there are in my apartment are black and white is 
accidentally true, we cannot hope to rely on the property of 
being in my apartment to reliably, predictably, and 
necessarily to generate black and white cats.
The statement, "Sugar dissolves in liquid," on the 
other hand, does entail the counterfactual "If this were 
sugar, it would dissolve in liquid," and, as such, is 
thought to be an instance of a natural law. It is 
sufficient, that is, to bring it about that something will 
dissolve in liquid if it is so naturally disposed; and sugar 
is one of those of things with a disposition to dissolve.3
This distinction between accidentally true 
generalizations and those that are counterfactual-supporting 
is one that can help to distinguish those descriptions of 
events that have a role in the explanations involving those 
events, and those that do not. Some descriptions of events 
will generate laws by way of supporting counterfactuals and 
will thus be pertinent to explanations; and some will not, 
although many of those that are not can be used, of course, 
to identify events which are causes.
Now it is important to point out that it is possible 
to reject the causal criterion of scientific explanation 
(see Salmon et al., 1992). One might even reject the idea 
that laws of any kind are needed in order to get to
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mechanisms, and so to explain how things work (Schiffer 
1991). Davidson, of course, is famous for claiming that 
psychological explanation can't be got at by the positing of 
laws (1980). The issue of competing models of explanation is 
one that will get some attention below, as it bears on the 
question of whether an externalist criterion of content 
individuation is compatible with the causal relevance of 
content.4
To return to the issue of primary concern: we have 
seen that a causal statement will contain singular terms 
referring to the causes and to the effects. The question is: 
do the descriptions occuring in those statements have an 
explanatory role or not? Let us see how this question 
applies to the case of mental events, their causes and 
effects, and psychological explanation.
3. Mental causation
Presupposing that mental events can be causes, we can 
ask the question: what does this amount to? A believer in 
mental causation would presumably take it that there are 
true singular causal statements referring to mental events:
(3) Pain caused her teeth to clench.
(4) Her thinking it was lunch time, and her desiring lunch, 
caused her to ring for the parlourmaid.
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The question now is whether mental descriptions 
('pain,' 'thinking,' 'desiring,') are explanatory or merely 
accidental. That is, is it in virtue of having mental 
properties that these events have the effects they do have?
The question is particularly pressing since mental 
events are thought to have a physical realization, so it is 
certainly not at all obvious that it will be the mental 
descriptions that have an explanatory role. Yablo (1992, 
248-249) expresses the worry:
. . . the mystery is how mental events, 
desires for example, can be making a 
causal difference when their 
unsupplemented neurophysiological 
underpinnings are already sufficient to 
the task at hand . . . mental events 
are effective, maybe, but not by way of 
their mental properties; any causal role 
that the latter might have hoped to play 
is occupied already by their physical 
rivals.
Of course, just because a mental event is described 
physically doesn't mean that the physical description will 
be ipso facto explanatorily pertinent: surely there can be 
many physical properties of an object or event that simply 
reveal nothing about the causal mechanisms at work. The 
point here is only that there are at least two descriptions 
of a mental event that can operate at any given time, so 
there is no logical reason to suppose that the mental 
description will be the one that will pick out the 
explanatory properties.
As we saw in the general case, causal relations are
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referentially transparent. Causes can be picked out without 
its being specified which of their characteristics have an 
explanatory role; that is, a cause can be referred to 
without its being specified what it is about it that brings 
about its effect. Making a causal statement does not entail 
making an explanatory one. So, for instance, even if you 
denied epiphenomenalism for mental events, it wouldn't 
follow from that that descriptions of mental events tell you 
what you need to know to explain their effects. Is there any 
real reason not to abandon mental talk in explanatory 
contexts?
4. Belief-Desire Psychology
Given the above quite familiar points one obvious 
option is simply to deny that mental descriptions are 
causally explanatory. This of course may or may not go along 
with the further option of denying that mental states are 
causal engines in the first place.5 The problem with these 
options, however, is that they appear to fly in the face of 
a commonsense theory about psychological explanation.
Human behavior, as well as that of some animals, is 
commonly and plausibly thought to be the outcome of a 
certain amount of mental perturbation. When we want to know 
why A kissed B, it helps to be told that A believed B was 
her lover, and that A desired to show her lover some 
affection. When we want to know why the cat is yowling, it
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helps to be told that he wants food. Behavior, that is, 
seems at least partly produced by mental states with 
content; and the content of those states appears to tell you 
much of what you need to know to explain behavior. So a 
discipline whose aim is to categorize, characterize and 
explain behavior seems to need to include mental states in 
its roster.6 Psychology plausibly proceeds by way of 
propositional attitudes.
Strong words have been uttered concerning the 
feasibility of abandoning talk of content in psychology 
(Fodor 1987, p.xii):
. . .  if commonsense intentional 
psychology really were to collapse, that 
would be beyond comparison the greatest 
intellectual catastrophe in the history 
of our species; if we're wrong about the 
mind, then that's the wrongest we've 
ever been about anything . . . We'll be 
in deep, deep trouble if we have to give 
it up.
Of course, Fodor concedes that folk psychology bears 
something of a mere family resemblance to the "rigorous and 
explicit intentional psychology that is our scientific goal" 
(1987, p.xii). No matter. In the end, it is intentional 
psychology that is our scientific goal. In fact, what it is 
that a properly scientific psychology should be is an issue 
that emerges as more problematic than Fodor makes it appear, 
inasmuch as the problem of content's explanatory role begins 
to look somewhat stubborn, inviting creative solutions. We 
will consider the issue of what should count as proper
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psychology below. For the moment, we can launch the 
investigation into the status of content's explanatory role 
as follows: content-citing mental descriptions seem, for the 
most part, to be successful tools for predicting and 
explaining behavior. And while it is the case 
presupposing a causal criterion of explanation - that it is 
possible to merely assert that mental descriptions have no 
explanatory utility, in fact there is a theory of content 
that has the unfortunate consequence of making it difficult 
to see how it is that content can play an explanatory role.
5. The Case of Factives: An Analogy
A useful analogy, both with respect to the issue of 
the explanatory relevance of mental descriptions in itself, 
and with respect to the complications engendered by 
externalism and psychological explanation, is the case of 
factive expressions: descriptions of mental states that 
imply that certain facts obtain: 'knowing that p,' 
'remembering that p ,' 'regretting that p,' 'realizing that 
p,' and 'perceiving that p,' for example.
Consider whether
(5) A went to Fairway to buy arugula because he knows that 
Fairway sells arugula
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cites an explanatorily relevant characteristic of the mental 
state involved in A's going to Fairway to buy arugula. (5) 
seems reasonable, on the face of it, as an explanation. But 
there is an objection, which goes as follows. The 
explanation offered, which cites A's knowing that Fairway is 
a place to get arugula, is misleading. Suppose A only thinks 
he knows that Fairway is a place to get arugula; suppose 
Fairway is a dressmakers instead. The fact that A is not,
after all, in a state of knowledge turns out to be neither
here nor there with respect to his Fairway-directed 
movements - what really matters is what A believes with 
respect to Fairway. From the fact that his belief is false
it doesn't follow that he doesn't possess it, and it is the
property of possessing that belief about Fairway - though 
false - that is causally implicated in his doings, and that 
it would be explanatorily useful to cite.
The point holds for cases, say, of remembering and 
even seeing. Both of these imply facts about the world which 
are out of the range of the subject's psychology, which, 
intuitively, is located inside his head. But it isn't what a 
subject actually remembers that plays a part his psychology: 
it's what he thinks he remembers. And it isn't what a 
subject sees that play a role in his psychology, but what it 
seems to him that he sees.7
What a subject knows, sees or remembers can be 
expressed in mental descriptions that imply something quite
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external to the subject: the state of the world.
Intuitively, it seems difficult to see how the state of the 
world outside the subject could make any difference to the 
subject's psychology. And so the correct thing to say about 
such cases would appear to be this: of course you can use 
factive descriptions of mental states to make causal 
statements about the doings of a subject, but, in so doing, 
you would not necessarily be citing the characteristics of 
his mental states that play a causally explanatory role. And 
if, say, you wanted to specify the taxonomic principles by 
which your science of human agency proceeded to make its 
distinctions, factive descriptions of mental events would be 
ruled out, for these do not necessarily pick out the 
explanatory factors that are operative in the doings of a 
psychological subject.
6. Externalism and the role of content 
in explanation 
This brings us at last to the consequences of 
externalism for psychological explanation. In fact, the 
basic intuitive problem has been anticipated - as intended - 
by the analogy with factive expressions. A theory of content 
that claims that some or all attitude attributions use 
content clauses which imply something independent of the 
subject's psychology - the environment, both particular and 
abstract, that surrounds her - will similarly have to face
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the possibility that such content clauses fail to have a 
genuinely explanatory role.
That there are consequences for the role of content in 
explanation given externalism is, on the face of it, a 
familiar issue, concerning which there is a vast literature. 
It is necessary, however, to revise some of the details 
associated with the orthodox view. Most in need of 
rethinking is the tacit belief that the explanatory role 
problem for content is its failure to supervene; that 
content becomes problematic in propositional 
attitude psychology because it fails to supervene; so, 
complementarily, if content does not fail to supervene there 
is no problem. Of course, given the rather widespread 
tendency to take Twin Earth cases as definitive (even 
necessary) for an understanding and formulation of an 
externalistic view, this conception of the problem of 
content's explanatory role is not surprising. But there is 
reason to think it is inaccurate.
The distinction between weak and strong externalism, 
defended in chapter 1, raises a question as to just what is 
to be understood by the consequences of externalism for the 
role of content in psychological explanation. We must 
understand this issue now as dividing into separate but 
related questions: What are strong externalism's 
consequences for explanation? Are there consequences for 
psychological explanation given weak externalism as well as
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strong externalism? And what, if any, are the logical 
connections between these problems?
7. Non-supervenience, extrinsicness, 
and redundancy 
We can begin by briefly considering the familiar 
consequences of strong externalism for content-based 
psychology. Two presuppositions - these are not completely 
uncontroversial in themselves - are relevant to this issue. 
One, as we have already noted, is the causal character of 
explanation. The other is that mental states have 
representational or semantic properties as well as intrinsic 
ones. The question arises: which features of propositional 
content have a genuinely explanatory role? The explanatory 
claims of a content-based psychology, of course, advert 
essentially to the semantic features of content, taking more 
or less the form:
(6) C did a because she believed that p and desired that g.
But is it the semantic features of content that have 
an explanatory role? The problem, briefly, is as follows. On 
one criterion, psychological explanation, like all 
scientific explanation, is causal explanation. The features 
of a cause that lead to an effect must be located where the 
causal interaction takes place, on pain of making a mystery
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of the causal process: invoking action at a distance and 
other occult phenomena. Mental causal interaction must thus 
be understood to take place in the head, as it is most 
likely to suppose that the relevant machinery to effect 
causal processes is going to be located there. But this of 
course sits uneasily with the contention that content fails 
to supervene on what's in the head. The tension is clear: 
the causal powers of content must be in the head, but 
content itself is not; a puzzling result.
As we noted above, it is a familiar story that strong 
externalism has untoward consequences for content in 
explanation. What may be less familiar, however, is the 
claim - to be defended here - that externalism in its most 
general formulation has problematic consequences for 
content's explanatory role; that is, an explanatory role 
problem arises for content whether or not content supervenes 
on inner states. What we are after, ultimately, is a way to 
formulate the problem of content's explanatory role so that 
it is clear that any concept for which externalistic 
determination conditions hold will fall afoul of it.8
It is worth showing how the orthodox formulation of 
the problem of content's explanatory role can be absorbed 
into a more general one. Some kinds of content, as we know, 
just imply that a person is on TE. And this, of course, 
implies something about the person's environment, the world 
they're in, the facts that obtain. Content doesn't supervene
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on the inner states that do the real explanatory work, so 
content doesn't do any real explanatory work.
One quite popular way of understanding this is to say: 
wide content varies in this way, and given that its 
variation doesn't seem to make any difference to the doings 
of the subject, then wide content has no explanatory role. 
What does have an explanatory role is narrow content. That 
is, given that twins could do the same thing whether or not 
they both believe that p, both me and my twin could yelp and 
run away at the sight of what we both call "water," since 
the respective substances referred to by that word in our 
environments scare us. So there must be something that is in 
common between us that explains why we do the same thing.
And it isn't our belief that p, when it is taxonomized 
widely; she doesn't believe that H20 is scary (and I don't 
believe that XYZ is scary). What we do share is a narrowly 
taxonomized belief that p; and it is this that has the 
explanatory role.
Logically speaking, of course, this is exactly the 
same as the claim that knowing that p is not what explains 
someone's doings; rather, what really explains someone's 
doings is, say, narrow knowledge, stipulated to mean 
believing that p. Of course in this case it is somewhat 
easier to see that there is something in common between 
someone who believes truly that p and someone who believes 
falsely that p: they both believe that p. The fact that one
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belief is true and the other false is a - dispensable - wide 
fact about them. Nevertheless, it is thought that some such 
distinction can be made for belief content itself.9
Now the arguments in chapter 1 put forward the case 
that only natural kind and indexical content fails to 
supervene. This of course suggests that two kinds of content 
- no more - fail to sustain a viable role in the explanatory 
claims of propositional attitude psychology (which, 
coincidentally, suggests that narrow content is a limited, 
even if successful, solution to the problem).10 Can we 
thus dismiss the problem of content's failure to supervene 
as too limited to be of any real worry? Or is there a wider 
aspect to the problem lurking beneath the surface?
Let us scrutinize a canonical failure of supervenience 
problem to see whether there is more to this sort of example 
than meets the eye. My twin is molecule-for-molecule 
identical to me, but when she believes that her colleague is 
a humorless prig, her mental state is not the same as mine, 
since we are not in the belief-relation to the same items.
So there is no content-involving psychological 
generalization that covers our (by hypothesis similar) 
behavior. My twin does not roll her eyes because she 
believes my colleague is a humorless prig.
On reflection, it seems clear that there is an obvious 
question as to what is the truly relevant factor that drives 
the standard type of non-supervenience problem. Content
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fails to supervene because, given externalist taxonomic 
criteria, it is individuated in virtue of head-independent 
entities. But isn't it the case that this fact alone is 
sufficient to generate an explanatory role problem?11 The 
essence of the non-supervenience problem really appears to 
devolve on the reason why content fails to supervene in some 
cases. And the answer is clear: externalistically determined 
content is extrinsic to the boundaries of the causal 
machinery of the subjects of mental states, making it 
difficult to see how it could play an explanatory role. The 
failure of supervenience problem, when we think it through, 
more accurately emerges as an instance of the widespread 
problem that arises whenever the individuation conditions of 
any concept are held to necessarily involve entities 
extrinsic to inner states, the states most plausibly thought 
to bear the causal burden in explanations of behavior.
These remarks suggest a very natural preliminary way 
to describe the explanatory role problem that arises for 
content from an externalist perspective: descriptions of 
mental states, on this view, are extrinsic - they refer to 
entities outside the boundaries of what can intuitively be 
claimed to play a role in the internal causal works - the 
psychology - of a subject.12 Commonsense thinking about 
what matters to a subject's psychology centers on, among 
other things, what appears to her to be the case; how things 
look, what she believes. And if something extrinsic to or
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independent of these states can vary without resulting in a 
variation in these states, then, intuitively, that something 
will not play an explanatory role with respect to the 
subject's psychology.
A few remarks on the notion of extrinsicness might be 
useful, although it must be said that beyond the obvious, it 
is not an easy notion to define. It can be understood by way 
of the distinction between internal and external relations, 
a topic that has enjoyed at least one period of 
philosophical vogue (see Moore 1922, and Ryle 1935, among 
others). It won't do to become too embroiled in this topic, 
however, as it raises deeply controversial metaphysical 
issues like essentialism, accidental properties, and the 
like, which it is preferable to avoid here.13
Typically, extrinsicness is understood as a spatial 
relation: two things are extrinsic to one another if they do 
not enter into each other's natures, are not part of one 
another. With respect to the issue of content in 
psychological explanation, however, it is best not to take 
the usual spatial understanding of this notion too 
literally. We can stipulate that an object a is extrinsic to
a system Jb if a is not part of the causal powers of b - a's
causal powers aren't a part of those of b, say. So if b is a
person and a is a denotatum of b ’s terms, then, since a is
out there in the head-independent environment, its causal 
powers aren't part of the causal powers of b. But if a is
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not part of the causal powers of b, then there seems to be a 
prima facie problem as to how it can be the case that being 
in relation to a is explanatory with respect to the doings 
of Jb.14 A question will arise - to be treated below - as 
to how best to understand the extrinsicness of the denotata 
of predicate expressions.
We have alluded, above and in chapter 1, to the 
prominent position occupied by the orthodox understanding of 
the failure of supervenience problem. But, as we have seen, 
the non-supervenience problem apparently affects only two 
kinds of contentful states. And as long as the problem of 
content in explanation is thought to be the problem of 
content's failure to supervene, we must conclude that the 
problem of content in explanation is a very limited problem.
But of course we have reason to suppose that there is 
more to the problem of content in explanation from an
1
externalist perspective than the problem of content's 
failure to supervene, since we now have reason to suppose 
there is more to externalism than the failure of content to 
supervene. As we have seen, what really lies behind the 
failure of supervenience problem is content's extrinsicness. 
Extrinsicness is a ubiquitous feature of all content 
individuated according to externalist criteria, whether 
strongly or weakly external. And if we pause here to ask the 
question what conceivably could be the operative idea behind 
the usual formulation of 'content's explanatory role
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problem,' what we see, after a moment's thought, is that the 
only thing that could mean is that referring to content in 
explanation is irrelevant; content has no explanatorily 
relevant role to play in causal explanations of behavior.
We are now in a position to formulate a completely 
general explanatory role problem for content. If content is 
extrinsic - as externalism weak and strong demands - then it 
will be redundant in psychological explanation. Consider the 
following: suppose someone insisted, in her explanations of 
a companion's behavior, on referring to his (justified true) 
belief-states by using the expression 'knowledge.' What 
would we make of this? It is, of course, possible to refer 
to someone's beliefs using the term 'knowledge' or to refer 
to someone's mental states by using contents that bring in 
the environment, but those modes of expression are 
irrelevant in the sense of being redundant. If they were 
omitted, clearly nothing by way. of explanatory force would 
be lost. And since, in psychology, what we are interested in 
is explanation, it appears safe to conclude that they can be 
omitted, since they appear to have no explanatory function.
A number of examples can be culled from the literature 
to illustrate what is known as the redundancy problem 
(hereafter TRP; see McCulloch 1988; Noonan 1991; Peacocke 
1981; Segal 1989).15 Most of these remarks focus on the 
redundancy of singular thought content, but the basic point 
has been extended to general thought (McGinn 1989) .
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The best way to understand TRP is in terms of 
counterfactuals. As we noted in chapter 1, externalism in 
its most general formulation is best understood as a thesis 
concerning the possession conditions of mental states. The 
existence of extra-cranial objects and properties - the 
reference of the expressions in a psychological subject's 
language - is a necessary condition on the possession of 
those of her mental states involving those objects and 
properties. Should the relevant object or property fail to 
exist, no contentful state can be attributed.
But now consider the not implausible case where two
people (or one person at different times) should perform the
same behavior, and yet only one of them instantiate the
relevant propositional attitude property. McCulloch gives an
example16 (1988, 84-85):
Faith, Hope and Charity are as similar 
as you please but for some important 
details. They are physically very 
similar, are embedded in very similar 
environments, have very similar 
histories, and each seems to herself to 
be confronted by a dangerous cat. Each 
seems to think to herself a thought she 
would express thus: 'I'm going to kick 
that cat.' Each conseguently lashes out.
But here are the important differences.
Faith and Hope confront distinct cats 
(Mildred and Consuela respectively), and 
Charity confronts no cat, but is 
hallucinating. Now some philosophers 
espouse the doctrine of Russellian 
thoughts (RT-doctrine), the doctrine 
that a thought standardly expressible by 
e.g. 'I'm going to kick that cat' 
essentally concerns the cat (if there is 
one) to which 'that cat' would refer.
And they mean this to imply (a) that
1 0 6
Faith and Hope think different thoughts 
(since they think about different cats), 
and (b) that Charity thinks nothing of 
the corresponding type (since she 
confronts no cat) . . . the RT-doctrine 
is part of a claim that Intentional 
psychology as we normally conceive it is 
externalist, in the sense that seeings, 
believings and many other states of mind 
are taken in a relational or 
environment-involving way, as seeings or 
believings about this or that 
environmental item . . . Some reject the 
RT-doctrine. With respect to the above 
case, their essential reason would be 
that our subjects are so similar: 
subjectively, things seem the same to 
each of them; objectively, they each 
lash out in the same manner because of 
how things seem. So (the thought 
continues) the lashings ought to succumb 
to parallel psychological explanations.
Yet the Russellian thought theorists 
seem to rule this out. According to 
them, there are psychological 
asymmetries among our subjects, and so 
if the actions are explained in the 
usual way by the ascription, . . .  of 
thoughts entertained, the explanations 
will not be parallel.
The idea is this: the same behavior can, intuitively, 
ensue irrespective of the existence of an object or 
property, so citing an object-or-property-involving thought 
in accounting for the behavior is bound to be explanatorily 
irrelevant. It can't be that what explains Charity's 
behavior is her belief that that is a cat, since she 
possesses no such belief. Citing a cat-related belief in an 
attempt to explain the three women's behavior will be beside 
the point (two of them don't have the same thought because 
it's not about the same cat, and the other just doesn't have 
a comparable thought at all - though, by hypothesis, she
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thinks she does), a violation of Ockham's maxim.17 Content 
in explanation is therefore causally redundant.
Another example, from Noonan, makes this explicit
(1991, 3-4):
Suppose I kick a cat, and suppose my 
action is intentional under a 
description in which occurs a term 
denoting that cat . . . Imagine now a 
second situation in which, from my point 
of view, everything is the same, but in 
which, in fact, I am hallucinating a 
cat. Since this is so I presumably lash 
out at the cat I believe to be within 
kicking distance in exactly the same way 
as in the first situation. The 
difficulty for the opponent of (the 
Redundancy Thesis] is now to explain why 
I do so . . . [In the first situation] 
some of the object-dependent 
psychological states I was in, reference 
to which was essential to the 
explanation of my action there, are not 
present at all in the second, 
hallucinatory, situation. Moreover, my 
hallucination in the second situation 
does not make it possible to me to think 
anything I was not able to think in the 
first, veridical situation . . .  if the 
contentful psychological states 
available to me in the hallucinatory 
situation suffice to explain my action 
there, no reference to psychological 
states with distinct contents will be 
required to explain my action in the 
veridical situation . . .  no reference 
to any object-dependent content, not 
available in the hallucinatory 
situation, will be required to explain 
my action in the veridical situation, 
non-relationally described . . . For if 
the subset of contentful psychological 
states common to deluded HN and non­
deluded HN suffices to explain the 
former's action, it must suffice to 
explain the latter's action, also, since 
the actions are identical - each, that 
is, makes the same bodily movement.
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These examples ought to suffice to get the intuitive 
problem across.18 Now, the arguments in chapter 1 defended 
the role of part of the abstract environment, as well as the 
more immediate environment, in the determination of content. 
Properties, we saw there, are head-independent. And if being 
in a content-bearing mental state involves being in a 
relation to, among other things, a property, one is thereby 
and likewise in a relation to something quite extrinsic to 
the causal entities relevant both to effecting the 
transition from thought to action, and explanatorily 
pertinent.
Mathematics offers the most obvious preliminary 
example. Thoughts with, say, arithmetical content ("I hope 
that lifting a 20 pound weight for 3 sets of 12 repetitions 
each will tone the bicep”) are expressed in sentences that 
contain expressions referring to numbers (number 
properties). Entertaining this thought puts one in the 
entertainment-relation to number properties, entities (pace 
anti-piatonism) that are completely head-independent. Their 
extrinsicness puts them well beyond a plausible causal range 
with respect to affecting behavior.19
The formulation of the problem with respect to content 
that does supervene, however, is most clearly understood in 
terms of counterfactuals, as in the case of singular thought 
content. Again, the existence-and-identity conditions of 
general content are those of the reference of the terms of
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the content-sentence: should these fail to exist, no content 
can be attributed. It is nevertheless plausible to suppose 
that a person could perform exactly the same behavior in the 
case where he does not genuinely possess the thought in 
question (but only appears to himself to so possess it20) 
as in the case where he does.
A superficial objection can arise regarding this 
formulation of the problem; it is not a good objection, but 
it is instructive. It may be said that properties, as 
abstract objects, are necessary existents; so that the 
counterfactual premise regarding their content-determining 
and causally explanatory role can never obtain. But this is 
confused. In the first place, it is not obvious that 
conditionals with impossible antecedents can't be well- 
defined21: why isn't it perfectly coherent to say that if 
property P hadn't existed - even though it necessarily 
does - then its non-existence would make no difference to 
the behavior person (thinking himself to be) referring to 
that property. Although the counterfactual is harder to 
interpret for the case of properties, it is clear that the 
same basis for the redundancy problem of content applies.
Just to be sure this has penetrated, consider the 
parallel case concerning a state of knowledge. Take a limit 
case: a belief one can't help knowing (Descartes' cogito, 
say). Now surely, even for a case like this one, it is 
perfectly in order to raise the question whether knowledge
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is an explanatory concept. Even in cases where a belief 
cannot be false, it is nevertheless the case that what is 
causally relevant, on the face of it, is the belief, not the 
state of knowledge. So a perfectly coherent question can 
arise regarding the explanatory role of knowledge, one that 
is mirrored in the formulation of the problem of weakly 
external content's explanatory role.22
A related point, worth clearing up, concerns the 
metaphysics of properties. The claim that properties are 
necessary existents is sometimes defended on the ground that 
they are abstract objects. This would appear to result from 
uncritical dogma regarding the modal status of properties, a 
view subjected to criticism in chapter 1. We can add a 
counterexample to what we said there, so to put to rest any 
further difficulty concerning this point. Consider sets.
Sets are abstract objects but their existence-and-identity 
conditions are those of their members; and the set of cats, 
it must be conceded, does not exist necessarily.23
Putting the issue of the modal status of properties to 
one side, it is now clear that there is more to the problem 
of content in explanation that its mere failure to 
supervene. Even when content does supervene, externalistic 
criteria require that it be individuated with respect to 
head-extrinsic entities: properties. Two related problems 
thus ensue (both of which also apply to content that fails 
to supervene): extrinsic entities are not situated at the
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causal nexus, so to speak, and so are explanatorily inert. 
And if we ask what difference the extrinsic, head- 
independent world makes to behavior, one quite plausible 
answer is none. Even when an object or property fails to 
exist, one can perfectly well be thought to behave in 
exactly the same way, in spite of the fact that one fails to 
be genuinely belief-related to an item out there in the 
world. To advert to the extrinsic objects of thoughts in 
explaining behavior is thus causally redundant.
A few clarificatory remarks are in order, especially 
with regard to the idea of a property - an abstract entity - 
being 'outside' or 'extrinsic to' the causal nexus. This 
extrinsicness certainly should not be thought of as a 
spatial issue. Confusion on this point might lead to the 
following objection: since properties are abstract, they 
can't be at the causal nexus (they can't be anywhere; the 
causal nexus is a specific location in space and time. So, 
if not being at the causal nexus were sufficient to rule 
something out as being explanatory, then all properties 
would be ruled out as explanatory, by reductio.24
This objection arises, as we suggested, by a too- 
literal interpretation of 'at (or not at) the causal nexus.' 
'Not at the causal nexus' shouldn't be thought to mean 'not 
existing at that place'; rather, 'outside the causal nexus' 
has to be understood, with respect to properties, as to do 
with not being instantiated. After all, it appears to be a
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minimal necessary condition (although not sufficient) of the 
explanatory relevance of a property that the property be 
instantiated: no property not instantiated by the table is 
going to be relevant to the causal powers of the table (its 
1 causal nexus1). A property P not instantiated by this table 
will be outside its causal nexus, thus, in this sense, and 
not in the (really rather puzzling) sense of not 'existing 
there.1
Properties can both be instantiated by and be the 
objects of mental states (as we have argued); confusing 
these two characteristics will interfere with grasp of the 
basic picture here. There is a difference between a 
property's being a content-constituent and its being 
instantiated. The point (the problem) about content in 
explanation is that the properties which are (arguably) part 
of the content are not instantiated by the person, the 
subject of the mental states in question. And it would be an 
obviously desperate and unsuccessful move to try to save the 
causal relevance of some set of properties by claiming that 
although properties are abstract universals which don't 
exist at or in the person, nevertheless they are 
instantiated by the person. In general, of course, one does 
not instantiate every property one can think about. The 
property that is instantiated by a subject is the property 
of having belief b about a property which, of course, is not 
the same property as the property one has the belief about.
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It is the relationality of content that results in 
content's explanatory role problem. What we have seen here, 
however, is that content is not just a relation to 
particulars, but also to properties via the predicate- 
expressions in content-bearing sentences. The properties 
that individuate content interfere with its causal role in 
that they themselves are not instantiated by the subject of 
the mental state in question. Properties fail a quite 
minimal condition on causal relevance - and long before any 
questions to do with their suitability for being the kinds 
of things that can be causally relevant can be raised.25
Formulating content's explanatory role problem in 
terms of redundancy is useful in that it undermines what 
appears to be the tacit understanding that there are no 
problematic consequences for content unless it fails to 
supervene. What we now see is that all concepts to which 
externalistic determination conditions apply are extrinsic 
to the causal machinery to which the fundamentals of 
mechanical engineering - even mental engineering - must 
apply.
8. Non-supervenience, Extrinsicness and Redundancy: 
Entailment Relations 
It is worthwhile to pause here to spell out the 
entailment relations between the problems with which we have 
been concerned. First: that content is extrinsic doesn't
114
entail that it fails to supervene: you can't run a TE case 
for mathematical content (as we saw in chapter 1), but, as 
explanations involving mathematical content will advert to 
entities quite extrinsic to the head, there remains the 
problem of adverting to content that is not situated in the 
requisite causal location. It seems plausible to suppose, 
however, that when content fails to supervene, it does so 
because of its determination in virtue of entities extrinsic 
to the head.26
Similarly, it will not strictly speaking follow from 
the fact that content is extrinsically determined that it 
will be explanatorily redundant. There are models of 
explanation, in fact, where being extrinsic to the head is a 
positive boon: a functional/teleological criterion of 
explanation is one such. The redundancy of content in 
explanation will follow, however, on the presupposition that 
explanation is meant to be causal. Extrinsic entities - 
particular or abstract - are simply not in the right 
location to play the required explanatory role, if what is 
relevant to explanation are the causal processes involved.
Finally, content might be redundant in explanation 
without it following from that it is externalistically 
individuated, of course. That x is redundant in a science, 
in a theory, or in an explanation is an extremely general 
complaint to make of it. X could be redundant for any number 
of reasons: it might be magical, meaningless, unverified,
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platonic, intrinsic. The terms of the inquiry set the limits 
of relevance.
9. The Redundancy Problem: Distinctions 
There are connections between the redundancy problem 
as we have formulated it and two other issues that can arise 
with respect to the problem of content in explanation that 
also involve a notion of redundancy. The issues we are about 
to consider are by no means equivalent, but they do have 
enough points of contact to cause confusion, and to make it 
imperative to delineate very carefully between them.
a. Syntactic Properties vs. Semantic Properties in 
Explanation.
There is a line of thought, associated with Stich
(1978, 1983) and Field (1978), that urges the repudiation of
semantic properties of content for the purposes of
psychological explanation.27 Stich, for example, writes
(1983, 8-9):
The core of my argument is the claim 
that the theorist who seeks to couch the 
generalizations of cognitive science in 
the content-ascribing language of folk 
psychology will be plagued by problems 
that can readily be avoided . . .  I 
shall sketch an alternative paradigm for 
cognitive theories which avoids the 
problems engendered by appeals to 
content . . . The alternative is what I 
will call the Syntactic Theory of Mind.
Cognitive theories which cleave to the 
STM pattern treat mental states as 
relations to purely syntactic mental
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sentence tokens, and they detail the 
interactions among mental states in 
terms' of the formal or syntactic 
properties of these tokens.
According to this view, it is the syntactic properties
of mental states that are the explanatorily relevant ones, 
and Stich, for one, gives arguments are meant to show that 
"folk locutions are scientifically otiose" (1983, 9).
Stich's position with respect to content in explanation is, 
in effect, indeed one that charges content with irrelevance 
given the demands of a properly erected cognitive science. 
But, as we said above, redundancy is an extremely general
notion. What externalism contributes with respect to
explanation is indeed also the idea that content is 
redundant in psychological explanation: the question is why. 
The answer will distinguish TRP from a position like that of 
Stich.
As we noted above, what lies behind TRP is a 
counterfactual idea: given the individuation-conditions on 
content imposed by externalism, and the parallel content 
possession-conditions that result, it is clear that no 
mental state can be ascribed if the object of the mental 
state (a particular, in the case of singular thoughts; a 
property, in the case of general thoughts) does not exist. 
But two subjects (or one subject at different times) can 
behave exactly the same way, in spite of the fact that only 
one of them can be ascribed a mental state with some content 
C. The explanatory generalization we desire will thus have
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to proceed other than by citing the content of their 
thoughts.28 On the other hand, a view that takes the 
syntactic properties of mental states to be all that need 
figure in properly scientific explanations can obviously be 
defended quite independently of anything to do with semantic 
externa1i sm.2 9
To see this, consider the familiar Language of Thought 
hypothesis.30 Whenever a belief is ascribed, it is 
surmised that there is a sentence in Mentalese that 
corresponds to the belief, and believing that p is 
formulated as a relation to that Mentalese sentence. 
Mentalese sentences, being sentences in the language of 
thought, are, of course, in the head. There are, of course, 
various effects of possessing the belief in question, which 
are what are meant to be explained by citing the belief.
Now, note that the Language of Thought hypothesis can 
be in principle paired with any number of theses concerning 
content and its individuation. But given that, on this view, 
to ascribe a belief that p is always to ascribe a 
corresponding sentence s of Mentalese, clearly one could 
consider explaining another's behavior by citing the 
Mentalese sentence; instead of (roughly): 'when C believes 
that p she does a,' rather: 'when C tokens sentence s she 
does a .' And it appears reasonable to propose that should it 
be the case that the syntactic properties of the mental 
state prove to capture all and more of the generalizations
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we require than do the semantic ones, that we jettison the 
semantic ones as excess baggage. It is worth pointing out 
that this position is more radical than the one that favors 
narrow content over broad content in explanation: for, after 
all, a notion of narrow content is still a semantic notion. 
If sentences in the head have both shape and narrow content, 
and their shape properties do succeed in doing the required 
explanatory work, it is reasonable to ask what point there 
is in speaking of these sentences as having truth-conditions 
at all - even when those truth-conditions are narrow
31ones. 1
In short, the kind of view that defends the 
explanatory role of syntax as being more adequate than that 
of content results in the idea that semantic properties are 
redundant in explanation, but does so in a completely 
different way, and according to quite different criteria, 
than does TRP. What Stich calls STM does not, for instance, 
make a counterfactual point in claiming that even narrow 
states have syntactic properties, so why bother citing the 
narrow states when the syntactic properties do the 
explanatory job; the point is not that even without narrow 
content the syntactic properties of a mental state are still 
on the scene. Rather, those that defend the explanatory 
superiority of syntax do so on the grounds that there is a 
kind of overdetermination problem that results when we 
compare the explanatory utility of syntactic and semantic
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properties; one that, as it happens, can be formulated as an 
invitation to apply Ockham's razor in favor of syntax.
The notion of overdetermination ushers in another kind 
of redundancy claim that must be distinguished from the one 
that underlies our formulation of TRP. Though somewhat 
controversial, there is a view that the sciences form a 
hierarchy, from the 'basic' (physics) to the 'non-basic' 
(sociology or anthropology), roughly speaking. The non-basic 
sciences are sometimes regarded as being explanatorily 
useless, or redundant. The question is, on the basis of what 
is the redundancy of the special sciences thought to obtain? 
Should special science redundancy be equivalent to that 
which results for externalistically individuated content in 
psychological explanation, then the latter is a) a tacit 
repetition of familiar points, and so uninteresting; and b) 
clearly vulnerable, on that score, to a host of telling 
objections to special science redundancy.
b. Redundancy and the special sciences.
What we are concerned to point out here is, in fact, 
the disanalogy between the causal redundancy of content 
engendered by externalism, and the familiar - though 
contested - point that special sciences (psychology, for 
instance) are explanatorily redundant. The problem of 
content in explanation as we have been formulating it is not 
to be confused with the objection to special sciences, and
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one of the ways to make the disanalogy explicit is to focus 
on whether the scepticism regarding content's explanatory 
role arises within the framework of objections to the 
explanatory relevance of special sciences in general, or 
whether, as we have been suggesting, the consequences of 
externalism for content's explanatory role are specific to 
externalism.
The explanatory relation between the special sciences 
and basic science is an issue that emerges from the wider 
one of reductionism in the sciences. Hempel comments (1969, 
179) :
. . . one further reason for the 
fascination the subject [of reduction] 
has held for philosophers lies, I think, 
in the ontological roots of many 
questions concerning reduction - 
questions such as these: Are mental 
states nothing else but brain states?
Are social phenomena simply compounds of 
individual modes of behavior? Are living 
organisms no more than complex 
physicochemical systems? Are the objects 
of our everyday experience nothing else 
than swarms of electrons and other 
subatomic particles? Or is it the case, 
as the doctrine of emergence would have 
it, that as we move from subatomic 
particles to atoms and molecules, to 
macroscopic objects, to living 
organisms, to individual human minds, 
and to social and cultural phenomena, we 
encounter at each stage various novel 
phenomena which are irreducible, which 
cannot be accounted for in terms of 
anything that is to be found on the 
preceding levels?
It is sometimes thought that the sciences are arranged 
in a hierarchy, according to a certain criterion of property
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instantiation. Not all objects in the world instantiate the 
same sorts of properties, so, plausibly, a particular theory 
will quantify over properties that another does not. So, for 
instance: all physical objects in. the world have physical 
properties, but not all of them have chemical properties - 
some don't form molecules. Of those that form molecules, not 
all have biochemical properties (not all are living things). 
Now take all the things with biochemical properties - do 
this set belong to the set of things with biological 
properties? Putting aside a detailed consideration of the 
question of what counts as a biological property, suppose 
you stipulated that a biological property is a functional 
property. Then not every piece of biochemical material has a 
function, clearly - some of these things could be, for 
instance, small freestanding bits of tissue. Finally, not 
everything that instantiates biological properties 
instantiates psychological properties.
Now consider an account of an object in the vocabulary 
of a theory of, say, evolutionary biology. Say that object 
is a person. This is an object with psychological 
properties, and it is true that all the objects with 
psychological properties that we know of have biological 
properties, and those that satisfy biological descriptions 
satisfy biochemical descriptions . . . and so on down. But 
when you are talking about an object from the point of view 
of evolutionary biology, and in those terms, it is plausible
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to claim that what you are not doing is talking, say, 
biochemistry; you are, presumably, at a higher level of 
generality. The controversy surrounds the question whether 
it follows that a higher level of generality means an 
explanation of little or no utility.
The methodological presumption behind reductionism in 
the sciences is that sound scientific generalizations are 
found only at the level of physics and possibly chemistry. 
Theories of any other kind - and their explanations - are 
thought to have to come under the rubric of physics in order 
to be sanctioned as making properly scientific 
contributions. This absorption is to be effected by certain 
principles of theory reduction. Nagel's work (1947, 1961) is 
the locus classicus for this notion. Briefly, reduction 
applies intertheoretically, and is accomplished by 
interpreting the non-logical vocabulary of the target theory 
into that of the so-called reducing theory. Combining this 
idea with the conditions imposed by the deductive- 
nomological model of explanation results in the further idea 
that the explanations of the now-subsumed theory can be 
derived from premises in the vocabulary of the reducing 
theory.32
An enthusiastic defense of reduction with respect to
folk psychology has been recently given by Churchland (1986,
395-396; 399):
Once folk psychology is held at arm's 
length and evaluated for theoretical
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strength in the way that any theory is 
evaluated, the more folkishly inept, 
soft, and narrow it seems to be . . .
Insofar as it is a theory, it is an 
empirical, not an a priori question how 
good a theory in fact it is, and its 
'obviousness' will not protect it from 
revision or replacement if it is flawed 
. . .  it would be astonishing if folk- 
psychology, alone among folk theories, 
was essentially correct. The mind-brain 
is exceedingly complex, and it seems 
unlikely that primitive folk would have 
lit upon the correct theoretical 
framework to explain its nature . . .
Mental states may be functional states, 
but this does not imply that the 
specification of their functional 
profile based in folk psychology is 
correct . . . Nor does it imply that 
psychology cannot be reduced to 
neuroscience. The claims for the 
autonomy of psychology are therefore 
misbegotten.
This is a rough approximation of the line of thought: 
it is, in fact, far from being universally accepted - 
particularly with respect to the elimination of folk 
psychology.33 Now there are obviously many questions that 
arise concerning the relations between the putative levels 
of scientific theories, their laws and their explanations, 
and the autonomy of psychology, all of which must be set 
aside here. I wish to focus instead on a more fundamental 
question: on what basis are the special sciences thought to 
be explanatorily redundant? Remember that our main concern 
is to distinguish the core of the objection to the 
explanatory relevance of the special sciences from that of 
the objection to the explanatory relevance of extrinsic 
content in psychological explanation. And this is simply
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stated. The special sciences are thought to be explanatorily 
irrelevant because, the objection to them goes, you won't 
lose any explanatory force by failing to cite them. No 
explanatory force is lost because the underlying or 
counterpart laws of physics - to which all these other 
vocabularies will reduce - capture all the generalities you 
need.
Now this is a highly general - if disputable - claim, 
and it applies to, say, chemistry, just as much to 
psychology. Nothing in this line of argument against the 
special sciences depends on the extrinsic individuation of 
content. Nobody who objects to the special sciences in terms 
of their explanatory utility is concerned even remotely with 
the extrinsic individuation of content, I'll wager. The 
argument concerning the redundancy of the special sciences 
arises quite independent of any issues to do with the 
individuation of content: it can arise if you are an 
internalist; it can arise if you didn't even believe in 
psychology at all (it applies to biology, to chemistry, to 
whatever isn’t physics).
It is particularly important to avoid assimilating 
content's explanatory role problem (as we have been 
considering it) with objections to special sciences, for 
this may easily result in the error of supposing that the 
objections to content's explanatory role can be overcome by 
countering the objections to special science explanations.
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But an example will show that such a move won't work.
Someone who thinks that objections to content in 
explanation stem from a failure to properly understand the 
explanatory relation of the special sciences to basic 
science, might, roughly speaking, make the following point, 
alluded to above: there is no reason to suppose that the 
move to a higher level of theoretical generality (assuming 
it even makes sense to think of the sciences as arranged in 
a hierarchy) entails, in some sense, a less effective 
explanation. If what we are interested in is, say, whether 
it is the fact that Elizabeth believes that Darcy is 
ungentleman-like that leads her to refuse him, and what kind 
of generalizations can be constructed as a result, then the 
laws of, say, gravity - though presumably applicable 
won't help. Why can't there be, that is, more than one 
explanation of the same thing. Imagine, analogously, the 
state of pornographic literature if all we could give were 
descriptions and explanations couched wholly in the 
vocabulary of basic physics; of course these terms apply - 
but that's not what we want from our dirty magazines.
The multiplicity of explanations point is, arguably, 
quite effective in the special vs. basic science debate, but 
it is not terribly convincing when it is applied to the 
problem of extrinsic content's explanatory role. Consider 
the familiar formulation (now, of course, superseded) of the 
problem in terms of content's failure to supervene: it does
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not seem very effective to counter the argument with the 
claim that there is every reason to suppose that there can 
be more than one kind of explanation for the same thing. The 
failure of supervenience problem, as we have seen, depends 
on certain quite specific issues raised by, in part, the 
nature of causation. The explanatory relation between 
special science and basic science is quite orthogonal to 
this.
Consider, to drive this home, what someone who was 
confused on just this sort of point might say in objection 
to narrow content. "Jerry," they'd likely sniff, "when you 
say that broad content isn't explanatory you're just 
forgetting that there are special sciences, and in one/some 
of them you've got broad content. The fact that there's 
another science that has narrow content and that explains 
the same events is neither here nor there. There can be more 
than one explanation of the same thing, you know." The right 
reply to this, of course, would be to say, "but there's a 
special reason why that view - one that in general has 
something to recommend it - doesn't apply here: and this 
special reason has to do with failures of supervenience. In 
those other special sciences the chemical, say, does 
supervene on the physical, so there's no violation. But a 
whole different problem emerges if broad content doesn't 
supervene on the physical. . . . "
On reflection, we can make the point that even if
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psychology were basic, one could still raise the question 
whether all of its descriptions were causally relevant - 
after all, in physics, I can describe a collision of 
particles using a causally irrelevant description. It would 
be, nevertheless, a description of elementary particles, but 
one with little or no explanatory role. And, ultimately, 
even if Cartesian immaterialism were true - even if there 
were no supervenience on the physical - one could still at 
least raise the question which mental descriptions are the 
causally relevant ones. Perhaps some are, perhaps some 
aren't, perhaps all are, etc. The answer to the question 
would have to proceed along the usual lines; the point is, 
the question is not empty, and none of these points have 
anything to do with the issue of special science redundancy.
In sum: it is confused to suppose that a hierarchy of 
the sciences and the availability of subsequent counterpart 
basic level explanations are sufficient reasons to entail an 
elimination of mental terminology from explanations, and 
further confused to suppose that any and all objections to 
mental terminology in explanations are just versions of that 
point. Redundancy is a very general concept, and more or 
less always means the same thing: what distinguishes TRP as 
we are considering it from both syntactic views about the 
mind and special science redundancy is what motivates 
TRP.34 The motivations have been enumerated above. It now 
should be quite clear that TRP cannot be said to presuppose
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any view at all about the status of the special science with 
respect to explanation, and, as a result, it should be clear 
that TRP cannot be overcome by way of counter-objections to 
scepticism about the explanatory relevance of the special 
sciences.
10. Resolving the problem of content's explanatory role:
the options
We have clarified and cleared aside a number of points 
regarding the formulation of extrinsic content's explanatory 
role problem. What concerns us now is to consider the 
options for a solution.
Let us recall, once more, the core of the problem.
McGinn comments (1989, 133):
Basically the point could be stated 
thus: the reference relation, as between 
symbol and object, does not contribute 
to the causal powers of the symbol - it 
is not what empowers the symbol to bring 
about its effects. The causal mechanism 
whereby the symbol has an impact on the 
world does not somehow incorporate the 
relation of reference. The relation of 
reference is to the symbol what the 
country of origin of a car is to its 
engine, i.e. not part of the causal 
machinery. Intentionality is not what 
makes the world go from one state to the 
next. Content is not a mechanistic 
feature of the world.
Different authors35 put this in different ways: 
mental causes must be supervenient on internal states of the 
subject; the only thing with a causal role is the "shape" 
of a mental symbol; the characterizations of causal mental
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processes must respect a "formality constraint"; the 
cognitive operating system is causally a "syntactic engine"; 
mental algorithms can be causally sensitive only to local 
features of their inputs; truth conditions cannot play any 
role in causal-role or functional psychology; it is a sort 
of category mistake to attribute causal potential to 
meanings; a causal-explanatory taxonomy of mental states 
must be narrowly individuated. In spite of the fact that all 
of these formulations fail to recognize a truly widespread 
problem with respect to content - taking it for granted that 
failure of supervenience is a necessary condition for the 
problem - nevertheless, all attempt to accommodate what 
appears to be an undeniable: mental explanations must cite 
local, proximate, intrinsic causes. So the causal powers of 
a mental state cannot depend essentially on relations to 
entities whose existence is extrinsic to the body. But 
externalism says that contentful states are identified by 
just those entities. So any science devoted to uncovering 
the causal laws and mechanisms of the mind cannot do so by 
reference to contentful states; or, at the very least, any 
science that purports both to refer to contentful states and 
to uncover causal mechanisms will suffer the usual 
instability of any mismatched alliance.
So, in some sense, the issue really begins here. What 
then are the alternatives for a solution to this problem? We 
can preliminarily, and quite abstractly, characterize the
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main contenders as follows:
1. Externalism is not at all inconsistent with
causal relevance.
2. It is indeed inconsistent; what is necessary is
a notion of narrow content.
3. No notion of narrow content can really be
defined, and yet the argument against 
wide content is correct, therefore, 
eliminativism about content is the only 
solution.
4. It is not necessarily the case that explanatory
taxonomy need proceed along 
causal lines; there are other, perfectly 
respectable sciences that individuate 
according to other criteria.36
There is also a view - which has both a radical and a 
moderate side - which, although not unfamiliar, seems to 
have been somewhat neglected in the most recent debate. I 
believe it is interesting enough to resurrect here. This is 
the view that belief-desire psychology is not at all a form 
of causal theory; rather, it is a radically different kind 
of understanding, involving a notion of rationalization. 
While it is true that this view and its associated 
repercussions has enjoyed some vogue in the past, what is 
worth considering now is the intersection between it and the 
issues raised by externalism and explanation. What seems to
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be the case is that such a view has the effect of 
undercutting the arguments against wide content, as 
psychology is thought not to be in the business of giving 
causal explanations - certainly something at which it is 
worth taking a closer look.
All of these views have different consequences for the 
issue as to whether content is something to preserve or 
reject in psychological explanation. And the key issue with 
respect to which this issue should be understood is that of 
the relation between individuation and causation. Wide 
content is thought to have to go when the dominant criterion 
is that of causation, with its concomitant imposition of 
locality, with which individuation is supposed to fall in, 
under threat of emasculation. A view that challenges that 
criterion, unsurprisingly, will have very different results 
for content in explanation.
So let us consider the alternatives for a solution to 
the problem of content in explanation according to how they 
view the individuation/causation connection.
a. The consistency of explanatory relevance and externalism.
We can begin with the the claim that externalism poses 
no problem for the explanatory relevance of content. This is 
a view associated with McDowell (1980;1984;1986), Evans 
(1982), and Peacocke (1981, inter alia). The most effective 
attack comes from, among others, Fodor (1988); McGinn
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(1991); Noonan (1986); and Segal (1989).
The view takes it that individuation - at least of
singular content - is relational, and no explanation of an
action directed onto a particular object can proceed other
than by citing such content. So not only is wide content
explanatorily relevant, it is downright indispensable in
explanations of certain kinds of behavior. Peacocke, for
instance, claims, (1981, 205):
. . .  No set of attitudes gives a 
satisfactory psychological explanation 
of a person's acting on a given object 
unless the content of those attitudes 
includes a demonstrative mode of 
presentation of that object.
This view is, of course, illustrated by way of
demonstrative content - content subject, as we have seen, to
strongly external individuation. In spite of the usual
difficulties attendant on the suitability of wide content in
explanation, Peacocke sees no problem, in accounting for the
explanatory relevance of such content (1981, 198-199):
. . . the obvious reply is that in the 
case of your belief that pen is 
valuable, your belief and the 
corresponding belief of your 
Doppleganger are not psychologically 
indistinguishable, because your belief 
causes you to act on the pen in front of 
your and his belief causes him to act on 
the pen in front of him. These are 
distinct pens.
That is: different objects of thought, so different 
causal powers of thoughts; different causal powers, so 
different thoughts. Wide content has an indispensable
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explanatory role, at least with respect to actions directed
onto particular demonstrative objects. Having a 'pen' 
thought has different causal powers than having a 'twinpen' 
thought; in fact, according to this argument, a 'pen' 
thought is a different causal power than a 'twinpen' 
thought. These are distinct pens.
Both Fodor and McGinn make the point that this is just
confused. Fodor (1988, 34-35):
. . . so, to summarize, if you're 
interested in causal explanation, it 
would be mad to distinguish between 
Oscar's brain states and 0scar2's; their 
mental states have identical causal 
powers . . . it's true that I say 
'water' I get water and when my Twin 
says 'water' he gets XYZ. But that's 
irrelevant to the question about 
identity of causal powers . . . what is 
relevant to the question of identity of 
causal powers is the following pair of 
counterfactuals: (a) If his utterance 
(/thought) had occurred in my context, 
it would have had the effects that my 
utterance (/thought) did have; and (b) 
if my utterance(/thought) had occurred 
in his context, it would have had the 
effects that his utterance (/thought) 
did have.
McGinn concurs (1991, 585):
The obvious fact that behaviour admits 
of relational description in terms of 
environmental entities has, we know, 
been triumphantly seized upon by 
opponents of the kind of causal thesis 
defended here: these opponents think it 
shows that there must be a difference 
between the causal powers of my beliefs 
and my twin's - after all, I reach for a 
drink of water (H20) and he reaches for 
retaw (XYZ)! Fodor (1991) definitively 
puts this 'argument' out of its misery 
(if it has not already expired of
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natural causes). You might as well say 
that my knife and its molecular double 
have different causal powers because 
they each cut numerically different 
loaves of bread - or do it at different 
times and places I
Now what about cases where subjects are deluded in 
their, say, demonstrative perceptions? We have already seen 
that such subjects can perfectly well be thought to behave 
in exactly the same way as their non-deluded counterparts - 
but no thought content can be brought to bear in an 
explanation of such behavior - since there is no such 
content possessed. In fact, as Segal (1989, 43) points out, 
this kind of view (the Russellian or singular thought 
theory) can't make sense of "actions of subjects of empty 
singular thoughts . . . without undermining itself." In 
fact, what he does is press the redundancy objection the 
same way that Noonan (1991), does above. Segal concludes 
(p.45):
[singular thought theory] faces an 
unpleasant dilemma: either object- 
dependent thoughts . . . are always 
explanatorily redundant, or sometimes 
the actions of subjects who act on the 
basis of what they take to be singular 
thoughts are not rationally explicable.
But neither of these options is 
acceptable. If we can explain all of a 
given subject's actions under 
intentional descriptions without 
attributing object-dependent thoughts, 
then surely we have no basis at all for 
making such attributions.
In sum, according to this kind of view, both 
relational individuation and explanatory relevance can apply
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to content - but only because, as we have seen, the notion 
of causal power or causal role has not been properly 
understood. However misunderstood, there is a general effort 
on the part of this kind of view to make causation the 
criterion of individuation: the mistake is to characterize 
that criterion, in our terms, extrinsically.
b . Syntax
Earlier (section 8, (a)), we considered the view that 
folk psychological categories - beliefs, desires and the 
like - have been superseded, and that, on pain of 
irrelevance, they ought to be excised from any science of 
the mind. Here we will limit ourselves to a few comments.
First: how does the syntacticalist interpret the
individuation/causation relation? Such a view that takes
the goal of specifying the causal mechanisms underlying
behavior to be the only one that a properly scientific
enterprise ought to be concerned with. Stich notes (1978,
575-576, emphasis his):
. . . the principle of psychological 
autonomy states that the properties and 
relations to be invoked in an 
explanatory psychological theory must be 
supervenient upon the current, internal, 
physical properties and relations of 
organisms (i.e. just those properties 
that an organism shares with all of its 
replicas) . . .  in specifying that only 
internal properties and relations are 
relevant to explanatory psychological 
properties, the autonomy principle 
decrees that relations between an 
organism and its external environment
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are irrelevant to the organism's current 
(explanatory) psychological state.
Representational or semantic properties of content, of
course, (sometimes) do not supervene, so cannot bear the
required mechanismic role. Stich is explicit in his
understanding of what the individuation/causation relation
means for belief/desire explanation (1978, 578) :
I will argue that if the autonomy 
principle is accepted then there are 
large numbers of belief properties that 
cannot play a role in an explanatory 
psychological theory . . .  I think the 
belief/desire thesis can be profitably 
viewed as the speculation that these 
intuitively sanctioned singular causal 
statements can be cashed out in a 
serious psychological theory couched in 
terms of beliefs and desires. In showing 
that large numbers of these singular 
causal statements cannot be cashed out 
in this way, we make the speculation 
appear idle and unmotivated.37
What can bear the required causal role are cognitive
states (1983, 149):
whose interaction is (in part) 
responsible for behavior . . . 
systematically mapped to abstract 
syntactic objects in such a way that 
causal interactions among cognitive 
states, as well as causal links with 
stimuli and behavioral events, can be 
described in terms of the syntactic 
properties and relations of the abstract 
objects to which the cognitive states 
are mapped . . . the idea is that causal 
relations among cognitive states mirror 
formal relations among syntactic 
objects.
Differently expressed but essentially consistent is 
what Field (1981, 100-101) proposes: a system of internal
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representation, or a narrow psychology:
. . . the syntax and type-identity 
conditions for a system of internal 
representation should be regarded as 
functionally characterized by a 
psychological theory in which they 
appear; and we can take that theory to 
be narrow psychology, that is, the kind 
of psychology that does not employ any 
semantic characterizations of the 
sentences in a system of representation.
This is important, for it means that the 
syntax and conditions of type-identity 
for the system of representation could 
in principle be determined independently 
of any considerations about what the 
sentences in the system mean.
This sort of view is explicit about the 
individuation/causation question. Causal considerations act 
as the primary constraint on individuation on this view, 
since they act as the primary constraint on any properly 
scientific enterprise. And semantic properties - since they 
fail to supervene - are not such as to be caught in the 
causal net.38
c. Narrow Content
The notion of narrow content, first proposed by Fodor 
(1988) as a solution to the problem of content in 
explanation, is excessively familiar; and as in our remarks 
above we have in effect provided some essential evaluative 
points, we can here be brief.39
How does Fodor interpret the individuation/causation 
connection? He notes (1988, 30-32):
. . . scientific psychological
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explanation, like commonsense 
belief/desire explanation, is committed 
to states to which semantic and causal 
properties are simultaneously ascribable 
. . . and I think it's quite easy to see 
how the required principles of 
individuation should be formulated . . . 
individuation in science is always 
individualistic. Common sense postulates 
a relational taxonomy for the attitudes, 
psychology postulates states that have 
content but are individualistic, so the 
question arises what notion of content 
survives this shift in criteria of 
individuation.
The scientific theory that vindicates belief-desire 
psychology is the computational conception of mental 
processes. The mind is conceived of as a symbol manipulating 
system, and mental symbols have both semantic and causal 
properties, which Fodor believes is the only way even to 
formulate an - or the - important question about the mind, 
namely, how it is that its causal processes make sense. But 
wide content falls afoul of a constraint on scientific 
theories: these, according to Fodor, are in the business of 
giving causal explanations ("of course," p. 34), and wide 
content cannot have a causal role because it doesn't 
supervene on the proximate bearers of the causal properties 
presumably involved in the production of behavior - 
internal, often physical, states. Enter narrow content: a 
notion of content that "survives the shift in criteria" 
since it cannot be sundered from its causal powers.
Fodor is thus crystal clear about the 
individuation/causation question: these stand or fall
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together, and, on pain of postulating causal mechanisms the 
likes of which the world has never seen, they stand united 
internally to the subject organism.
The notion of narrow content has come in for its share 
of criticism,40 and as my intention here is to consider 
the alternatives for a solution to the problem of content in 
explanation from a particular perspective, rather than to 
adjudicate these options, I will have little to add.
A few critical comments will, however, provide a 
natural segue to the next stage of these remarks. Recall 
that the interesting question insofar as these options are 
concerned is a common thread that runs through all but one 
of them: that is, how the relation between individuation and 
causation is to be characterized. As we shall shortly see, 
there are yet other options that reject the connection in 
question, with what success we shall see.
Confidence in narrow content as a solution to the 
explanatory role problem is eroded, as I suggested above, by 
the fact that it is only useful - if at all - in two cases: 
with respect to natural kind and indexical content, the only 
two kinds of content that fail to supervene. In cases where 
content does supervene, as we have seen, the extrinsicness 
of content generates the redundancy problem, a problem I 
have argued really subsumes the failure of supervenience 
problem, and for which narrow content fails to provide a 
relevant - even coherent - solution.
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The problem for content in explanation, once again, 
arises when classification criteria for content don't 
coincide with what has to be the case about causality and 
causal powers. And whenever content is extrinsically 
classified, this problem will arise - the point is, content 
can be so classified, and yet supervene. The mistake is to 
think that the only time content gets pulled apart from its 
causal powers is when it fails to supervene. Isn't it just 
grotesque to apply the notion of narrow content to cases 
where content did not fail to supervene (even if it weren't 
the case that it is defined in terms of non-supervenience)? 
Consider, again, formal or mathematical concepts; we argued 
in chapter 1 that it was just not possible to coherently 
consider these cases where the internal and external 
properties could be independently varied, what needs to be 
the case to get the failure of supervenience off the ground. 
Let the sceptic imagine trying to propose a notion of narrow 
number, or narrow truth-function, to provide explanatory 
generalizations in cases where, say, my twin means something 
different from me when she says "not," but what she means 
seems the same to her as it does to me.
Further, should someone confuse the wide/narrow 
categories with the distinction between weak and strong 
externalism, one will embroil himself in no end of further 
confusion. Among other things, the status of the problem of 
content's explanatory role may appear more accounted for
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than we have reason to suppose it is. Weakly external 
content is not equivalent to wide content: wide content is 
what varies in twin earth cases; what fails to supervene. 
And, as we spelled out in chapter 1, though it is the case 
that if it's wide it's weak, so to speak, it is not the case
that if it's weak it's wide. We might - if we could be sure
not to risk total referential chaos - stipulate a notion of 
wide* content: wide* content is to be understood in the 
sense of broad, global, extensive, sweeping - comprising, as 
we have argued, the particular and the abstract environment. 
When, however, wide content means what it is usually thought 
to mean, we would do well to remember that narrow content - 
at best - leaves much left over to be explained.
A final pedantic note. Fodor (1988, 27) says:
I am about to tell you two stories that 
you've very probably heard before.
Having once told you the stories, I will 
then spend most of this chapter trying 
to puzzle out what, if anything, they 
have to do either with commonsense 
belief/desire explanation . . . The 
conclusion will be: not much . . .
Indeed, contrary to the conclusion that 
I am driving toward, it is widely held 
that one or both stories have morals 
that tend to undermine the notion of 
content and thereby raise problems for 
propositional-attitude-based theories of 
mind.
The two stories are, of course, the Putnam/Burge twin 
earth cases, which, as we have seen, Fodor mistakenly takes 
to apply to all content. Be that as it may: another question 
arises. Contrary to Fodor's claim, it does seem as if
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externalism genuinely raises a problem for propositional- 
attitude-based theories of mind - even if, like Fodor, you 
take externalism to be defined in terms of twin 
earth/failure of supervenience cases. Isn't the dialectical 
progression in Fodor's argument just that since the ordinary 
kind of content at work in ordinary commonsense psychology 
is too wide to accommodate the causal constraints on any 
scientific explanation, that we need this other - narrow - 
aspect of content? The point is that the ordinary 
commonsense content at work in folk psychology isn' t narrow 
content. Fodor's claim that folk psychology can be saved 
from elimination by narrow content seems somewhat 
optimistic.
In any event, it may be that the very thing that Fodor 
takes as unarguable - namely, the causal nature of 
scientific explanation - is a constraint that ought to be 
relaxed in order to account for content's explanatory role. 
Clearly, as we have seen, all of the accounts that consider 
the criterion of individuation to be that of causation are 
faced with the problem of accommodating content's 
extrinsicness in a causal apparatus. It is unclear that any 
are terribly successful at resolving the problem. Let us 
consider two other accounts that distinguish individuation 
from causation and see whether they fare any better.41
d. Non-causal criteria of individuation
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When Fodor sets his agenda for the issue of content in 
explanation, he - as we saw above - meets with incredulity 
the idea that scientific explanatory taxonomy could be 
anything but causal. Some views regarding the problem of 
content in explanation, however, are attempts to recalibrate 
the individuation/causation relation in just the way that 
Fodor finds unthinkable. It seems fair to say that the view 
associated with Burge (1986) tries to make causal locality 
compatible with distal individuation, a somewhat more 
radical claim than views associated with Millikan (1984). In 
urging an altogether non-causal criterion of individuation 
in explanation, the latter do not have to overcome the prima 
facie incompatibility of intrinsic causation and extrinsic 
individuation, whatever the rest of their difficulties. 
Dretske's (1981, 1988) views, are also, I believe, 
reasonably represented here among those who claim that non- 
causal criteria of explanation can make more profitable 
headway with content's explanatory role problem.
The sort of view in question might be generally 
summarized as follows. While it is true that referring to 
content in what purports to be a causal explanation will be 
problematical, to infer from that it need be eliminated from 
psychology is to suppose that the only legitimate way to 
individuate for the purpose of explanation in science is 
causally. However, it is contended, this doesn't follow. Why 
can't it be supposed that it is legitimate to individuate
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entities in ways that are, in fact, not relevant to their 
causal powers. Among the sciences there are some - perfectly 
respectable - in which entities are individuated in ways 
that are not causally dictated. The mere fact that content 
and causation are not compatible is no reason to eliminate 
content from explanation - the solution is to individuate 
content non-causally.
Burge (1986) gives a sustained argument in defense of 
the thesis that individualism - understood as a view about 
how kinds are correctly individuated - is false for 
psychology. I will limit myself to comment on Burge's 
•metaphysical' remarks, as it is these that most directly 
address the issue of concern here.
Individualism - the view that what is within the
physical confines of an individual is all that can be
relevant to, among other things, his psychology - seems to
be a natural result of a causal constraint on individuation.
The individuation of kinds in psychology have to be causal,
so they have to be individualistic; there can be no other
way to accommodate the causal requirement presupposed as
essential to scientific enterprise. Burge, however, is
sceptical (1986, 9):
. . .  I shall assume that individualism 
is prima facie wrong about psychology, 
including cognitive psychology . . . the 
generalizations with counterfactual 
force that appear in psychological 
theories, given their standard 
interpretations, are not all 
individualistic.
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Burge summarizes two arguments against non-
individualistic accounts. These arguments, according to
Burge, presuppose the familiar Twin Earth cases. The first,
according to Burge, takes it that twins are behaviorally
identical, so there is no reason to suppose that we cannot
formulate explanatory generalizations to cover them, in
spite of the contextual differences that apply. The second
argument is essentially the causation argument with which we
are already familiar. According to Burge (p.13), proponents
of this argument take it that
the determinants of behavior supervene 
on states of the brain. So if 
propositional attitudes are to be 
treated as among the determinants of 
behavior, they must be taken to 
supervene on brain states. The 
alternative is to take propositional 
attitudes as behaviorally irrelevant.
Burge attacks the presuppositions of the first 
argument, arguing that the conception of behavior that is at 
work there cannot sustain an intelligible position. We have 
already made some points with regard to the subproblem of 
the individuation of behavior and its relevance to 
explanatory role problems, and must put further comment on 
this to one side here. Instead we will focus on one of 
Burge's attacks on the second argument; it is reasonable to 
suppose that these points can be applied to both positions.
The focus of Burge's criticism concerns the 
individuation/causation relation. The argument for 
individualism in psychology, according to Burge, proceeds by
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way of what he calls (p.15):
bland observations about the etiology of 
mental events and behavior. It is 
plausible that events in the external 
world causally affect the mental events 
of a subject only by affecting the 
subject's bodily surfaces; and that 
nothing (not excluding mental events) 
causally affects behavior except by 
affecting (causing or being a causal 
antecedent of causes of) local states of 
the subject's body . . . only if mental 
events (and states) supervene on the 
individual's body can the causal 
principles be maintained.
But this, he says, is confused reasoning. According to
Burge, there is every reason to suppose that the
individuation of explanatory entities in psychology must
meet causal criteria, but there is no reason to suppose that
it follows from this that standards of individuation are
individualist; that is, intrinsic, local, proximate: what it
is that causes have to be. Rather, he claims (p.16-17):
. . . there is no simple argument from 
the causal principles just enunciated to 
individualism . . . local causation does 
not make more plausible local 
individuation, or individualistic 
supervenience . . . causation is local. 
Individuation may presuppose facts about 
the specific nature of the subject's 
environment.
How does Burge make local causation and non-local 
individuation compatible? First, he urges care regarding the 
use of the notion of "affect," a preliminary to the 
examples that are meant to carry his counter-argument 
intuitively. The individualism argument proceeds by way of 
the claim that commonsense conditions on causality impose
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certain constraints on all that is involved in mental 
causality, both in the world-mind direction as in the mind- 
behavior direction. That is, the head-independent world can 
only impinge on mental events via the subject's body; and 
the only way for anything mental to be connected causally to 
some behavioral episode is for it to affect the body 
involved in that episode. Twin Earth cases are thought to 
pose a problem for content - and consequently suggest that 
psychology needs to be individualist - because the nature of 
such cases is to drive a wedge in between mental states and 
states of the body (recall that twins are intrinsically 
identical down to their molecular structure; but they do not 
share the same mental states). One way to put this is to 
say, as Burge has it (p.16): "events in the environment are 
alleged to differentially 'affect' a person's mental events 
and behavior without differentially 'affecting' his or her 
body." This is bad news for causal explanation, clearly, 
especially when what is supposed to be explained is the 
connection between what I thought with what I did: so 
psychology must be individualist in its taxonomy of mental 
states.
What Burge claims is that this line of argument 
equivocates on 'affect,' confusing causation with 
individuation. Events in the environment 'affect' in the 
sense of individuate a person's mental events and subsequent 
behavior; this does not mean, however, that such
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individuation fails to get implicated in someone's 
psychology according to the usual constraints; it is not the 
case, that is, that the body is not also causally 
1 affected.'
Burge offers a number of examples to illustrate his 
claim that local causation and remote individuation are not 
mutually exclusive: predominant among them is the notion of 
functional individuation. The relations involved in the 
movement of tectonic plates are all physical and proceed 
along the usual causal lines - but what counts as Continent 
A has something to do with its spatial relations; so that if 
the very same collection of molecules were to sink to the 
bottom of the ocean, or be mysteriously removed to Mars, 
there is no reason to suppose we would continue to count it 
as Continent A. Likewise, if the very same molecular 
configurations that in us perform visual functions were to 
perform menstrual functions in other organisms, then, in 
those organisms, they wouldn't be eyes. These examples are 
meant to show that we do not always individuate along 
causal, intrinsically supervenient lines.
The readily available literature is replete with 
parries and thrusts on the issue of whether psychology must 
be individualistic;42 I shall limit myself to a few 
remarks.
Burge, who, like others, takes it that his own 
versions of the TE cases are almost universally applicable
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(see chapter 1), fails to realize that content's failure to 
play a causal explanatory role is a question of more than 
its failure to supervene. His remarks about the 
individualism thesis in psychology all presuppose that the 
real problem stems from, as we said above, the fact that 
content's failure to supervene pulls it apart from its 
causal role, since it interferes with a reliable, 
generalizable, context-independent correlation of contentful 
states with intrinsic, physical states.
Now, we have already seen (chapter 1) that it is a 
misformulation of the main issue to suppose that the 
intrinsic states thought to be held stable betwixt twins 
must be physical states; quite apart from this, what Burge 
doesn't consider is the case of supervening content with no 
causal/explanatory role. Recall that the main thrust of 
Burge's counter-argument against the individualist is that 
there are non-individualistic modes of explanation - in, for 
instance, geology, physiology and parts of biology - where 
there is an appeal to entities that do not supervene on the 
physical substructure (1986, 19). The explanation adheres 
nevertheless to causal principles. But now what of the 
numerous cases of supervening but extrinsically individuated 
content? As we know, a causal role problem for such content 
arises for all that it supervenes. The fact that there are 
ways of individuating non-individualistically - yet 
causally - won't be of great help with respect to the
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problem of weakly external content: and, as we have already 
seen, there are a lot more concepts vulnerable to the 
redundancy problem than there are likely to fail to 
supervene.
In sum, we can object to Burge's position from a quite 
general point of view. The question arises why it is that 
extrinsic individuation is defended if causal properties 
have to be intrinsic. It is hard to see, given the adherence 
to the usual causal requirements, what motivates extrinsic 
individuation, save faith in the TE cases - faith that turns 
out to be exaggerated, as we have seen. Perhaps there is an 
independent reason for defending extrinsic individuation in 
the face of having to make it compatible with intrinsic 
causal requirements; but if so, it is not forthcoming from 
Burge.
e. Teleology
Burge tries, in a sense, to have it both ways, with 
limited, if any, success. There is another, less 
compromising view, associated with Dretske (1981;1988); 
Millikan (1984); Papineau (1987) and Stampe (1975;1977). 
Fodor veered close to once endorsing something like it 
(1984;1985), and McGinn once found something to recommend it 
with respect to the issues raised by content's explanatory 
role problem (1989).
This kind of view effects an adjustment of the
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individuation/causation relation so to comprise an idea 
familiar in modern accounts of evolutionary biology - 
teleology. I want to avoid detailed comment on the prospect 
for naturalizing content by way of teleology (for an 
exhaustive consideration, see Millikan (1984); also Dennett 
(1987)). Rather, I will limit my remarks to the way that 
teleological theories of content can be thought to 
recalibrate the individuation/causation relation and what 
results for the problem of content's explanatory role.
The claim, ultimately, is that citing the content of a 
mental state is to give its function, and this will explain 
why an organism does what it does. What does it mean for 
content to be individuated with respect to function? And how 
is this meant to circumvent content's explanatory role 
problem?
The idea is this. Things like organs, traits or 
processes are to be understood to have functions. The proper 
function of an entity is understood normatively: what it 
supposed to or ought to do. The key point is that the 
normativity has a relational or environmental element - 
organisms evolve characteristics in the fullness of 
evolutionary time in order to survive; so what a given 
characteristic is supposed to do is to be understood 
relative to this supreme need of the organism in which it 
resides. But, of course, an organism inhabits an 
environmental context, which supplies both what to exploit
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and what to avoid in the survival contest. The functions of 
an organism's constitutive parts therefore must be 
understood relative to the context in which the organism 
either flourishes or perishes. In fact, a rather stronger 
claim can be made: not only are these entities to be 
understood relative to the environment, they are defined 
with respect to the environment. So: a duck's foot is webbed 
so it can cope with water; cat's eyes reflect light so as to 
be able to hunt in underilluminated conditions; etc. The 
function of these entities is hence extrinsically defined: 
it is individuated by reference to things outside the 
organism itself.
Now the interesting and controversial claim with 
respect to content is that representational mental states - 
not just physical states - are themselves capable of being 
understood as having a proper biological function that is 
determined relationally. This is perhaps most easily seen in 
the case of desire. The desire that p has a function - that 
of bringing it about that the organism does what it has to 
do to get p. Sometimes getting p has crucial survival value, 
and sometimes not (the unfulfilled desire for food and water 
has earlier, quicker and nastier effects than does the 
unfulfilled desire for a date with Peter the aerobics 
teacher). The mental state is nonetheless determined with 
respect to something independent of the organism that 
possesses it. The general picture, according to McGinn
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(1989, 148), is this:
Evolution must install mechanisms which 
perform . . . interlocking functions of 
sensitivity to need and sensitivity to 
what in the world will meet the need: 
desire and perception are the solutions 
it has come up with, at least in 
'higher' organisms. The teleological 
theory sees in these basic relational 
functions the deep roots of content.
Belief comes into the picture as a way 
of guiding behavior in the light of 
perception so as to satisfy desires.
Thus the function of the belief that 
there is water here is to combine with 
perceptions of water to guide behavior 
in the satisfaction of the desire (and 
hence need) for water: the desire can 
only cause the right goal-satisfying 
behavior if it controlled by beliefs 
about the current state of the 
environment. In this way, the, the 
functions of mental states are absorbed 
into their content, thus incorporating 
the worldly items that the functions 
themselves concern. Teleology is what 
originally brings the world into the 
mind. It spans the divide.
Lots of complicated issues converge at this point: 
whether and how 'indication' is a part of mental 
representation; misrepresentation, original intentionality 
and derived intentionality; how it is that genuine 
intentionality can emerge from relational proper function 
(or, for that matter, from causal theories) - how, that is, 
that function can be thought to be attached to something 
propositional; purposes that go forever unrealized.43 
Fortunately, the only one that can concern us here is how an 
individuative criterion of content according to function is 
thought to overcome the problem of content's explanatory
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role.
The solution is thought to lie in the fact that
teleologically-individuated content is understood to have a
non-causal explanatory role. What explains why organism 0
did a is what his mental state s was for: and this must be
understood as world-involving, since organisms are
fundamentally environment-interactive instruments. The
explanation of O's behavior goes beyond mere mechanisms, as
his behavioral episodes are interpreted to be goal-directed.
Causal mechanisms are at work, to be sure, but, on this
view, they turn out to be explanatorily inadequate, since
they are just bedrock, so to speak: necessary elements in
the process of producing behavior - hence explaining it -
but not sufficient; true descriptions but not explanatory
ones. On this view, it is no surprise that there is a risk
to content on a causal criterion of explanation, since a
causal mechanism can never in itself reveal what it is for.
The basic form of psychological explanation on the
teleological account thus denies, in an important sense,
that explanations are causal, as long as causal explanations
are interpreted as descriptions of the workings of the
causal machinery involved. McGinn summarizes the point
(1989, 152-153):
The explanatory property - namely, a 
state with a certain content - is just 
not a 'mechanistic' property, any more 
than functional properties in general 
are. Reasons are not causally 
explanatory qua reasons, though reasons
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may in fact be causes. The causal 
mechanisms are in the head (literally), 
but reasons themselves are not in the 
head, since their contents are not. But 
in the same way the property of having 
the function of pumping blood to the 
muscles is not in the heart, since it 
involves a relation between the organ 
that is the heart and the muscles; the 
mechanism of that function, however, is 
right there in the heart. Functional 
properties of this kind are not causally 
explanatory either - if this means that 
they figure in the mechanisms that bring 
about the effects. We might more 
perspicuously say: explanation by 
reasons is not a species of mechanistic 
explanation, i.e. an account of the 
causal mechanisms whose operation led to 
the behavior being explained.
As we have already suggested, this sort of view is by 
no means uncontroversial; but adjudication of it and the 
other options for a solution to the problem of content's 
explanatory role is not part of our project here. Rather, we 
would only draw attention to the way in which this view - at 
least in principle - undermines the usual explanatory 
problem thought to arise when content is extrinsically 
individuated. It is not the case - so this view suggests - 
that extrinsic individuation necessarily interferes with the 
explanatory doings of content with respect to behavior. On 
the contrary, what could be more explanatorily relevant to 
an organism's transactions than citing the function of the 
implicated mental state? When we know what that state is 
for, we can also know why the organism in possession of that 
state did what it did: the explanation, roughly speaking, 
just falls right out of the function. Functional taxonomy
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is, of course, firmly and genuinely extrinsic, and, by 
denying that causal properties (though applicable) tell the 
relevant explanatory story, the teleological determination 
of content assures the compatibility of externalist 
individuation and explanatory role. The 
individuation/causation relation is thus, on this view, 
reconsidered in favor of function rather than of mechanism; 
with the nature of explanation itself following suit.
f. Rationalization; or the True Nature of Psychology
One line of resistance to the idea that content has no 
explanatory role to play in psychology, as we saw above, is 
to insist that there are ways of classifying explanatory 
entities according to criteria other than the tracing of 
their causal properties. This line of argument calls 
attention to the fact that sciences quite often are not 
solely concerned with identifying the causes of things, and 
taxonomize accordingly along non-causal lines.
There is, however, another line of thought that 
centers on the understanding of what we might call the true 
nature of psychology. This view has it that it is quite 
wrong to think that psychology is or ought to be interested 
in causation. Belief-desire psychology, in particular, is 
not a form of causal theory at all, rather, it is a 
radically different kind of understanding which involves a 
notion of rationalization. Explanation in psychology isn't
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given by causes, but, for instance, by what the reasons were 
for an agent's doings: why it seemed reasonable to him to do 
what he did, given his beliefs and desires. And this is to 
be understood entirely non-causally.
Such a view tends to go some way to undermine the 
worries about the explanatory role of extrinsic content. 
After all, as we have seen, these worries devolve on the 
inadmissibility of content's playing a causally explanatory 
role, given its remoteness from head-dependent causal 
reticulations. Extrinsic content, as we have seen, is quite 
literally not in a position to bear causal-explanatory 
burdens. Should we deny, however, that there is such a 
causal role for it to play, then the worries consequently 
evaporate. None of the usual considerations could count 
against wide (or wide*) content, since, on this view, 
psychology is not in the business of giving causal 
explanations.
Just to establish the atmosphere, we may take a brief 
look at the issues that appear to be at work in 
Wittgenstein's thought about psychology.
Wittgenstein's conception of psychology is being
fairly astringent. According to Budd (1989, ix-x):
Wittgenstein claimed that the science of 
psychology is barren and confusion is 
endemic in it. This is not due, he 
maintained, to the fact that psychology 
is a young science that is still 
struggling to find appropriate ways to 
investigate its subject matter. The kind 
of confusion that reigns in psychology
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is, he believed, conceptual confusion: 
psychologists are prone to unclarity 
about everyday psychological concepts 
and the sophisticated experimental 
methods they employ fail to deal 
satisfactorily with the problems 
addressed, which are really of a 
philosophical nature.
Those familiar with Wittgenstein's approach to 
conceptual problems will recognize his trademark: what is 
needed is therapy or remedy; with enough care, conceptual 
difficulties will be recognized for the misconceptions that 
they are. Wittgenstein is, of course, not alone among 
philosophers in maintaining that lots of what goes on in 
psychology is a waste of time.44
Where the contemporary philosopher of mind might, 
however, want to part company with Wittgenstein is over his 
conception of mental causation - such as it is. Wittgenstein 
appears to find nothing troubling about the view that 
psychological differences need not be based in physical 
differences; and he seems to deny the idea that mental 
events (like sensations) cause behavior. Budd notes (1989, 
72) :
Now it is hard to understand how the 
inherent suitability of sensations to 
play a causal role in the production of 
behavior could be accommodated by 
Wittgenstein in any other way than by 
regarding them as being physical events 
in people's bodies . . . But whatever 
the merits of the suggestion, it is 
clear, I believe, that Wittgenstein 
would not have accepted it.
This is borne out in Wittgenstein's clearly sceptical
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remarks concerning the possibility of there being a causal
connection between the physiological and the
psychological.45 Given this, the possibility of explaining
human behavior by reference to what happens to people's
bodies really seems a non-starter (1981,
#608;#609;#610;#613):
No supposition seems to me more natural 
than that there is no process in the 
brain correlated with associating or 
with thinking; so that it would be 
impossible to read off thought-processes 
from brain-processes. I mean this: if I 
talk or write, there is, I assume, a 
system of impulses going out from my 
brain and correlated with my spoken or 
written thoughts. But why should the 
system continue further in the direction 
of the centre? Why should this order not 
proceed, so to speak, out of chaos? The 
case would be like the following - 
certain kinds of plants multiply by 
seed, so that a seed always produces a 
plant of the same kind as that from 
which it was produced - but nothing in 
the seed corresponds to the plant which 
comes from it; so that it is impossible 
to infer the properties or structure of 
the plant from those of the seed that it 
comes out of - this can only be done 
from the history of the seed. So an 
organism might come into being even out 
of something guite amorphous, as it were 
causelessly; and there is no reason why 
this should not really hold for our 
thoughts, and hence for our talking and 
writing.
It is thus perfectly possible that certain 
psychological phenomena cannot be 
investigated physiologically, because 
physiologically nothing corresponds to them.
The prejudice in favour of 
psychophysical parallelism is a fruit of 
primitive interpretation of our 
concepts. For if one allows a causality
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between psychological phenomena which is 
not mediated physiologically, one thinks 
one is making a profession that there 
exists a soul side by side with the 
body, a ghostly soul-nature.
Why should there not be a natural law 
connecting a starting and a finishing 
state of a system, but not covering the 
intermediary state? (Only one must not 
think of causal efficacy.)
In short, the kind of conception of psychology 
arguably exemplified in Wittgenstein is one in which a 
causal role for mental states is simply not on the cards, at 
least via mediation by physical states. Whatever the 
independent plausibility or validity of this view, what 
concerns us is merely this. The extrinsic individuation of 
content, as we have taken pains to examine, has problematic 
causal consequences for content's explanatory role. Deny 
that psychology is a causal enterprise, however, and the 
motivation for finding an alternative to the extrinsic 
individuation of content for the sake of folk psychology is 
undercut.
One thing we might pause to consider is that there is, 
in fact, a plausible analysis of 'because' that might be 
adapted to the idea that psychology is not a causal 
undertaking. Suppose you want to know why a proposition p is 
true. Someone says, "it's because it follows from 
propositions q and r from a rule of inference I .' Now, this 
use of 'because' is hardly causal; rather, it's logical. 
Certainly nothing in any of this shows that the propositions
1 6 1
involved couldn't have wide or wide* content. So there is a 
precedent for a non-causal use of 'because,' and the 
'because' of psychological explanation might best be thought 
of as analogous. Maybe the most profitable emphasis 
concerning the nature of psychological explanation could 
center on the logical relations that hold between mental 
states and action, with the resulting explanatory role of 
mental descriptions being that of justifying these 
relations.
Now there is a conception of psychological 
explanation, associated with Davidson, that might be thought 
to have something in common with the more radical 
Wittgensteinian position, and which touches on the above 
points. Although Davidson's position on the issue of causal 
explanation is familiar, what is worth exploring are the 
implications for such a view on the issues raised by 
externalism and explanation. So let us briefly explore the 
convergence of these lines of thought.
The Wittgensteinian position might be thought to be an 
expression of the idea that there is some incompatibility 
between something's having a normative or rationalizing role 
at the same time as its being causal, a view, that, until 
Davidson's work emerged on the scene, was not without its 
defenders (see Evnine 1991, for discussion; also Davidson 
1980). As we have seen, it is hardly the case that 
explanation in mathematics, logic, or even fiction is not
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genuine explanation; but then it appears to have to be 
conceded that explanation isn't always causal. Now the 
objection that can be made to this is that the relation 
between events - say, a mental event and a physical event - 
is of such a nature as to impose unavoidable causal 
considerations; but we know that while causal relations may 
indeed hold of events, it does not follow from this that an 
event causally explains another to which it bears a causal 
relation.
Davidson, as is well-known, claims (1980, 3-19) that 
rationalization is indeed a form of causal explanation 
(p.3) :
. . . What is the relation between a 
reason and an action when the reason 
explains the action by giving the 
agent's reason for doing what he did? We 
may call such explanations 
rationalizations, and say that the 
reason rationalizes the action.
In this paper I want to defend the 
ancient - and commonsense - position 
that rationalization is a species of 
causal explanation. The defense no doubt 
requires some redeployment, but it does 
not seem necessary to abandon the 
position, as has been urged by many 
recent writers.
Now, given that there is a certain amount of 
controversy concerning exactly what, given his arguments, 
Davidson is entitled to claim - quite apart from what it is 
that he does claim - it is best to get the basics right. 
Rationalization is giving the reasons for why somebody did 
what she did - the beliefs and desires she had and for which
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she did what she did. The question is: is giving reasons a 
form of causal explanation - is it a form of causal talk at 
all?
Now - as we see in the quote from Davidson above - 
Davidson's thesis is, apparently, that rationalization is 
causal explanation. What complicates the situation is that 
in his (1980) he argues primarily for the view that reasons 
cause actions. And the trouble is, the latter does not 
entail the former.
The entailment doesn't hold for the familiar reasons 
that 'causation' is referentially transparent, but 
'explanation' is referentially opaque. So, as is familiar, 
it's possible for reasons to cause actions, but not be 
explanatory under those descriptions: either at all, or more 
moderately, explanatory under those descriptions but not 
causally explanatory under those descriptions. There is 
certainly logical room for the idea that reasons cause 
actions, and that the property of being a reason, though 
explanatory, is not causally explanatory, but, instead, has 
a sui generis justifying explanatory role.
Now, Davidson tends to conflate the two points in 
question (see Evnine 1991 for discussion); arguing that 
reasons not only cause actions but are causally explanatory 
of them. Certainly in (1980, 3-19) he takes it that if 
reasons were causes, then it would follow that 
rationalization is a species of causal explanation. And what
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further complicates matters is the appearance in Davidson's 
later work of the notion of anomalous monism.
One of Davidson's fundamental claims is that the 
mental is anomalous. Anomalism of the mental is the view 
that states and events - beliefs, desires, perceptions, 
sensations - are not covered by either psychophysical or 
psychological laws; laws that purport to govern, 
respectively, the relations between mental states and events 
and physical states and events; and the relations between 
mental states and events to one another.46
Davidson is unfazed by the seeming incompatibility. He
notes (1980, 207):
Mental events such as perceivings, 
rememberings, decisions, and actions 
resist capture in the nomological net of 
physical theory. How can this fact be 
reconciled with the causal role of 
mental events in the physical world?
. . .  I start from the assumption that 
both the causal dependence, and the 
anomalousness, of mental events are 
undeniable facts. My aim is therefore to 
explain, in the face of apparent 
difficulties, how this can be.
The strategy Davidson employs is to dissolve the 
supposed inconsistency of three principles: 1) that mental 
events causally interact with physical events; 2) that 
causality entails laws; and 3) that (p.208) "there are no 
strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental 
events can be predicated and explained (the Anomalism of the 
Mental)."
The anomalism of the mental results from a number of
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things taken together. Briefly, mental events and physical 
events do causally interact, and such a causal relation can 
be captured by a true singular causal statement. Causal 
relations are governed by causal laws. There are no strict 
causal laws that hold between mental events (qua mental) and 
physical events; or between mental events and other mental 
events. So mental events need be thought of as having 
physical descriptions under which they fall under causal 
physical laws. But the mental - qua mental - is anomalous. 
And this purports to make it possible for someone to be a 
materialist without having to violate reasonable intuitions 
concerning the distinction between mental and physical 
properties.
Davidson has been criticized for being rather unclear 
about the combination of the thesis of anomalous monism with 
his claims that rationalization is a species of causal 
explanation. In fact, many take it that Davidson is 
compelled to have to give up the idea that rationalization 
is a form of causal explanation (Evnine 1992) - in spite of 
the fact that he himself is explicitly in the business of 
defending just that connection.
We need to build up to this. Davidson (1980, 3-19), in 
arguing against the traditional picture that denies that 
rationalization is a species of causal explanation, argues 
also against the view that tries to distinguish causal 
explanation from rationalization on grounds that laws are
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involved essentially in ordinary causal explanations, but 
not in rationalizations. Davidson points out that Hume's 
doctrine that singular causal statements imply 
generalizations is ambiguous, and that the weaker 
interpretation fits both causal explanation and 
rationalization. And given that Davidson quite explicitly is 
taking himself to be giving a defense of rationalization as 
a species of causal explanation, it is clear that he finds 
in this line of argument support for the view that 
rationalization is causal explanation.
But this means that Davidson thinks that causal 
explanation involves laws. And putting this together with 
his thesis of anomalous monism generates headaches. The 
familiar criticism runs roughly as follows: if explanation 
always involves laws, but (by anomalous monism) there are no 
laws of psychology (of actions), then the psychological 
explanations got by rationalizations cannot involve laws, so 
rationalizing explanations are not causal explanations.
Such is a sketch of the background to the Davidsonian 
position. The thing to consider now is the connection 
between rationalization and causation in the explanation of 
behavior.
A behavioral episode is particular event, and only 
under certain descriptions can such an episode count as an 
action. Such descriptions involve an intention; a reason for 
the production and performance of the event in question.
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Standardly, actions are events intentional under a 
description under which they are rationalized; and it is the 
content of the mental states involved that give the reasons 
for them. The question I want to focus on is how reasons are 
related to the actions for which they are reasons. Davidson 
(1980, 3-19) claims that apart from the relations between 
content and the description of an action that make the 
former a reason for the latter, a further, causal relation 
need obtain so as to make a mental state the reason for an 
action. So, when one says "I refused him because he was 
ungentleman-like" the 'because' is meant, according to 
Davidson, to be understood causally. Reasons are therefore 
causes, and reason explanations are causal explanations.
As we have seen, this appears, on the face of it, 
incompatible with Davidson's claims about the anomalism of 
the mental - but, while Davidson denies that there are 
strict psychophysical and psychological laws, he does not 
deny that there exist psychophysical and psychological 
generalizations. So a causal role for content (reasons) in 
explanation is defended as a viable possibility.
Something in all in of this is worth taking a closer 
look at, however. We know that not all descriptions of 
events will be relevant to the explanations of those events. 
Not all descriptions of actions, thus, will be relevant to 
the explanations of those actions. Davidson's position 
appears to overlook a certain possibility. What if the
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intentional description of an action isn't causally 
explanatory?
That this might be so can be seen, preliminarily, in 
the following way. Davidson's position is that there is a 
causal relation (1980, 17): "what other relation could there 
be other than causation?") between content and actions and 
that citing the implicated mental state is to cite the cause 
in question. But the question that arises is whether from 
the fact that events have the property of being the (say) 
belief that p, that it follows that they have a or the 
causally relevant property. Certainly - and as we have 
mentioned in our remarks above - it could easily be the case 
that when you frame an explanation of an event you cite 
something that is a cause; but it would not follow that you 
cite that cause under a description that is a causally or 
explanatorily relevant description.
The upshot of these remarks is that, in spite of 
Davidson's assertions - and arguments - to the contrary, 
rationalizing explanation need by no means be or be thought 
to be causal explanation. A logically possible position is 
one that claims that although mental states are causes and 
enter into causal relations, it is not the case that mental 
descriptions need purport to be causal descriptions - they 
might instead purport to be rationalizing descriptions, 
functioning rather in the same way as a description would in 
the context of a mathematical or logical explanation. So,
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for instance, when we describe mental states in explanatory 
contexts, it is certainly possible that we just might not be 
interested in them as causes - though they happen to be 
causes.
He who holds this position is in a position to agree 
with mental causation, but would not have to agree that 
mental explanation is causal. He could claim that it is true 
that if one has a desire and one does something as a result 
of it, than that desire caused one to do it - it caused one 
to do it via the fact that something in one's brain token- 
identical with that desire caused one's body to move. But it 
needn't follow that the explanation of such an intentional 
action - given by saying ''I did it because I desired to do 
it" is a causal explanation. Certainly there's no entailment 
between 'A caused B' and 'B because A.' The 'because' might 
just as easily be interpreted non-causally.
This kind of view has - at least in principle - very 
different consequences for the bearing of externalist 
considerations on the future of folk psychology. Quite apart 
from the independent merits or weaknessness of such a view, 
it is clear that its proponents are under no obligation to 
cave in to externalist pressures on content-based 
psychology. On this position one could claim that all 
causally relevant properties in cases of mental causation 
are entirely internal to the agent; mental states 
themselves, on the other hand, are completely external (that
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is, individuated relationally). Mental descriptions are 
indeed explanatory - just not causally explanatory - so this 
separation needn't be troublesome to content-based 
psychology, as long as we think of its explanations as non- 
causal.
The Wittgensteinian position is a radical one: no 
mental causation. The above position - as yet unnamed - is a 
more moderate version of the same basic idea. On this view 
we allow for mental causation, but given that we understand 
the difference between causal relations and causal 
explanations, we can concede that there is quite enough 
logical room to deny that psychological explanation is 
causal explanation. If it is non-causal rationalizing 
explanation, then the pressure in the way of doing anything 
to eliminate content is decreased.
10. Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined two related issues.
The formulation of externalism defended in chapter 1 
requires a reconsideration of its consequences for content- 
based psychology. We have seen that the distinction between 
weak and strong externalism imposes a reevaluation of the 
nature externalism's consequences for explanation. I have 
argued that the relational or extrinsic individuation of 
content poses a general problem for the supposition that 
content plays a causal role in psychological explanation,
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quite independent of content's supervenience on internal 
states or its failure to so supervene. I have urged a more 
critical look at the real nature of the failure of 
supervenience problem, claiming that it is but an instance 
of the more widespread problem of content's extrinsicness, 
and hence redundancy, in causally explanatory contexts. I 
have distinguished the redundancy problem from other - 
superficially similar - cases of redundancy, and argued that 
objections to these fail to make the case against 
the notion of causal redundancy that I argue is the basis of 
the problem of content's explanatory role.
There are a number of responses to the initial 
argument that extrinsic individuation and causal role do not 
a compatible combination make. These I summarize and 
consider in turn, indicating which have more plausibility 
than the rest. I have avoided any outright partisanship, 
preferring to consider the options from a more abstract 
point of view. It turns out that the presuppositions at work 
concerning the individuation/causation relation have the 
result not only of distinguishing the alternatives for a 
solution to the explanatory role problem in interesting 
ways, but of shedding some light on the nature of content- 
based psychology as an explanatory enterprise.
That externalism has consequences for psychological 
explanation is an issue that is, at least in some sense, 
been well-worked in the literature. In fact, one could
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easily come to the view, given recent and familiar emphases, 
that externalism has consequences exclusively for 
explanation and for the issues of self-knowledge and, more 
generally, scepticism. What I argue in chapter 3, however, 
is that externalism has further consequences. As we shall 
see, both the nature of analytic truth and the notion of 
•semantic innocence' are subject to redeployment from the 
extrinsic individuation of content.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
1. The locus classicus for enquiries of this kind is 
Hume (1978).
2. Useful but flawed. See Kitcher and Salmon (1989).
3. Laws involving dispositions are notoriously 
controversial. See W. Salmon (1992).
4. There is a further issue, concerning the 
distinction between strict and ceteris paribus laws, which 
has received some attention in the literature (see, for 
starters, the debate between Fodor and Schiffer, 1991). I 
will be making some remarks about the status of special 
sciences below, an issue that classically involves that of 
hedged laws, but I do not anticipate becoming enmeshed in 
this controversy.
5. Wittgenstein (among others) seems to hold that 
mental states can't cause anything. See below, section 11.
6. A few clarificatory remarks about behavior and its 
characterization are indicated: for an excellent 
introduction to the issues, see Dretske (1988); and for 
further details, Burge (1986, 10-15 is useful). What 
explains behavior is relevant to the way it is described. 
Say, for example, that one presupposes or defends a non- 
intentional account; an account that makes use of ordinary 
physical descriptions. Given that non-intentional 
explanandum, the odds are there will be no pressing 
motivation to offer an intentional explanans, and vice 
versa. Dretske puts it like this (1988, p.83):
. . . what we are trying to explain when 
we advert to such content-bearing 
entities as beliefs and desires, is not 
the physical movements or changes that 
are the normal product of behavior. What 
we are trying to explain, causally or
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otherwise, is not why our limbs move but 
why we move them.
Now, describing an event as a behavioral event is a 
(weak) attempt at neutrality. This is because to describe an 
event as an action presupposes intentionality, something 
that we might want to avoid. Consider that one issue that 
could conceivably arise with respect to externalism is this: 
perhaps a non-intentional redescription of the behavioral 
event in question might succeed in removing the 
necessitating conditions for the problem of content in 
explanation. If the behavior in question is described in 
ways that are not externalist then it may not need 
explanation under externalist descriptions of mental states, 
which have such untoward explanatory consequences. If you 
describe something as a reaching for a then it is likely 
that you shall have to explain it in terms of having beliefs 
about a. Describing the behavior as a mere reaching, 
however, may avoid the problem entirely.
7. See also Stich (1978, 575-576).
8. The more general the problem, of course, the more, 
ultimately, we would have to consider abandoning either 
externalism or propositional attitude psychology. Any views 
I have about which one should go I reserve for another 
paper.
9. The locus classicus concerning narrow content is 
Fodor (1987), and most anything of Fodor's from 1987-1992. 
This notion has generated an industry: see the bibliography 
to Loewer and Rey (1991).
10. A claim at odds, of course, with the tenor of much 
of the literature on the subject, which takes failure of 
supervenience to constitute a general problem for the role 
of semantic content in psychological explanation. This is 
just a error, parallel to the original one concerning the 
head-independence of meaning. Just as Putnam and many of his 
commentators uncritically took his points to apply to all 
content, so further work concerning content in explanation 
perpetuated and compounded the original error by supposing 
that all content fails to supervene, so that content-based 
psychology in general was in hot water.
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11. Note that adhering to a TE formulation of 
externalism will interfere with a grasp of this point. As we 
saw in chapter 1, 'non-supervenience' is but one way of 
formulating the issue. Many commentators avail themselves of 
the singular thought formulation: see chapter 1, section 9.
12. McGinn argues (1989, chapter 2) that an 
interesting parallel argument, in effect, has been given by 
Field (1980). His argument that science ought to be done 
without numbers can be understood along these lines: physics 
is certainly replete with numerical references, but it is 
scarcely credible that it is numbers that are driving the 
causal mechanisms that are at work in, say, what happens to 
water when it reaches 0° Celsius. Numbers are abstract, so 
they have no causal powers, and, even if they did, they are 
extrinsic to the entities whose doings they are employed to 
characterize.
13. See Marcus (1971) for an interesting discussion.
It so happens that in Dretske's discussion of the 
individuation of behavior (1988, chapter 1), he makes use of 
a distinction between internal and external not entirely 
devoid of quasi-essentialist points to illustrate his points 
about systems, their behavior, and action (p.2):
A bee's stinging a child qualifies as 
bee behavior, as something the bee does, 
not simply because M (penetration of the 
child's finger by the bee's stinger) 
occurs. For this can happen without the 
bee's doing anything - if, for example, 
the child accidentally pokes its finger 
with the stinger of a dead bee. This 
would be a case of some external (to the 
bee) event's causing M. To get bee 
behavior, to have something the bee 
does, the cause of M (stinger 
penetration) must come from within the 
bee . . . the difference between Clyde's 
losing his job (something that happens 
to him) and his quitting his job 
(something he does) resides in the locus 
- in Clyde or in his employer - of the 
cause of termination . . . Despite its 
apparent crudity, the simple contrast 
between internally and externally 
produced movement capture the basic idea 
underlying our classification of 
behavior. If we have a well-defined
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ordinary notion of behavior . . . it is, 
with a few refinements, equivalent to 
internally produced movement or change.
14. An analogous point concerns the role of the truth- 
conditions of a belief in explanation. It has seemed to some 
that the truth of a belief is not part of its causal 
potential, and we can understand this to mean - with no 
violence to those views - that the truth of a belief is 
extrinsic, not part of, the relevant causal machinery.
15. In chapter 1 we noted an Anglo/American divide in 
the literature concerning formulations of externalism; 
predictably, the same divide reoccurs with respect to the 
consequences of externalism for psychological explanation. 
The contenders to take note of on this subject on the 
British side subdivide as follows: Boer, Evans, McDowell, 
Peacocke and McCulloch defend the view that, in their terms, 
folk psychology (at Ceast as it involves singular thought) 
is Russellian; Carruthers, Noonan, and Segal oppose it.
16. His example makes use of singular rather than 
general content: it involves the use of a demonstrative. The 
kind of example in question, however, can be extended - 
counterfactually - to the case of general content. It is 
this extension that results in the widespread problem of 
content1s explanatory role.
17. William of Ockham (c. 1285-1349) urged what is 
known as the principle of parsimony or economy as a 
methodological principle in explanation: "what can be done 
with fewer . . .  is done in vain with more." Following this 
advice is meant to result in the elimination of pseudo- 
explanatory entities.
18. And also, hopefully, to put an end to any further 
insistence on the point that formulation of the problem of 
content's explanatory role somehow essentially involves Twin 
Earth or failures of supervenience.
19. See below for a close examination of what this 
comes to.
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20. See Strawson (1974) and Evans (1982) for an 
extended treatment of this.
21. Of course there is controversy concerning the 
interpretation of counterfactuals with impossible 
antecedents - which doesn't mean there aren't optimistic 
views. See Goodman (1983) and Jackson (1991), for starters. 
In any case, consider that if God exists, he exists 
necessarily; nevertheless it is no violation of the laws of 
logic or anything else to ponder the question "if God didn't 
exist - though of course He does necessarily, then . . . "
22. Leaving no stone unturned, consider the still more 
extreme counterexample: Even if Descartes were wrong and you 
didn't know that you existed, but you still believed it, 
this would on the fact of it make no difference whatever to 
your behavior. I am grateful to Colin McGinn for this point.
23. Obviously, there are puzzles that arise with 
respect to necessarily existing entities like the empty set 
- these aren't relevant here. The fact that there is one 
necessarily existing set doesn't mean that any claim to the 
effect that if x is abstract then x exists necessarily is 
true. The only point I'm making here is that there is no 
legitimate inference from the fact that x is abstract to the 
fact that x is a necessary existent.
24. And surely it is unlikely that we want to rule out 
an explanation like "It has puppies rather than kittens 
because it's a dog," which is both perfectly good and 
adverts to properties.
25. I believe it is necessary to point out that the 
abstractness of abstract universals (as an objection to 
their role as properly externalistic entities) is really a 
red herring: and it's one, I suspect, that an exaggerated 
fidelity to TE formulations of externalism tends to support. 
Any abstract objects you can have beliefs about aren't 
anywhere (take numbers), but it just doesn't follow that 
issues to do with externalism can't be formulated with 
respect to them. As an exercise, compare what Frege would 
say about mathematical expressions with what a direct 
reference theorist would say.
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26. The problem of generalizing between me and my 
twin, however, is one that occurs only when she and I do not 
share the putatively explanatory content-bearing state: but 
as we have seen, this is a problem limited to two kinds of 
mental state, and loses much of its threatening aspect - as 
well as most of its allure - accordingly.
27. This line of thought might be understood to fall 
under a more general view, which goes as follows: on any 
understanding of truth-conditions, an explanatory role 
problem for content is generated; hence explanation must be 
formulated with reference to the syntactic properties of 
sentences or internal representations, properties that exist 
in tandem with semantic ones. No assignment of truth- 
conditions to propositional attitudes is required to account 
for their explanatory role.
This kind of view, of course, stands as an objection to 
an externalist account of truth-conditions, just one of a 
host of views concerning the nature of truth-conditions 
(consider: verification-conditions, truth-conditions as sets 
of possible worlds, coherence-conditions, pragmatic-success 
conditions). So something needs to be said about the 
relation between externalism - in particular, weak 
externalism - and truth conditions, in the light of this 
kind of view. In particular, we have to consider the 
question whether the claim that propositional attitudes are 
externalistically individuated is equivalent to the claim 
that they have truth-conditions. If this were so, there 
would be nothing particularly unique or interesting about 
the consequences of externalism for content in explanation - 
it is the wider notion of truth-conditions that forms the 
basis of the problem, on this view.
A few brief remarks will have to suffice. First: it is 
clear that an assignment of truth-conditions does not entail 
externalism, since such an assignment need not be made in 
terms of worldly entities at all (consider an assignment of 
truth-conditions in terms of images). Second: it is 
plausible to suppose that there are explanatory role 
problems for content generated uniquely by externalism, weak 
and strong; such problems would be specific to externalism 
and will not generalize to the problems raised by truth- 
conditions for explanation (although there may be points of 
contact). This line of thought is explored in this chapter.
28. A more streamlined way of putting the same point: 
even if the object or property didn't exist, the same 
behavior might be manifested, so the object of a mental 
state is irrelevant to producing the behavior. The external 
object is not part of the causal machinery in operation.
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29. The point to focus on here is merely that from the 
fact that the claims at hand make use of the terms 
'counterfactuality' and 'redundancy,' it shouldn't be 
supposed that what's at issue is motivated in the same way, 
or amounts to exactly the same thing.
30. See Fodor (1975).
31. I do not wish to be taken to be defending syntax 
over semantics in explanation here: in fact, I intend to shy 
away from any adjudication of this and related issues. Here 
I intend only to sketch the broad outlines of the various 
orthodox positions concerning content's explanatory role in 
order to situate the problem as I have formulated it more 
generally.
32. Lots of interesting issues proprietary to the 
philosophy of science arise here: the putative distinction 
between observational and theoretical terms and the notion 
of a bridge law, to name but two. See Churchland (1986); 
Hempel (1965); Kitcher and Salmon (1989); Nagel (1961); and 
Putnam (1975f), for an introduction.
33. Fodor gives the general idea (1988, 9):
Even if psychology were 
dispensable in principle, that 
would be no argument for 
dispensing with it. (Perhaps 
geology is dispensable in 
principle; every river is a 
physical object, after all.
Would that be a reason for 
supposing that rivers aren't a 
natural kind? Or that 
'meandering rivers erode 
outside their banks is 
untrue?')
Also useful is Salmon, M. (1989) for an overview of 
the notion of explanation in the social sciences, a 
discussion that proceeds by way of noting the difficulties 
with a reductionist program. More specifically, the debate 
between those who favor autonomy in psychology and those who 
do not is well-represented in the literature: see, among 
others, Fodor (1968 and 1975); Putnam (1975), Pylyshyn 
(1984), and Churchland (1986), respectively.
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34. It is particularly important, in fact, to 
distinguish TRP from both of these, since it is not 
immediately clear that these two views are so easy to 
distinguish from each other. On the face of it, it certainly 
does seem as if defenders of syntax are arguing in at least 
the same terms as those who object to special sciences. The 
syntacticians say: you've got two counterpart possible 
explanations: one in terms of syntax and one in terms of 
content. You don't lose any generalizations if you move to 
the 'lower' level (in fact, as Stich has it, you gain some), 
so the 'higher' level is explanatory excess to be 
jettisoned. That these views can be distinguished is not an 
issue I will to investigate here.
35. I leave it to the reader, as an exercise, to match 
the author with the view.
36. There are no doubt a host of versions, 
refinements, offshoots and tributaries associated with these 
views, notice of which we shall have to forgo. For the 
record, new directions have recently emerged: see Fodor 
(forthcoming, 1994); McGinn (1991).
37. Interestingly, Stich appears to consider the 
possibility that one way to save belief/desire psychology is 
to abandon the causal restraint on explanation in which 
those attitudes are meant to figure. See (1978, 582).
38. Stich has all kinds of reasons for thinking STM is 
better than RTM at explaining what needs to be explained.
See McGinn (1989, 127-129) for a criticism of the view as a 
whole.
39. Fodor has recently come about and struck out into 
different waters; see Fodor (forthcoming, 1994), where 
narrow content is, in effect, repudiated.
40. See Loewer and Rey (1991), for no end of 
criticism, also Schiffer (in Villanueva, 1992). But see also 
Fodor, (forthcoming, 1994) for the next, post-narrow content 
stage.
41. A few comments regarding so-called 'two-factor,' 
'dual componency,' 'two-tiered,' or 'dual aspect' theories 
of content are in order here. Some have argued that it is in
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principle implausible to propose a notion of hybrid or 
divided content; this, I take it, is supposed to hold quite 
independent of what notions go into the compilation of the 
hybrid. I myself don't see that there is any in principle 
objection to a hybrid notion of content, but that is a topic 
for another project. For a glance at those who agree, see, 
among others, Field (1981); Loar (1981); McGinn (1982). For 
those against, see, among others, Lepore and Loewer (1987).
In fact, I am sceptical that any viable solution to the
explanatory role problem for content will be possible save
in the light of an acknowledgment that the semantic 
properties of content are extrinsically individuated, but 
that its causal properties will have to be accounted for in 
other terms. Fodor, for one, explicitly claims that 
externalism is most likely right for semantics; what he 
resists is that this has any untoward repercussions for the 
role of content .- the causal role of content - in
explanation. He notes (1991, 6):
Externalism is independent of 
individualism because, whatever the 
explanatory status of broad content, it 
is not in dispute . . . that the content 
of my twin's water thoughts differs from 
the content of mine; or that 'water' 
means something different in my mouth 
and in his; or that these semantical 
differences derive from differences in 
our respective head/world relations.
Many of the proposed solutions to the explanatory role 
problem make use of a hybrid notion of content, even if 
implicitly, as we can see in the survey of the solutions in 
this chapter. What is interesting is that in spite of many 
protestations to the contrary, many of those who insist that 
content can't be hybrid, and who insist that criteria of 
individuation and causation stand or fall together (either 
internalistically or externalistically) end up, it seems to 
me, defending just such a hybrid notion of content. On 
Fodor's own view, for instance, content is most naturally 
and plausibly thought to be a hybrid: content is composed of 
narrow and wide aspects, factors, tiers, components. 
McDowell, for another, is explicitly dismissive of the idea 
of a hybrid notion of content (1986, 3):
. . . meaning what one does by a 
natural-kind word has been revealed to 
be a composite . . . Something's being 
the state of mind it is cannot be purely 
a matter of how things are 'in the 
head,' if meaning what one does by a 
natural-kind word is an example . . .
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[this] protects a form of the conception 
that has come under pressure: it 
incorporates a narrow psychological fact 
in a composite picture of the problem 
cases. Some version of this is often 
represented as the only possible way of 
accommodating Putnam's thesis. But there 
is, as we have said, a choice . . . Need 
there be a psychological state of that 
kind even partly constituting one's 
meaning what one does by a natural-kind 
word?
What McDowell calls for is the notion of object- 
dependent thought with which we were occupied in chapter 1, 
as the basis for a more general understanding of 
externalism. McDowell thinks anything less than this 
conception of content "fails to supply a satisfying account 
of the mind's directedness towards the world" (p.166). The 
trouble is, he makes the further point (p.3) that "no doubt 
what is 'in the head' is causally relevant to states of 
mind." And how this is supposed to square with his mono­
content view is anybody's guess.
42. See, for an introduction, Burge (1986); Egan 
(1991); Fodor (1988); and Segal (1989). Recently Fodor 
appears to have partly conceded that things other than 
intrinsic causal mechanisms can be relevant to explanation - 
see his (1994), forthcoming.
43. For much discussion on these and related issues, 
see Dennett (1989); Dretske (1988); Fodor (1990); and McGinn 
(1989), among others. The bibliographies to these are 
useful, too.
44. See Fodor (1986, chapter 8).
45. Wittgenstein also appears to be somewhat sceptical 
about there being a connection between physiological states 
and processes and mental events, because - somewhat 
alarmingly - he is not altogether sanguine about the 
existence of physiological processes at all (1980, #1063):
Thinking in terms of physiological 
processes is extremely dangerous in 
connexion with the clarification of 
conceptual problems in psychology.
Thinking in physiological hypotheses
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deludes us sometimes with false 
difficulties, sometimes with false 
solutions. The best prophylactic against 
this is the thought that I don't know at 
all whether the humans I am acquainted 
with actually have a nervous system.
Not to mention that it is "imaginable that my skull 
should turn out empty when it was operated on" (Wittgenstein 
1969, #4).
46. The claim that the mental should be anomalous, is, 
I believe, Davidson's attempt to embrace materialism while 
rejecting reductionism.
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CHAPTER 3
EXTERNALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
FOR
SEMANTIC INNOCENCE AND ANALYTIC TRUTH
Leibniz . . . was always engaged in trying to construct such 
a mathematical logic as we have now, or rather such a one as 
Boole constructed, and he was always failing because of his 
respect for Aristotle. Whenever he invented a really good 
system, as he did several times, it always brought out that 
such moods as Darapti are fallacious . . . but he could not 
bring himself to believe that it was fallacious, so he began 
again. That shows you that you should not have too much 
respect for distinguished men.
Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism
1. Introduction 
In the philosophy of language (as well as in related 
metaphysical inquiries) there is a long tradition of 
distinguishing meaning and reference. Theories of meaning 
and theories of truth; intension and extension; concept and 
object; connotation and denotation - not only are these not 
to be confused, but, depending on one's ideological 
presuppositions, one is thought to be in better shape 
theoretically than the other.1
This canonical ontological distinction is most 
explicitly captured in Fregean semantics, where it is put to 
work to solve an apparent puzzle concerning the semantics of
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expressions in intensional or so-called opaque contexts. It 
is also clearly what is behind the common-sense distinction 
between analytic and synthetic truth: the distinction, as it 
is often and most simply described, between truth in virtue 
of meaning alone and truth in virtue of meaning and the 
world.
Externalism about meaning, as we are now in a position 
to appreciate, reconfigures the distinction between meaning 
and reference. No longer is it possible to viably posit a 
conceptual realm, in some sense co-existing with and related 
to that of the ordinary world of objects, but autonomous or 
independent from that world. The world of reference now 
permeates the realm of meaning.2
We have seen that this account of meaning has decided 
repercussions for mental content and the explanation of 
behavior. In this chapter we trace the consequences of 
externalism for the semantics of expressions in intensional 
contexts, and for an account of analytic truth. The issues 
that concern us here are simply - the simplicity is slightly 
deceptive - put. First: given, as externalism about meaning 
demands, that the meaning of an expression is (at least in 
part) its reference, a minute but interesting consequence 
results for a Fregean account of the reference of 
expressions in opaque contexts. Such an account has been 
thought to violate 'semantic innocence' (Davidson 1980), in 
its claim that the reference of expressions in indirect
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discourse are the ordinary senses of those expressions: the 
senses they bear when outside of those contexts. The 
reference of an expression is an ambiguous thing, therefore, 
on Frege's account.
What I claim here is that one - unnoticed - 
consequence of externalism is to make it possible to 
recapture semantic innocence for a Fregean account of 
opacity. If meaning is determined by reference, then, when 
an expression refers to its ordinary sense in an opaque 
context, it - indirectly, perhaps - really preserves its 
ordinary reference. Semantic externalism makes it possible 
to deny that meaning, senses, intensions and the like are 
corrupt and exotic creatures, reference to which is perilous 
and unjustified by any properly hardheaded and virtuous 
semantics.
Externalism has further repercussions for the question 
of the nature of analytic truth. This is an issue of 
monumental controversy, much of which we can very 
fortunately set aside. What I am concerned with is this: 
analytic truth has traditionally been conceived of as purely 
conceptual truth with certain concomitant modal and 
epistemic properties - purely conceptual in the sense of 
independent of the world. As we know, externalism forbids 
that kind of conceptual autonomy, so the question arises: 
does externalism at last spell the end of analyticity? I 
argue the contrary: not only is it possible to give a
187
perfectly viable account of analytic truth from an 
externalist perspective; externalism also forces us to 
reconsider the very nature of analytic truth.
It is worth pointing out that both of these issues 
lead, often ultra-precipitously, into unsavory, and tangled, 
philosophical webs. Any number of presuppositions have to be 
made - and kept in mind - to keep the scope of my remarks 
from becoming unmanageable. I have indicated these 
presuppositions, where appropriate.
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PART ONE 
SEMANTIC INNOCENCE
1. Introduction 
Semantic innocence - the expression is due to Davidson 
(1984, 93-108) - is a view about the reference of 
expressions. It concerns, roughly speaking, not only the 
idea that the reference of an expression ought not to be 
ambiguous, but, in particular, that the reference of an 
expression should not be thought sometimes to comprise an 
intensional entity, and, the rest of the time, the mundane 
and ordinary middle-sized world.
Fregean semantics has been accused, by Davidson, of 
violating semantic innocence; indeed Fregean semantics is 
perhaps a paradigm case of such violation. Frege's strategy 
in accounting for the behavior of expressions in indirect 
discourse is well known. Frege maintains the principle that 
the truth-value of a sentence must remain unchanged when one 
of the expressions in the sentence is replaced with another 
with which it is co-referential. Expressions in certain now 
familiar contexts, however, appear to flout this principle. 
When, for instance, an expression in the scope of a verb of 
propositional attitude such as 'believe'is replaced with
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another whose reference is identical, the truth-value of the 
sentence seems subject to variation. Thus, although 
'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' co-refer, replacement of 'Clark 
Kent' for 'Superman' in
(1) Lois Lane believes that Superman is a hero
apparently results in a variation of truth-value of that 
sentence. Frege's solution was to conclude that expressions 
occurring in opaque contexts do not have their ordinary 
reference - rather, it is the ordinary sense of the 
expressions that, in such cases, comes to serve as their 
reference. Replacing 'Superman' with an expression that 
expresses the same sense in the sentence ('the defender of 
good from Krypton,' say), does not appear to have the same 
effect on the truth-value of a sentence as does replacing 
the term with one whose reference is the same but which has 
another sense. Frege thus preserves the principle of 
substitutivity; no variation in truth-value is held to occur 
between two belief sentences whose embedded that-clauses 
express the same sense.3
2. "Two Provinces so Fundamentally Distinct":
Meaning and Reference 
Davidson's comment on the Fregean account is notorious 
(1984, 93-108):
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Since Frege, philosophers have become 
hardened to the idea that content- 
sentences in talk about propositional 
attitudes may strangely refer to such 
entities as intensions, propositions, 
sentences, utterances, and inscriptions. 
What is strange is not the entities 
. . . but the notion that ordinary 
words for planets, people, tables, and 
hippopotami in indirect discourse may 
give up these pedestrian references for 
the exotica. If we could recover our 
pre-Fregean semantic innocence, I think 
it would seem to us plainly incredible 
that the words 'The earth moves1, 
uttered after the words 'Galileo said 
that', mean anything different, or refer 
to anything else, than is their wont 
when they come in other environments.4
Davidson alludes here to a familiar distinction: that
between intensional entities and more mundane objects of
reference. This distinction may be understood as based on
another, one that Quine (1980, 130) has described as:
two provinces so fundamentally distinct 
as not to deserve a joint appellation at 
all. They may be called the theory of 
meaning and the theory of reference.
The difference between the two theories is revealed in 
the separate and distinct ontologies to which each permits 
reference. The subject-matter of the theory of meaning 
includes meaning, synonymy, and analyticity; that of the 
theory of reference, instead, includes naming, truth and 
extension.
Now, Davidson is right: it is difficult to accept that 
expressions in opaque contexts are ambiguous in the way 
Frege's account suggests. At the same time, we might suggest
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that the temptation to think of such a shift of reference as 
particularly significant is strongest inasmuch as we think 
of theories of meaning and reference as discriminated 
according to tradition. Given that distinction, the 
reference shift that expressions in a that-clause appear to 
experience seems to be precisely a shift from entities 
belonging to the theory of reference to those belonging to 
the theory of meaning, these being disjoint provinces.
But we no longer tend to think so much of meaning and 
mental content as - in themselves - harbingers of the 
exotic. Familiar claims concerning extra-individual 
environment, both particular and abstract, have taught us 
that neither meaning nor mental content is isolated from the 
world of pedestrian reference in quite the simple way 
Davidson - in keeping with tradition - suggests. And if this 
is so, there is another alternative to consider in our 
account of the semantics of expressions in indirect 
discourse. Semantic externalism offers just the antidote we 
need to quash the temptation to separate meaning and 
reference and to provide an alternative account.
3. Externalism and the reference of that-clauses: 
exotica or the mundane?
We will consider expressions of the form 'x believes 
that p,' and argue that the determination to reject a 
Fregean solution to the problem of the reference of
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expressions in an opaque context varies in intensity 
relative to the perceived inextricability of the link 
between meaning and the extra-individual environment. If the 
link is perceived as negligible - if a theory of meaning is 
internalist - then we can claim that the view that 
expressions in indirect discourse take their ordinary sense 
as reference will rest on a distinction with some 
significance in that theory. Their non-standard behavior is 
based, in that case, on a theory of meaning that holds that 
the reference of a that-clause is determined essentially by 
sub-cutaneous facts about an individual; on a theory of 
meaning, that is, that carves a significant ontological 
distinction between what serves as the sense of an 
expression, and what its reference. This may well, with some 
justice, stiffen the resolve of opponents to a Fregean 
theory, given the deep referential ambiguity that is 
necessarily visited on expressions on such an account.
If, on the other hand, the link is perceived as 
essential - if, that is, what determines the meaning of 
words and the reference of that-clauses is held to be the 
extra-cranial environment - then we can argue that there 
will be no in principle rejection of a view that takes the 
reference of that-clauses to be their ordinary sense; for, 
on such an externalist view, the semantic values of 
expressions in a that-clause will be their ordinary 
references after all, or something that involves them
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essentially. There is nothing exotic about an expression's 
taking either its denotation, or what McDowell (1984, pp. 
283-294) has called its de re sense as reference in an 
opaque context, for, on an externalist theory, the cleavage 
between meaning and reference that Davidson appears to be 
presupposing does not obtain.
Now, there is another context for which the same point 
can be made: the context generated by the prefix It is 
analytic that. . . .  An examination of this context will 
show that analytic sentences are another class of sentence 
whose constituent expressions appear to invite the idea of a 
shift to their ordinary sense as reference.
Suppose 'p* is the analytic truth 'All bachelors are 
unmarried males,' and compare the truth-conditions of 'p' 
with those of 'It is analytic that p.' What makes 'It is 
analytic that p' true, on a Fregean account, are the senses 
referred to by 'p''s constituent expressions, since, in this 
case, 'p' is opaquely embedded. Yet what makes 'p' itself 
analytically true are the senses expressed by its 
constituent expressions - for 'p' is true, as we say, in 
virtue of its meaning alone. The truth-conditions of 'p' 
itself thus appear to involve the very entities relevant to 
the truth of 'It is analytic that p'; the very entities 
referred to by 'p' when 'p' is embedded in a that-clause.
This seems to correlate with the distinction we tend to 
accept between the nature of analytic truth and that of
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synthetic truth. For what is it that distinguishes the truth 
of 'p', above, from 'g', the synthetic truth 'All bachelors 
are happy'? The truth-conditions of 'g' are a function of 
the ordinary reference of the expression 'bachelor' and 
whether or not the predicate 'happy' applies. But 'p' is 
held to have a set of unique features5 that do not appear 
accountable for unless 'p''s truth-conditions are specified 
in terms of the senses of its constituent expressions. These 
features appear to depend on 'p''s truth-value being 
determined, as we say, independent of the world; in virtue, 
that is, of 'p''s meaning, and that alone.
Thus it appears that both the prefix It is analytic 
that. . . . and the prefix x believes that. . . . have the 
same influence on an embedded sentence; both, we may say, 
are reference-shifting operators. This suggests that the 
distinction we tend to accept between analytic and synthetic 
truth seems to be yet another distinction supported by the 
divide between meaning and reference described by Quine 
above. And, if all this is right, then the same consequences 
of externalism about meaning that we have claimed for belief 
will hold for analytic truth. It would seem difficult to 
deny that whatever is problematic about expressions shifting 
their reference to exotica in belief contexts could be any 
less so in the case of analytic contexts. So, although 
analytic sentences are sentences with distinguishing 
features of a particular kind, and, on the face of it, it
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does not appear possible that an account of their truth- 
conditions could fail to include an account of their 
constituent expressions' experiencing a shift of reference 
to their ordinary senses, nevertheless, we cannot accept 
reference to exotica for analytic sentences yet deny it for 
belief sentences. If our objective is to recover semantic 
innocence, it appears that we must expunge reference to 
exotica from an account of the truth-conditions of analytic 
sentences as well.
Let us consider what it is about internalist 
theories of meaning that encourages an ambiguity-favoring 
account of the semantics of expressions in the opaque 
contents generated by x believes that. . . . and It is 
analytic that. . . ., and let us see whether externalism 
about meaning does indeed deflate the "plainly incredible" 
view that expressions shift their reference to exotica when 
embedded in opaque contexts.
Belief, we are accustomed to saying, is a relation 
between an individual and a proposition with constituent 
structure. Different views assign different structures to 
propositions, largely as a function of what entities are 
accepted as relevant to an account of meaning and content. 
Thus, for example, the semantic analysis of (1), above, will 
vary, among other things, according to whether the relevant 
relation is held to obtain between Lois and a proposition 
whose constituents are the senses expressed by the singular
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term 'Superman' and the predicate 'hero'; or whether, 
instead, Lois is held to be in the belief relation to a 
proposition whose constituents are the very objects and 
properties denoted by those expressions.
We are not entirely unaccustomed to discussing 
analytic truth in these terms, and it is clear that similar 
considerations will apply to analytic contexts as do to 
belief contexts. In the context It is analytic that p, 'p' 
also expresses a proposition with constituent structure. An 
account of this structure will vary in just the same way as 
do accounts of the constituent structure of a proposition in 
a belief context.
The contribution made by the reference of expressions 
is what is crucial to determining the truth-value of a 
sentence formed by those expressions. Now, an internalist 
about content must claim that it is internal facts about a 
subject that essentially determine that subject's mental 
states. Her belief about Superman's heroism is quite 
independent of any environmental variations with respect to 
Superman. The mental state enjoyed in belief is, as we have 
said, commonly analyzed as a relation to a proposition. And 
an internalist has to say that the expressions embedded in 
the that-clause that expresses the proposition believed 
express concepts that have their essential nature fixed in 
isolation from the environment that contains the references 
of those terms. In transparent contexts, this split between
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what words refer to and what they mean is not as evident as 
it becomes in opaque contexts. The truth-value of a sentence 
in a transparent context is a function partly of the meaning 
of its words and partly of the properties of what those 
words pick out. But the contribution to truth-value of the 
ordinary reference of expressions is a liability in opaque 
contexts; for there, although expressions co-refer, 
substituting one for the other appears to affect truth- 
value.
And, at least for the internalist, there is an 
alternative. Denotation is only one aspect of expressions; 
they also have meaning, which is independently determined. 
Semantic internalism, operating as it does with a 
comparatively loose connection between what determines the 
meaning of expressions and what it is that those expressions 
refer to, is a theory of meaning where there exists the 
theoretical option of invoking something other than the 
ordinary reference of expressions to act as their reference 
in opaque contexts - namely, their meaning, which has 
distinct enough properties to offer a solution to a problem 
generated in those contexts by their denotation.
No such theoretical option exists, however, for an 
externalist about meaning, whose theory does not carve a 
decisive individuative incision between meaning and the 
world beyond the subject. But this implies that to hold that 
the reference of expressions in opaque contexts is their
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sense is, in effect, for the externalist to meet Davidson's 
plea. Expressions in indirect discourse ultimately take 
nothing other than their ordinary reference as reference, if 
the meaning of an expression is essentially determined by 
what in the environment it refers to.
4. The Varieties of Externalism:
The Account Applied
Within the externalist camp theoretical commitment 
varies.6 Theories of direct reference (TDR), one variety of 
externalism, hold that the meaning of an expression is 
identical to its denotation.7 Another variety employs, 
instead, the idea of a de re sense. De re senses enmesh 
particulars and properties, so to speak; they are not 
bearers of them in such a way as to be intrinsically 
independent of what they bear. What consequences could 
follow from these types of view in holding that the 
reference of an expression in an opaque context is its sense 
- since sense is determined by reference?
To speak of expressions in opaque contexts as 
referring to their senses is, on a TDR, to speak in a long- 
winded, perhaps partly ironic way - the fact remains that 
the reference of expressions in those contexts is their 
ordinary reference and nothing more.8 Further, the meaning 
of the embedded sentence in (1) does not change, since both 
•Superman' and 'Clark Kent' refer to the very same
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individual. These are terms with the same sense because 
sense is exhausted by reference and they are terms with the 
same reference.9
If the meaning of an expression is held instead to 
consist in the de re sense it expresses, its reference in an 
opaque context will be ultimately no less pedestrian. It is 
true that, strictly speaking, the reference of an expression 
in an embedded sentence is, on this view, a de re sense, 
which is not identical to its ordinary reference. However - 
and this is the key point - de re senses are essentially 
determined by and not independent of the objects and 
properties that are their bearers. If we think of these 
senses as media through which ordinary reference is 
preserved, then it is clear that, on such a view, it is the 
ordinary reference of an expression that genuinely serves as 
its reference or semantic value in an opaque context. 
Crucially, a de re sense is not to be understood as an 
entity unmoored from the world of pedestrian reference; and 
it is precisely such unmoored entities that Davidson 
repudiates as exotica. In these terms, then, we may say that 
a Fregean account of (1) is innocent of reference to 
exotica.
The apparent variation in truth-value between (1) and
(2) is accounted for, standardly, by the claim that 
expressions can share reference but differ in sense. A 
particular individual is the reference of the terms in the
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embedded sentences in (1) and (2) and it is he who, on this 
sort of view, determines the sense of those terms. Since a 
de re sense is not identical with the reference of an 
expression, however, it will not follow that two expressions 
with the same reference have the same (de re) sense. The 
troubles Lois generates by instantiating (1) and not (2), in 
spite of the fact that she is held to be in the belief 
relation to the very same singular proposition, are 
explained by taking this into account.
5. Opacity, Belief and Analyticity
Now, given the analogy we have pressed between belief 
contexts and analytic contexts, the same account must hold, 
with no untoward consequences for analytic truth, for
(3) It is analytic that Hesperus is Hesperus.
But if 'Phosphorus' replaces the second occurrence of 
'Hesperus' in (3), (3) seems, prima facie, to undergo the 
familiar variation in truth-value. Suppose, however, that we 
accept a TDR; if so, we do not seem to be able to deny that 
it is also true that
(4) It is analytic that Hesperus is Phosphorus.
A TDR holds that meaning is identical to reference; on
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this view, there is no change in meaning between the 
embedded sentences in (3) and (4). Further, since meaning is 
identical to reference, neither (3) nor (4) is any less true 
in virtue of meaning; although, again, to put it like this 
is to speak in roundabout way. It is worth mentioning here, 
that a sentence can be true in virtue of meaning in two 
ways: in a purely semantic sense, where the analytic truth 
of a sentence follows from the semantic values of the terms 
in the sentence, which are assigned to terms by semantic 
rules alone; and in a more psychological sense, where 
analytic sentences are held to be those sentences whose 
terms can be substituted for one another salva veritate in a 
belief context. Accepting (4) as true may grate less, 
perhaps, if we think of the embedded sentence as 
analytically true in the purely semantic sense. If instead 
we characterize analytic truth in the more psychological 
sense, then facts about the believer become relevant, and 
the apparent variation in truth-value between (3) and (4) 
can be explained by taking facts about the believer into 
account.
If, on the other hand, the embedded expressions are 
taken to refer to their de re senses, then, again, the key 
point is that the expressions do not genuinely refer to 
exotica, for, again, de re senses are not independent of the 
objects and properties that are their bearers. De re senses 
are, we may say, object-involving, if they are expressed by
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singular terms, and property-involving, if they are 
expressed by predicates. Thus, in (3) and (4), the embedded 
expressions refer to their object-involving de re senses. 
This view does not, however, commit us to the truth of (4), 
since we can allow, standardly, that two terms that share 
reference need not share the same (de re) sense. Further, in
(5) It is analytic that bachelors are unmarried males
we say that the embedded expressions refer to their 
property-involving de re senses: that is, the ordinary 
reference of these expressions is what individuates the 
senses they express; via the de re senses, thus, the 
ordinary reference of these expressions is preserved in an 
opaque context. Further, we can accept the truth of (5) in 
the usual way: two expressions can share both reference and 
sense.
6. Conclusion
The context generated by It is analytic that. . . .  is 
one for which it may seem as though semantic innocence is 
the last thing we ought to want to recover. If expressions 
in this context refer to their denotations or to their de re 
senses, then, given our earlier comparison of the truth- 
conditions of analytic sentences and those of sentences like
(5), the truth-conditions of analytic sentences will be
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specified, in the end, in terms of the world - just like 
synthetic sentences. Externalism about meaning may indeed 
block the theoretical option of invoking a realm of meaning 
alone, distinguished by a unique set of properties, to serve 
as what it is that the truth-conditions for this class of
sentence will involve. But, I would insist, it is far from
clear that it follows from this that there is no analytic- 
synthetic distinction.
I have argued that the theoretical alternatives 
offered by externalism about meaning appear to meet
Davidson's plea against semantic corruption in an account of
the reference of expressions in indirect discourse. And I 
have urged that our recuperation of pre-Fregean semantic 
innocence cannot be half-hearted. What goes for one opaque 
context must go for all opaque contexts. This suggests that 
our recovery will be complete only when we overcome the idea 
that analytic truth is an exotic kind of truth.
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PART TWO
ANALYTIC TRUTH
1. Externalism and Analyticity
Quine's scepticism regarding the notion of analytic
truth presupposes a - quite traditional - ontological
distinction between intensions, meanings, or concepts, and
the extra-semantic world. This is manifest in some
preliminary remarks of Quine's (1980, 21)i1
Kant's intent . . . can be restated 
thus: a statement is analytic when it is 
true by virtue of meanings and 
independently of fact . . . Meaning, let 
us remember, is not to be identified 
with naming. Frege's example of 'Evening 
Star' and 'Morning Star', and Russell's 
of 'Scott' and 'the author of Waverly' 
illustrate that terms can name the same 
thing but differ in meaning . . .  It is 
indeed a commonplace in philosophy to 
oppose intension (or meaning) to 
extension, or, in a variant vocabulary, 
connotation to denotation.
Quine's rejection of the notion of analyticity can be
understood as the claim that there is no reason to suppose
that a purely conceptual or linguistic element of truth can
be made sense of (1980, 36):
It is obvious that truth in general 
depends on both language and 
extralinguistic fact . . . thus one is 
tempted to suppose in general that the
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truth of a statement is somehow 
analyzable into a linguistic component 
and a factual component. Given this 
supposition, it next seems reasonable 
that in some statements the factual 
component should be null; and these are 
the analytic statements. But for all its 
apriori reasonableness, a boundary 
between analytic and synthetic 
statements simply has not been drawn 
• • • •
Recent developments in the theory of meaning seem to 
add further support to Quine's rejection of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction. Semantic externalism claims 
that neither meaning nor mental content can be determined 
independently of an individual's environment. Given 
externalism, to say that a sentence is true in virtue of 
meaning is to say, ultimately, that it is true in virtue of 
reference. And if all sentences are true in virtue of the 
world, it is difficult to see how we can even in principle 
distinguish some sentences from others as true in virtue of 
the world-independent, purely semantic entities that their 
truth-conditions involve.2
I believe, however, that semantic externalism exposes 
and challenges an uncritical assumption about the nature of 
analytic truth, one grounded in the traditional distinction 
between meaning and reference. According to this assumption, 
analytic truth is some species of linguistic or 'purely 
conceptual' truth. Quine is of course quite right to reject 
a distinction between sentences whose truth-conditions 
involve a linguistic or conceptual component alone, and
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those whose truth is settled with respect to the world. But, 
as I will argue, it is far from clear that it follows from 
this that there is no analytic/synthetic distinction.
What follows is an account of analytic truth from the 
perspective of semantic externalism. The truth-conditions of 
analytic sentences will not be distinguished from those of 
synthetic sentences; all, sentences, given externalism, are 
true in virtue of the world. It will emerge, however, that 
the truth-conditions of an analytic sentence are to be 
distinguished from what makes it analytic. This account is 
one that will revoke the customary world-independence of 
analytic sentences - but will not sacrifice their unique 
modal and epistemic features.3
A programmatic proviso should be noted at the outset. 
These remarks are not intended as an argument for 
analyticity; such an argument is a project to be pursued 
independently. Rather, the notion of analyticity as truth- 
value in virtue of meaning alone is here presupposed,4 in 
order to reveal an interesting consequence of semantic 
externalism.
2. Truth-Conditions and Analyticity-Conditions:
A Distinction
As we have argued (see chapter 1), externalist claims 
can be distinguished as either weak or strong. An account of 
analytic truth given strong externalism would, obviously, be
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unnecessarily restrictive, since, arguably, only a limited 
number of concepts are capable of strongly external 
individuation. Accordingly we will develop an account of 
analytic truth along the lines of weak externalism, and go 
on to consider some objections.
Two questions must be carefully distinguished: first, 
by reference to what are the truth-conditions of sentences 
like
(1) Bachelors are happy 
and
(2) Bachelors are unmarried males
to be given? What is it, that is, that determines the truth 
value of those sentences? Second, what is it that makes (2) 
analytic? In what terms, that is, are its analyticity- 
conditions to be made?
With Frege, we will say that the constituent 
expressions of a sentence have both sense and reference. We 
take the reference of singular terms to be individual 
particulars, and those of predicates to be properties 
(parting company with Frege). Further, we take it that 
properties are characterized by what we will call 
'structural complexity,' to be defined shortly. Now, it is
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objects and properties that are meant to individuate the 
senses of expressions given externalism about meaning. How 
does this picture of meaning constrain an account of truth 
in virtue of meaning alone?
The answer to the first guestion above need raise no 
especial difficulties. If meaning is determined by 
reference, then (1) and (2) have their truth-value fixed by 
the reference of their constituent expressions.5 We can 
focus on sentences like (2) for brevity. Such sentences are 
composed of general terms whose reference, as we have said, 
are properties. Now, given the characterization of a 
property as a mind-and-language independent entity with 
structural complexity of varying degree, we can begin to 
construct an account of the features that contribute to the 
semantic profile of those sentences we call analytic truths.
3. The Structural Complexity of Abstract Properties
First, we understand the structural complexity of a 
property to comprise: 1) its identity with other properties; 
2) its component structure - the simpler properties of which 
it is composed; and 3) the relations it bears to other 
properties. We take a property to have the structural 
complexity it has necessarily,6 and to bear either 
necessary or contingent relations to other properties in 
virtue of that structure. Accordingly, we say that the 
reference of the expression 'bachelor' in (2) - the property
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of being a bachelor - has structural complexity. One of the 
properties with which it is identical is the property 
denoted by the expression 'unmarried male.' Thus, (2) is 
true in virtue of the (improper) componential relation 
between the reference of its constituent expressions.7 So 
much for what makes (2) true - what is it that makes this 
sentence an analytic truth?
4. Property-revealing sense
In order to answer this question, we need to build up
to a notion of property-revealing sense. The best way to
understand this notion is by way of McDowell's notion of a
de re sense.8 Segal gives an useful and elegant summary of
the idea (1989, 41-42):
From Russell comes the idea that certain 
singular thoughts are object-dependent, 
in the sense that the object of thought 
(the object that the thought is about) 
is itself a feature of the thought's 
content . . . McDowell incorporates the 
Russellian idea of object-dependence . .
. into a basically Fregean conception of 
thoughts. A Fregean thought contains 
only Fregean senses as constituents. A 
Fregean sense is a mode of presentation 
of an object of thought, a way in which 
the object is presented in thought.
Since any given object may be presented 
in different ways, a sense cannot be 
identical with the object it presents.
The point of holding that thoughts are 
made up of senses is, of course, to 
explain how it is possible rationally to 
hold conflicting attitudes towards the 
same object . . . The synthesis of 
Russellian and Fregean views is achieved 
by allowing that Fregean senses may 
themselves be object-dependent. The
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thought that Viola is male contains, in 
subject position, a mode of presentation 
of Viola. But that mode of presentation 
itself owes its existence and identity 
to Viola. That sense could not have 
presented a different object, nor could 
it have failed to present any object at 
all. The object of thought thus figures 
in the thought under a particular mode 
of presentation.
Now, what we are claiming is this: while all senses 
are individuated by extrinsic entities - properties, 
according to weak externalism - it is not the case that all 
senses will be such as to reveal the structural complexity 
of the properties that individuate them. We will say, 
accordingly, that while all senses are property-involving 
(that is, de re, in McDowell's sense), not all senses are 
property-revealing. Property-revealing senses manifest both 
the (proper and improper) structural composition of the 
properties that individuate them and the necessary or 
contingent relations borne by those properties.9 And an 
analytic sentence, we will say, is one whose constituent 
terms express senses that reveal the necessary relations 
borne by the properties denoted by the terms.
How is the property-revealing function of sense to be 
understood? This is not so easy to say. Nevertheless, a 
number of clarificatory remarks can be made.
First, the property-revealing character of the sense 
of an expression is not a direct function of any syntactic 
complexity in the expression itself. One cannot, that is, 
distinguish the property-revealing sense of an expression by
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simply looking at the syntactic structure of that 
expression. Any correlation there is a contingent one.
We can enlarge on this point by considering some 
contrasting cases. First, take a predicate with, as it 
happens, syntactic and semantic structural complexity: 'is 
an unmarried male.1 Now compare the predicate 'is a 
bachelor.' Here there is no obvious syntactic complexity, 
but it would be difficult to deny its semantic complexity: 
it has the same complex sense as the syntactically complex 
'is an unmarried male.'
It is not the case, further, that the property- 
revealing function of a sense is a trivial one. Imagine a 
case where an individual - perhaps a non-native speaker of a 
language L - is aware that her community uses a certain 
word, say, 'bachelor.' She herself begins to use this word, 
but the descriptive content associated with the word by the 
other speakers in the community is, for some reason, not 
available to her. She would thus simply be using 'bachelor' 
as a label or a name she has picked up from others without 
knowing any descriptive information about its bearer.
Now, if we extend the claims of a theory of direct 
reference - one variety of externalism - from singular terms 
to predicates, it is clear that we may say that for such a 
speaker, the predicate 'bachelor' is property involving but 
not property revealing. The predicate, in her idiolect, will 
have sense; but not descriptive sense.10
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Thus, while it is true that it is on the semantic 
complexity of terms that analytic relations depend, it is 
clearly the case that not all terms will generate 
analyticities in the case of particular speakers. It is not 
sufficient that an expression has as its reference a 
property with constituent structure which is taken to 
individuate the sense of that expression in an essential 
way; for a speaker may fail entirely to associate any 
descriptive content to that expression.
Nor, further, is it the case that a term expresses a 
property-revealing sense context-independently. Whether the 
sense of an expression reveals the structural complexity of 
the property that, on this view, individuates it, is a 
matter of its relation to the other senses with which it co­
occurs in a proposition. An expression has sense and 
reference, and such reference has constituent structure, but 
this will not necessarily be revealed by the sense of that 
expression on its own (among other things, it would 
difficult to see how there could be different senses 
associated with the same expression if this were so). 
Instead, we want to say that the structure of the properties 
that individuate senses may be revealed in the relation of 
one sense to another. The structural complexity of a 
property, something that may remain hidden when one 
considers an expression and its sense and reference in 
isolation (consider 'water') may better emerge in the
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encounter of senses in a proposition.
Thus it is that the relation of senses to one another 
will sometimes be such as to manifest the structural 
complexity of the properties that individuate them, by 
displaying a property's (proper or improper) relations to 
another in virtue of its structure. It may help to consider 
that while it is true, following Frege, that sense is the 
mode of presentation of reference, it does not follow that a 
mode of presentation will illuminate the structural features 
of the reference of the expression, by which it is 
individuated.
It may be useful, in this context, simply to think of 
the distinction between property-revealing and property- 
involving sense to be analogous to the distinction between 
directly referring to an object and referring to it via a 
description. A descriptive singular term obviously 
contributes, in the act of reference, much more information 
about the entity referred to than does a mere label.
So, given an externalist individuation relation, we 
will say that senses sometimes mirror the structural 
relations of the properties that individuate them - by 
bearing those relations themselves. And, if all this is 
plausible, we are now in a position to entertain an account 
of analytic truth made in terms of property-revealing sense.
Property-revealing senses account for the modal 
features that characterize analytic truth as follows. An
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analytic sentence is necessarily true in that 1) it is true 
in virtue of the reference of its terms and 2) the objects 
of reference of the terms of analytic sentences are, as we 
have said, properties, which have the constituent structure 
they have necessarily, and which bear a number of necessary 
relations to one another as a result. So (2), above, is 
necessarily true on the view we have sketched, in that what 
it is to be an unmarried male is part of the necessary 
structural complexity of what it is to be a bachelor. The 
structural composition of the property of being a bachelor, 
we may say, necessarily comprises the property of being an 
unmarried male: the properties in this case are identical. 
What may come as some surprise is that analytic sentences 
will be, on this account, necessarily true de re.11
Property-revealing senses further account for the 
unique epistemic features characteristic of analytic truths. 
How is it that a sentence composed of terms that express 
property-revealing senses is a sentence knowable a priori? 
Recall that, given weak externalism, senses are individuated 
by properties and their relations; all senses are property- 
involving. For one class of sentence, however, the 
properties referred to by the constituent terms of the 
sentence will bear a (de re) necessary relation to one 
another, and, as we have said, a necessary relation will be 
borne by the senses individuated by those properties 
themselves, if those senses are property-revealing. No other
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appeal will be needed to grasp the structure and the 
relations characteristic of the properties that determine 
the truth-value of the sentence. Grasp of the (property- 
revealing) senses is sufficient. Propositions whose 
constituents are property-revealing senses are thus both 
necessarily true and knowable a priori. The sentences that 
express such propositions are analytic sentences.
5. The Account Applied 
The following examples serve to illustrate this 
account of analytic truth:
(1) PH20 is partly oxygen.' Here the properties 
referred to by the terms bear a necessary componential 
relation to one another: it is part of the structural 
complexity of the property of being H20 that it is partly 
composed of oxygen. The senses of these expressions reveal 
this structural complexity by bearing a necessary relation 
themselves. Grasp of the senses is sufficient for knowledge 
of the truth of the proposition. The sentence is, 
accordingly, an analytic truth: necessarily true and 
knowable a priori.
(2)12 'A fortnight is a period of 14 days.' Here 
the properties referred to by the terms bear a necessary 
component relation to one another: the constituent structure 
of the property of being a fortnight is such that being a 
period of 14 days is a necessary (improper) part of it. The
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senses of these expressions mirror the necessary structural 
complexity of the properties denoted by the expressions, and 
grasp of these senses is, again, sufficient for the 
knowledge of the truth of the proposition expressed by the 
sentence. The sentence is, accordingly, an analytic truth.
(3) 'Water is partly oxygen.' The senses of the 
expressions in this case are property-involving, but, while 
the properties denoted by the expressions bear a necessary 
relation to one another in virtue of their component 
structure, the senses fail to capture it; they are not 
property-revealing. The structural complexity of the 
properties - crucially, the necessary relations borne by 
the properties - is not graspable by mere grasp of the 
senses of the terms in this sentence. Accordingly, we say 
that the sentence is a necessary but synthetic sentence.
(4) 'There are puddles of water on 73rd street.'
In this case, the senses of the expressions can be said to 
property-revealing, in that they reveal that the constituent 
structure of the properties referred to by the terms of this 
sentence is such that they bear only a contingent relation 
to one another. The senses mirror that contingent relation 
themselves; but grasp of the senses alone is insufficient to 
know the truth of the proposition. The sentence that 
expresses the proposition made up of these senses is a 
synthetic sentence, contingently true.
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6. Objections and Replies
We may now turn to some of the objections that might 
be raised to the foregoing account of analytic truth from an 
externalist perspective. We will be chiefly concerned with 
replies to what seem to be three main lines of objection.
a. Externalism: Proper Formulations
The first sort of objection may be traced to a 
possible misunderstanding concerning the nature of 
externalism as a theory of content. It takes the form of 
resisting what may seem to be the prima facie implausibility 
of an account of analytic sentences whose truth-conditions 
are made in the same terms as those of synthetic sentences. 
This kind of objection goes more or less as follows: suppose 
one takes Fregean senses to individuate mental states. 
Fregean senses are not in the head; indeed, Frege was 
adamant about their abstract nature. The view that takes 
Fregean senses to individuate mental states is not thereby, 
internalist, and - crucially - such a view preserves the 
classic distinction between sentences true in virtue of 
meaning alone and those true in virtue of meaning and the 
world. Such a view, it is claimed, is externalist at less 
cost (a related objection takes the favored individuative 
entity to be a structured proposition; the gist is the 
same).
Now I take it as obvious that it is an error to
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suppose that internalism is circumvented by mere appeal to 
entities no one would claim are in the head to play the 
relevant role in the determination of a mental state. 
Something's being merely external to the head is 
insufficient to generate any interesting externalism. To see 
this, let us ask ourselves whether the following two 
accounts of the content of a belief differ in any crucial 
way.
One account specifies the content of
(7) Lois Lane believes that Superman is a hero
in terms of the belief relation holding between Lois and the 
structured singular proposition whose constituents are the 
individual particular Superman and the property of heroism. 
The other specifies the content of (7) in terms of the 
belief relation holding between Lois and the structured 
proposition whose constituents are, instead, the modes of 
presentation expressed by 'Superman' and by 'heroism,' where 
these do not involve the reference essentially. It seems 
obvious, in spite of the fact that both accounts specify 
belief as a relation to a proposition - an abstract object, 
one not in the head - that there is a difference in what it 
is that bears the individuative burden. As the controversy 
in the literature will attest, there is a critical 
difference in what each view takes to be the constituent
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structure of the proposition, a difference that is essential 
to the account - and to the theoretical slant of the account 
- of the mental state in question. Clearly, it is 
insufficient to employ a vehicle of individuation that is 
not itself in the head in order to be able to claim that 
one's theory is an externalist one: it is quite consistent 
with internalism about meaning that a mental state is held 
to be characterized in the grasp of an abstract proposition. 
For suppose that one holds that the grasp of a proposition 
depends solely on internal facts about the subject of the 
mental state. Such a view would seem to be unarguably 
internalist. In order for a theory of the individuation of 
mental states to pass muster as externalist it is clear that 
an account both of the component structure of the vehicles 
of individuation, and of the role played by those vehicles 
with respect to certain conditions of understanding that is 
consistent with externalist requirements, must be supplied.
b. Mentalism about Properties Opposed
The second and third lines of objection are somewhat 
related. One is a denial that an account of analytic truth 
that claims that the truth-conditions of analytic sentences 
are to be made in property-revealing terms could be properly 
externalist, since properties are abstract objects, and as 
such, are worId-independent. The other takes the form of the 
familiar claim that the relevant notion of a property is,
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essentially, a semantic one. If this were so, it would 
naturally rob much of the interest from our view, since it 
would effectively collapse it into the standard view. If 
properties really are just semantic entities, then claiming 
that analytic sentences are true in virtue of necessary 
relations between properties would seem to be nothing but a 
verbal idiosyncracy.
To deny that properties are of an essentially semantic 
nature is something of quite independent interest and 
deserves minute attention. Nevertheless, a number of basic - 
possibly familiar - remarks against a sense-property 
identity theory can be profitably made here.13 These will 
further aid in answering the objection against our account 
of analytic truth as properly externalist. Briefly:
(i) It seems implausible that there is no distinction 
between 'The carpet has the property of being red' and 'The 
carpet has the sense of the word 'red.'' Objects instantiate 
properties, they do not instantiate senses.
(ii) It appears to be in dispute, as Fregean exegesis 
attests, whether or not senses depend on language, but it is 
again implausible that properties do. If properties are not 
distinguished from senses, some commentators are in the 
position of defending the view that properties depend on 
language. Surely, however, whether the carpet is red is a 
state of affairs quite independent of our linguistic 
faculty.
221
(iii) On the usual criterion for distinguishing sense 
from reference, one must consider whether there can be non- 
synonymous terms that have the same reference. This 
criterion applies no less to predicates than it does to 
singular terms. Both 'water* and 'H20' are predicates with 
the same reference, but they do not have the same sense.
(iv) Consider sentences that express identities between 
properties. It would seem that to claim that properties are 
senses would be to deny that there can be informative 
identities of this kind. For instance, one standard way to 
distinguish
(a) Water is water
from
(b) Water is H20
is on the grounds that (b) is a synthetic necessity. The 
properties denoted by the terms are identical but the sense 
of 'water' and that of 'H20' are not; hence, classically,
(b) is informative but (a) is trifling. Suppose now that one 
holds that properties are senses. In both sentences the 
property denoted by the terms 'water' and 'H20' is the same. 
If properties are senses then the sense of 'water' is 
identical with the sense of 'H20'; not only that, the sense 
of 'water' is identical with the propery of being H20, the 
reference of both terms. The implausibility of such a view
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is shown, among other things, in that it surrenders the 
informativeness of (b) - not a happy result.
(v) Harking back for the moment to twin Earth, it seems 
that a sense-property identity theorist is committed to the 
following:
(1) that water is not H20. The fact that the sense 
of 'water' and that of 'H20' are not the same sense would 
render being water and being H20 different properties, if 
properties are senses.
(2) that water is XYZ. The communities of Earth
and twin Earth associate the same concepts with the word
'water.' The sense of both terms is thus the same; and if 
properties are senses, this would be sufficient to conclude, 
in spite of the fact that 'water' on twin Earth refers to 
XYZ, that water is XYZ.
(3) that H20 is XYZ. Both 'water' and 'watert'
have the same sense. But 'watert' is a word we've coined to
translate what twin Earthians call 'water* so as to keep 
things straight for ourselves. Crucially, what it is that we 
are distinguishing is that 'water' and 'watert' do not have 
the same reference. A sense-property identity theorist seems 
hard pressed to account for this move.
c. Externalism and Abstracta
Now, while the foregoing considerations may help to 
break down resistance to rethinking a sense-property
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identity theory, what is at issue, insofar as our account of 
analytic truth is concerned, is to claim a role for 
properties as entities of bona fide externalist 
individuation. Denying that they are essentially semantic 
entities is a start; but it might be further objected that 
it is their status as abstract objects that disqualifies 
them as the sort of individuative entities properly relevant 
to an externalist theory.
A few demarcations can serve as an indication of the 
line of argument we find compelling. First, we must find a 
plausible way to claim that a property, in spite of being an 
abstract object like a proposition or a Fregean sense, is 
not thereby a denizen of what some (Barwise and Perry 1983, 
4) have called a "third realm" of abstraction. We have 
already noted that if one takes the relevant individuating 
context to be simply what is not in the head, then senses 
and abstract propositions per se will count as vehicles of 
externalist individuation. And we have already seen that it 
is imperative to give some account of the constituent 
structure of these entities, for the theoretical character 
of a theory of content depends in some measure on what it is 
that is taken to constitute the grasp of a sense or the 
component structure of a proposition. Now, properties belong 
to the extra-cranial environment in this wide sense. Is it 
possible to place them more locally?
A useful distinction to draw in order to achieve our
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ends is one that distinguishes entities that figure in an 
account of mind, and whose characterization is intended to 
satisfy the demands of a psychological explanation, from 
entities that figure in an account of what we may call the 
scientific world, and whose characterization is intended to 
satisfy the demands of explanatory theories of this world. 
While it is true, of course, that theories about the events 
and state of affairs of the scientific world are expressed 
as a set of propositions, it is not the case that it is 
these abstracta that are the relevant objects of theories of 
the head-independent environment. Theories of this 
environment will take different objects from theories of 
mind, say, where propositions and other abstracta will 
figure as the relevant theoretical objects, as well as the 
vehicles through which the theory is expressed.
If we reflect a moment on the innovative nature of 
externalism as a theory of mind, the plausibility of such a 
distinction makes itself felt. The claim that the content of 
mind is shaped and essentially constituted by a reality 
distinct from, indifferent to, and independent of our bodily 
limits is not a lackluster claim. To say that properties 
individuate mental states might indeed fall rather flat as a 
theoretical claim if it were to turn out that properties 
are, for instance, essentially semantic entities with no 
claim to any interesting membership in the context beyond 
the cutaneous limits of a mind. It is in fact the essential
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distinction between heads on the one hand, and the events 
and states of affairs - the objects and properties that are 
the context in which those heads navigate - that makes 
externalism provocative as a theory of mind.14
The literature regarding properties and their role in 
the explanation of what we have called the scientific 
world15 has introduced the notion of a property's causal 
role in explanatory theories of the world. Properties, on 
this view, have causal properties themselves in virtue of 
their necessary structural complexity. Thus, for example, 
one way to explain the events and states of affairs of the 
scientific world is to appeal to the causal laws that govern 
that world in terms of necessary relations between 
properties. Properties are understood to have causal powers 
in virtue of their structure and the necessary relations 
they bear to other properties in virtue of such structure. 
Given this picture of the extra-cranial environment, it seem 
clear that we can neither banish every abstract object to a 
"third realm," effectively removing it from that context we 
take as having an essential mind-individuative role; nor 
need we accept that every abstract object is per se on a par 
with every other as far as individuative theses of mind are 
concerned.
7. Conclusion
Given externalism, analytic sentences are true in
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virtue of the world - true in virtue of the necessary 
structure and relations borne by the properties that are the 
reference of their terms - yet analytic all the same. A 
natural correspondence theory of truth is preserved, with 
the result that for analytic sentences, intension may be 
said to determine truth-value, not just extension. Truth- 
value is delivered through extension to intension; the world 
is not cut out.
We have seen that the characteristic modal and 
epistemic features of analytic sentences may be preserved by 
appeal to the notion of a property-revealing sense. Although 
their truth-conditions are made in the very same terms as 
those of synthetic sentences - world-involving terms - 
analytic sentences are distinguished by the way the senses 
expressed by their constituent terms reveal the componential 
structure and necessary relations borne by the properties by 
which they are individuated. Grasp of these property- 
revealing senses is sufficient for knowledge of the truth of 
these sentences: it is this feature that essentially 
distinguishes analytic sentences from synthetic sentences, 
both necessary and contingent.
In short, there is no opposition, on this view, 
between 'true in virtue of meaning' and 'true in virtue of 
the world' - the former is a special case of the latter. 
Analytic sentences express necessary truths as always; the 
difference is that the necessity is necessity de re.
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Analytic truths are knowable a priori, as always; the 
difference is that what is grasped is not a truth about mind 
but a truth about the world. This is of course how it should 
be: analytic truth is, after all, truth in virtue of 
meaning. Analytic truth is necessary truth about the world, 
knowable a priori.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3, Part One
1. See Quine (1980, 130-138).
2. To one degree or another, depending on what degree 
of externalism one espouses. More on this below.
3. In what follows we consider different accounts of 
the constituent structure of a proposition to examine the 
consequences of certain variations in the accounts. We 
understand Frege, familiarly, to take the sense of a 
sentence as the proposition it expresses: a proposition 
whose constituent structure consists in the senses expressed 
by the words in the sentence.
4. Barwise and Perry (1981, 387-403) also employ this 
particular segment to introduce their way of recovering 
semantic innocence. Our treatment differs in that the 
discussion is framed in terms of externalism about meaning 
in general, and extended to the question of analytic truth.
5. It is held to be knowable a priori and necessarily
true.
6. Situation semantics is, of course, another variety.
7. Salmon and Soames (1988) contains a number of 
articles that are the best introduction to a semantic theory 
of this kind.
8. An objection might be raised here that a TDR meets 
Davidson's challenge to exorcise appeal to intensional 
entities in an account of the behavior of expressions in 
indirect discourse only trivially, if at all. For how is it 
possible to claim, as we wish to, that a Fregean theory need 
not make an in principle commitment to an independent realm 
of distinct semantic entities to serve as the reference of 
expressions in opaque contexts, when a TDR does not support
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even the initial erection of the Fregean account? On a view 
that holds that there is nothing more to the meaning of an 
expression than its reference, it does not seem possible to 
claim that expressions in a that-clause shift their 
reference at all, let alone that the reference-shift they 
experience amounts to nothing untoward when the dust has 
settled. To meet this objection is not brief work; it 
raises, among other things, the issue of iterated belief 
contexts and I must defer elaboration to another paper. 
Suffice it to say that from the fact that an expression 
refers to nothing but its ordinary reference in and out of 
an opaque context, it does not follow that the sense 
expressed by the expression in and out of an opaque context 
remains the same.
9. A familiar complication that arises is, of course, 
that Lois may instantiate (1) and not (2):
(2) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is a hero
This is something to be explained by any theory that takes 
the meaning of an expression to be exhausted by its 
reference; fortunately, it is not the ins and outs of Direct 
Reference Semantics that concerns us here. The options are 
considered and perfected in, among others, a number of the 
papers in Salmon and Soames, 1988. The bibliography gives 
further directions.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3, Part Two
1. See also Quine (1980, 9;130).
2. We are accustomed to thinking of the difference 
between analytic and synthetic sentences as a distinction 
between sentences whose truth-value is determined 
independently of the world and those whose truth-value is 
not. Now, we might understand 'true independent of the 
world' to mean two things: either necessarily true - true 
independent of the way things are in any world - or, 
alternatively, true in virtue of entities whose nature is 
distinct from the world. The former sense of 'true 
independent of the world,' however, is insufficient for a 
distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences, for as 
Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975a, 215-71) have shown, we can 
countenance some sentences as necessary but synthetic. And 
the latter sense is thwarted by externalism about meaning. 
Clearly, if we claim that meaning is neither independent of 
nor isolated from the environment, it is doubtful that the 
truth-value of a sentence can be held to be determined in 
virtue of meaning alone, independently of how things stand 
in the world.
3. I have already acknowledged the controversy 
surrounding analyticity and I do assume throughout that 
analytic truths are necessary and knowable apriori. A brief 
comment on a notorious counterexample to the necessity 
condition might be useful, however. 'I am here now' would 
appear to be known apriori yet be contingently true: I might 
well have been somewhere else. Kaplan's distinction between 
character and content is useful in taking the sting out of 
this putative counterexample. As Kaplan puts it (1977, 71- 
2):
. . .  a truth in the logic of 
demonstratives, like 'I am here now' 
need not be necessary . . . how can 
something be both logically true and 
thus certain, and contingent at the same 
time? . . .  in the case of indexicals 
the answer is easy to see . . . the 
bearers of logical truth and of 
contingency are different entities . . .
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it is the character that is logically 
true . . . but it is the content that is 
contingent or necessary.
We might represent the distinction as a distinction of 
scope; that is, from the fact that:
(1) Necessarily, every utterance of 'I am here now' is a 
true utterance.
it does not follow that:
(2) Every utterance of 'I am here now1 is necessarily true.
4. See Kripke (1980, 39) for the working definition, 
and see Burge (1992, 9) for a useful exposition of the lack 
of consensus concerning the characterization of analyticity.
5. Familiar problems arise for an account of certain 
kinds of expressions when reference is taken to determine 
meaning: the problem of opacity is the most notorious. See 
Salmon and Soames (1988) for a useful introduction to so- 
called direct reference semantics. See also chapter 3, part 
one, where I argue that semantic innocence can be thought to 
characterize Fregean semantics - in spite of appearances.
6. Here I agree with Forbes (1989, 132). I should say 
that it was my misfortune to have worked out this account 
before I came across his book. I was no less elated (and 
somewhat relieved) to discover support for it there. This is 
not to say that I am confident that he would agree with 
everything I have claimed in this paper.
7. A distinction between proper and improper subset 
with respect to the constituent structure of properties will 
help to make this clear. We can understand some of the 
componential relations between properties to be improper, so 
to speak; to include the identity of properties as well as - 
the relation of proper parts of properties.
8. See McDowell (1984, 283-94) for a profitable 
comparison. McDowell argues there for what I would call 
object-involving senses for singular terms. I extend the 
idea to predicates, and claim that while all terms express 
senses that are property-involving, some of those senses 
will be property-revealing.
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9. The structural composition of a property is not to 
be confused with its essence.
10. Evans (1982) and McDowell (1977, 1984) were the 
first to suggest and defend a distinction between 
descriptive (so-called Fregean) sense and an alternative, so 
called de re sense. Briefly, the distinction turns on the 
relation between sense and its bearer. Frege argued that the 
sense of an expression could exist independently of the 
reference of the expression. Evans and McDowell deny this, 
defending a necessary relation between the existence and 
identity conditions of the reference of an expression and 
its sense.
11. One thing I take to result from this view of 
analyticity is the need for a reconsideration of the 
familiar categories of the de dicto and the de re as they 
apply to propositions. In particular, I believe that this 
view of analyticity recommends abandoning entirely the 
notion of the de dicto proposition. I pursue this in another 
paper.
12. I am grateful to Graeme Forbes for supplying me 
with this and the following example. He did also include: 
'Every number has a successor,' but I believe that this one 
is possibly more controversial. One might argue that 
mathematics is the sort of area where discoveries take 
place, and that it is more akin to a discovery about the 
nature of numbers that they in fact have successors, than 
anything about the meaning of the word 'number.'
13. There are others. See Putnam (1975b, 429-40). 
Perhaps, in addition, the standard debate concerning 
intension and extension has resulted in an unwarranted 
conflation of the sense and reference of a predicate. Since 
extension is not sufficient to fix the meaning of a 
predicate, given non-synonymous predicates with the same 
extension, intensions were invoked to satisfy the demand for 
the meaning of a predicate - but intensions are commonly 
held to be the property or attribute denoted by a predicate. 
This may be a case were convenience sacrifices clarity - or 
even truth.
14. See McGinn (1989, chapter 1) for more on this
point.
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15. See, among others, Armstrong (1983, 1989), Dretske 
(1977, 248-68), Shoemaker (1984, 206-33; 234-60), and 
Tooley (1987) .
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